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SUMMARY
This thesis argues that questions of ethical life,
moral identity, and gender are inextricably involved,
and that an appropriate conception of each is
necessary for the thinking of the others. In
particular it seeks to demonstrate that the way in
which freedom is conceived in its relation to moral
identity and ethical life has profound implications
for the thought of gender relations. It is further
argued that the writings of Kierkegaard open up a way
of relating freedom and the finite that offers the
possibility of re-thinking gender.
The writings of Rousseau and of Freud are examined to
show the interdependence of their philosophical
anthropology and the systematic subordination and
exclusion of women that operates in each of them. In
each case it is shown that, despite the very
different, and even opposed ways that they construe
the nature of moral identity and its relation to
ethical life, a parallel gender polarity is at work.
In Rousseau male moral identity rests on independence
from society and infinite, excessive freedom. This is
brought into relation to the mundane world of ethical
life through gender. Women are denied independence
and moral identity and made responsible for social
being. Their subordination is such that dependence on
them does not destroy the integrity of men. The
crisis of this unstable structure is demonstrated
through a reading of Rousseau's novel La Nouvelle
Heloise, the death of whose heroine is shown to be
the moment of collapse of the Rousseauean synthesis.
In Freud moral identity is achieved through the
identification of the self with social authority. The
finite freedom that can be thought in psychoanalysis
rests on a fusion of ethical and moral life. The
"depersonalisation" of the super-ego is the road to
liberation. Through the gendered experience of the
Oedipal drama this path can only be taken by men.
Woman are again exclude from moral identity, being
allowed only a "masochistic" relation to the Law. The
crisis of this structure is found in the notion of
the "archaic heritage", which it is argued,
represents a collapse of Freudian thought.
Finally both Freud and Rousseau are brought into
relation with the psychological writings of
Kierkegaard, whose distinctive notion of freedom and
faith is held to address the limitations of both sets
of writing. Infinite freedom is made to co-exist with
finitude. The implications of these writings for the
thought of gender is briefly explored through other
of the writings of Kierkegaard.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis argues that the ethical subject is
necessarily a gendered subject, and that the notions
of gender and ethics have deep implications for one
another. In particular it argues that the way in
which the social dimension of ethical life interacts
with the moral integrity and autonomy of the subject
is profoundly involved with the way in which the
relations between and respective natures of the sexes
i$ conceived. Central to this complex of problems· is
the conception of freedom, and especially the meeting
of freedom and limit, the limit imposed by human
finitude.
This argument is made through a reading of the texts
of Rousseau and Freud, two outstanding thinkers of
sex, love, and ethics in modernity. Their sharply
opposed ideas on freedom, ethics, and the
constitution of the subject are examined in
connection with their correlated theories of the
sexual difference and the connections between these
areas made clear. It is shown that in each case a
.systematic subordination of women answers needs found
in the thinking of the possibility of masculine
freedom, even though the nature of that freedom is
profoundly different in the two cases.
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It is shown that there is in Rousseau an idea of
integrity and independence that finds expression in
both the idea of the "natural man" in immediate and
simple touch with himself and nature, and the "free
soul" which forms the centre of Rousseau's religious
thought. This idea is at the heart of the Rousseauean
conception of freedom, and can only be brought into
touch with an organic sociality through the sexual
relation. The nature of femininity is social and this
provides the basis for the synthesis of independent
and integral masculinity and the social order.
The first chapter exposits the. character of
masculinity in this system of ideas, while the second
concentrates on the nature and role of the feminine
in its subordinate relation to the masculine. The
essential character of this relation in displacing
problems inherent to masculinity is stressed here.
The third chapter turns to the contradictions of this
constructed femininity, through a reading of .
Rousseau's novel Julie ou La Nouvelle Heloise. Here,
as nowhere else, Rousseau makes femininity the focus
of his attention, and in the cAreer·and death·of
Julie its impossibility is made clear. With the
collapse of Julie comes the collapse of Rousseau's
sexual synthesis.
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The next two chapters are devoted to Freud, whose
work has dominated thinking on sex and sexuality for
at least the last half century. In contrast to'
Rousseau, whose thought is characterised by attempts
to find stability in a flight from contradiction
Freud argues for the acceptance of and adjustment to
ambivalence, the dual nature of human beings. The
instincts of death and life are inextricable and
their conflict can only be lived and suffered, not
evaded. The resigned maturity of Freud's writing
expresses itself also in a limited and finite notion
of the self and its possibilities. Freedom in Freud
has a very different character to Rousseau's infinite
excess.
The first chapter develops this contrast, beginning
from a comparison of Rousseau's idea of the
conscience as the locus of moral autonomy and its
Freudian equivalent in the superego. It is shown that
where Rousseau posits an opposition between the
conscience and the social ·determination of ethical
idea Freud sees the superego as the internalisation
of a socially imposed law. In Freud liberation
becomes the:'rationalisation and "owning" of the
social law rather than its rejection.
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The second chapter on Freud looks at the limits of
ambivalence and of the liberation offered by
analysis. As in the reading of Rousseau this is
centrally concerned with the sexual difference. In
Freud the engendering of the self in the experience
of the Oedipal drama is also the moment of the
acquisition of the moral sense, of the formation of
the superego. The superego is formed in response to
the threat of castration, which is identified, by the
Oedipal infant, with feminisation. It is the first
moment in a "repudiation of femininity".
A result of the sexual difference is that the girl
never really leaves the Oedipal position or forms a
strong superego. It is shown that these, exclusively
masculine, achievements are necessary to the process
of maturation and winning of autonomy at the service
of which analysis is placed. Women are assigned a
"masochistic", passive relation to the law of the
father condemning them to infantile subordination.
The necessity of the terror of the Oedipal drama, in
which the sexual positions are established and the
"denfgr at Lon of'women rooted, is traced 'to the limit,'
of ambivalence. This is found in an external
opposition of desire (instinct) and authority. The
figure of this opposition is the primal horde, and
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the primal murder the beginning of the process of
internalisation of authority through which Freud
seeks to overcome it. However, the idea of the
"archaic heritage", the inheritance of the guilt of
the murder figures the impossibility of this
overcoming, re-enacted in every child's life.
The final chapter turns to the work of Kierkegaard to
indicate a way out of this impasse. The inability to
overcome the externality of desire and authority is
argued to be a result of Freud's refusal of the
transcendent moment of freedom, of spirit. This is
interpreted as a "clinging to the finite", as anxiety
in the terms established in Kierkegaardian
psychology. The Freudian finite ego, unable to free
itself of its position (the heteronomous social law)
and take responsibility for itself clings to the
finitude of its posited sexual identity in face of
the anxiety this entails.
In the final chapter this Kierkegaardian freedom is
contrasted also to the escapist excess of Rousseau
and its nature and relation to sex and to love
briefly consider~d. It is argued that the
Kierkegaardian concept of faith (of risk of faith)
and of the relation to the finite, provide a starting
point for the rethinking of gender that is necessary.
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PART I: ROUSSEAU
Introduction
The first three chapters of this thesis are concerned
with Rousseau, and argue that his theory of gender is
an essential part of his attempt to resolve two
intimately connected polarities that occupy the
centre of his thought. These are: first that of an
excessive and infinite freedom limited by the
possibilities of the finite body, which is dramatised
as the problem of passion, of insatiable desire; and
second that of a primitive and necessary need for
integrity and the systematic dependency imposed by
social life, which expresses itself in the most
important of the passions, amour propre.
The first two chapters present an introduction to
these issues in the writings of Rousseau. It is
argued that in his teaching of the necessary
difference between the sexes Rousseau resolves these
tensions by means of a displacement into the field of
sex. Freedom and integrity are made characteristic of
meri, while'women are held to be the bearers of a
natural sociality, with its roots in maternity.
Through the "moralisation" of the sexual relation men
are socially "bound" without thereby surrendering
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their integrity. Since men are accorded the dominant
role in the relation women's social nature is
incorporated, while held apart. This is reflected in
the different moral codes proposed for the sexes. Men
are responsible only to conscience, while women are
to place the opinion of others at the centre of their
ethical life. This is justified by their
responsibility to give men reason to respect the
social order, this reason being paternity.
The habitual conjugal love that, in the family, is to
provide the natural foundation of the social order
comes into conflict with a passionate love. This,
through the play of imagnation, represents the return
of the problem of freedom, of the transgressive
essence of the spirit, in the field of sex. Infinite
satisfactions are posited that no finite relation can
provide. The management of this problem is again
feminised. Women are so to manage romantic love that
it can be made compatible with the order of the
familiar.
The third chapter traces the working out of these
issues in che'textof'La'Nouvelle Heloise. It is
argued that in this text Rousseau follows through the
complex and difficult relations between his
philosophical anthropology, his doubled ethics, and
,,
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his thought of love. In the figure of Julie he
presents the struggle of woman to reconcile the
passionate force of love with the stable order of the
family. In this struggle the central importance of
the problem of humanity's dual nature becomes clear,
in its relation to issues of sex and sexuality. The
dichotomy of conjugal and romantic love is
complicated by the addition of a tension between a
bodily, sexual and a spiritualised love.
There is moreover a profound ambiguity over the
character of this latter, spiritual love. The
intimate connection between spirit and imagination
can be read both ways. It can be asserted that the
imagination is a faculty of the spirit, but equally
it can be suggested that spirit is a figment of the
imagination. While there can be little real doubt
that Rousseau believed in the reality of the soul
there is a strong and increasing tendency to read him
in terms of a naturalism or materialism. This
ambiguity is irreducible and is central to the
continuing relevance of Rousseau's writing.
In Julie's death these difficulties are ~~ystallised.
The attempt to synthesise the tensions inherent in
Rousseau's thought through displacement onto
femininity collapse. Julie's passion does not allow
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the stabilisation of a social order. It exceeds this
order, but crucially this excess is a religious one.
While it is true that sex plays a role, and one often
stressed to the exclusion of all else, Rousseau has
in fact demonstrated the possibility of a
reconciliation of sex with the order of the family.
What cannot be contained is spirit, or imagination.
Equally, and this is a common theme in recent
readings, feminine passion is too explosive. This
cannot be understood only in terms of "patriarchy".
What is here argued is that this patriarchal order
must be understood in terms of a fundamental problem
with the nature of human freedom, the impossibility,
in Rousseau of reconciling it with any stable order.
In Part II these themes will be traced through a
reading of Freud, who, it will be argued develops an
account of the relation to the law of the father
which makes identification with that law the
precondition for the limited liberation that analysis
offers.
The first chapter argues that at the heart of
Rousseau's thought. is the problem ~f human freedom.
In the second the working out of this problem is
traced through his acount of sexual difference and
sexual relation, which is shown to be inextricably
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bound up with it. It is shown that his notorious
double standard in ethics can only be understood in
terms of the dialectic of freedom, and that in it
woman is made responsible for the conditions allowing
an essentially irresponsible male freedom. Finally it
is shown that this resolution is an unstable one
which breaks down over the difficulty of female
desire.
Rouseau's concept of freedom, working itself out
through the imagination, is an excessive one,
breaking through whatever limitations it comes up
against. In particular this is expressed through the
insatiable desire he calls passion. Here the finite
and hence satiable physical needs of the body are
transformed by imagination into infinite and hence
'insatiable desires. One passion stands out above all,
amour propre. Passionate self love is the
transformed, social form of the natural amour de soi,
which being self contained is content. Amour propre,
recognising' others, becomes a passion for mastery and
condemns the social man to a ceaseless war of all
against all.
This perspective on Rousseau, which understands his
thought as centred on the problem of passion as an
expression of the transgressive power of imagination,
. ..
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as the foremost faculty of freedom, is then used to
illuminate the meaning of his political thought and
of his teaching on compassion and conscience. In
particular the focus is on Emile, the work where his
"system" is brought together. It is argued that the
social contract sets out the conditions of a
"republican" resolution of the problem of amour
propre but that both there and in Emile it is shown
that this possibility is closed for the modern
bourgeois European.
The response to this is the idea of the creation of
the "natural man in the state of society" the centre
piece of which is the education of amour propre to
self-dependency. This is the meaning of the turor's
teaching of Emile to adhere to a morality of
conscience. Any man who inhabits the social state,
and Rousseau recognises that all men must, that any
"return" to the fictional state of nature would
involve a dehumanisation, will relate to themselves
in the mediated form of amour propre. The correct
training of this passion, and of its relation to
compassion, will free it of dependency in this
mediation, and hence of the struggle-for mastery, 'by
makingJthis mastery internal. The compassionate
conscience is satisfied with itself and thus free
from the need for the regard of others.
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This teaching on conscience is to contrasted with
that of the Savoyard Vicar. Here the conscience is
not related to compassion and amour propre, but
rather derived directly from freedom. It is this
doctrine that was to influence the development of
German idealism through its reception by Kant. Unlike
Kant's though the Vicar's morality is essentially
sentimental. God, or Nature has made the free heart
such that it wills the good immediately. The passions
are the voice of the body and oppose that of the
conscience. Here a dualistic account, which derives
the problems of human existence directly from the co-
existence of a free soul and a finite body, is placed
alongside the more mediate one traced above, which
indeed the Vicar derives from his own.
What emerges, therefore, is that the manipulation
exercised upon Emile's sentiments is a process
comprehended by the Vicar, and by implication by the
tutor, but not by Emile and not in the main body of
the text. There the concept of freedom is principally
the negative one of lack of external restraint, and
conscience is thought of as sentimental. The concept
of freedom is hatdly invoked· even in its negative
meaning. By contrast the Vicar makes a positive
doctrine of freedom, as unrestrained conformity with
an essentially non-material nature the ground of the
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sentiments of conscience. Where in the education of
Emile artifice overcomes the problems of sociality in
the thought of the Vicar this artifice is expounded
as the return or recuperation of a buried freedom.
The relation between these two accounts, and the
meaning of their disrepancy has been the subject of
much debate, under the topic of "Rousseau and
religion". This thesis argues that those who have put
forward the interpretation that gives priority to the
natural religion of the Vicar are fundamentally
correct, as opposed to those who have argued for a
naturalistic account of Rousseau's thought, seeing
the Vicar as the spokesman for a religious belief
that his author has rejected. This stance will be
defended when the Vicar's thought is discussed below.
The first chapter is brought to a conclusion with the
observation that the onset of sexual desire is the
force that preCipitates Emile's movement from the
self-enclosure of childhood into the social being
that necessitates the education of nascent amour
propre.
The second chapter, which exposits Rousseau's
doctrine of sexual love as mediating excessive
freedom and the limits opposed by the necessities of
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social life, begins with the role of sexuality as
socialising force. The first chapter has suggested
that conscience as a morality of self sufficiency is
Rousseau's response to the problem of amour propre as
the drive to assert integrity and freedom through
mastery. The difficulty with conscience remains that
it cannot provide a stable basis for a social order.
The social order that corresponds to conscience is
that of the republic, but even here it is not
sufficient. Because men are to be psychologically
independent of one another they cannot experience the
intense affective bonds that are formative of the
republic, and it is for this reason that Rousseau
gives such prominence to femininity and maternity in
such texts as the Dedication of the Second Discourse
and the proposals for Corsica and Poland, where the
figure of the nation as mother is central. In modern
Europe, where republican patriotism and legitimate
law are impossible conscience is of necessity opposed
to the social reality of competitive civil society.
The masculine morality of conscience requires
completion by a feminine ethic of responsibility. It
is for this reason that Emile 'needs the carefully
prepared supplement of Sophie.
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The pattern reproduced in this marriage can be traced
in the Second Discourse, where a natural sociality of
woman is derived from the fact of maternity and made
the basis of the first stable social order, that of
the family. Men are attached to the mother-child unit
by sexual desire and this is the nucleus for further
social development. This closely parallels Emile's
propulsion into social existence at puberty.
Naturally independent men are socialised by their
sexual attachment to naturally social women. The
natural independence of men can be retained through
careful education, but depends, since it can only be
thus developed in society, on the sociality of women.
This basic dichotomy is expressed in the positing of
a fundamentally different ethical principle for
women. Where men should depend only on their
judgement of themselves women must make that of
others the centre of their conduct. It is their
foremost duty to win the good opinion of others.
Where self-relation is the centre of the lives of men
other-relation dominates for women.
This doubling is then brought into the heart· of the .
relation of marriage. Men must, if they are to remain
free in their relation to the women to whom they are
bound, have authority over them, but Rousseau is
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insistent that this authority must overlie the real
control of men by women. The latter are to manipulate
the former in order to get their own way without
ceasing to obey. Male autonomy is thus preserved
without its asocial principle undermining the
stability of an order opposed to it. The principles
of moral autonomy and social conformity are
reconciled through familial love.
At this point the freedom which has apparently been
domesticated returns through its primary medium,
imaginative desire, in this case specified as sexual
in passionate love. The basis of the family is a calm
love, which does not depend on imagination but only
on habit. This was the force in operation at the dawn
of the family as set out in the Second Discourse and
the Essay on the Origin of Language and it is the
ideal end point of family life. It is succeeded in
this case and preceeded for the modern (like Emile)
by passionate love. Here the object of desire is
transformed by the action of imagination into a
uniquely satisfying one that will still the restlesss
play of imaginative deSire. Since this illusion
cannot be sustained in' reali~y' this desire becomes a
disruptor of the calm of family life.
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In this return of the excess~ve moment of freedom the
sexual difference is again deployed to reconcile it
with the enduring social order. Through the virtue of
modesty women are to preserve the illusion of passion
for as long as possible in order that its place may
be taken by habit when it finally passes away. No
similar action is to be taken in respect of female
passion, since women have a natural interest in
sustaining marriage. Where desire is the ground of
attachment in the case of men, a natural sociality
based on maternity fulfills this role for women. The
manipulation of men by women noted above thus gains
another dimension in the realm of sexual desire.
Male autonomy has been shown to depend in Rousseau on
its manipulation by non-autonomous female sociality.
The third chapter is a reading of Rousseau's novel La
Nouvelle Heloise, which shows that not only do all
the themes developed in the present chapter appear in
particularly clear form in this text, but that the
·contradictions of a freedom that depends on its
manipulation are exposed in the collapse of the
heroine. Julie's death concentrates the difficulties
of Rousseau's attempt to reconcile an excessive'
freedom with the limits of human social existence.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM.
This chapter argues that Rousseau's political thought
and his teaching on conscience must be understood in
relation to the problem of freedom. This problem is a
controversial one in the interpretive literature,
with Horowitz, who gives an excellent summary of the
debate1' arguing that Rousseau's "conscience" should
be interpreted as a proto-Freudian internalisation of
repression. In general much of the recent literature
has emphasised Rousseau's political writings to the
extent that the ontological problem of freedom, made
central here, is neglected. 2. Dent's careful study
notes this tendency and sets out deliberately to
combat it. In a spirit close to that of this thesis
be argues that Rousseau's central preoccupation is
with the difficulty of reconciling freedom and order,
to which he gives a wide meaning, extending it into
psychology.
In the older literature the problem of freedom was
made central in the neo-Kantian interpretation of
which Cassirer is the fOEemost exponent. This line
suffers, however, from a tendency to over-rationalise
Rousseau's distinctive position in the direction of a
pre-Kantianism. This leads to a distortion of
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Rousseau's thought and especially a neglect or
exclusion of the importance of affective factors,
which will be the focus of the second chapter.
Starobinski's classic study identifies a radical
freedom as crucial to Rousseau3 but does not trace
this through the problem of passion as is done here.
This is a consequence of the primarily personal-
psychological orientation of that work. It is in the
work of Derrida, who brilliantly extends Starobinski,
and of De Man, that the problems of the
transformation of need through imagination, and of
radical freedom receive the profoundest attention,
and to the former in particular this thesis is deeply
indebted. Derrida's attention to the centrality of
gender in relation to the question of moral identity,
and De Man's to the radicality with which the notion
of freedom in Rousseau questions the integrity of the
subject are of the greatest importance in the reading
of Rousseau.
Power and desire.
Nes·r the beginning of Book II of Emile Rousseau
discusses the conditions for human happiness and
unhappiness. This polarity is at all times the guide
in his investigations and this statement at the
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beginning 'of his consideration of Emile "as a moral
being"4 is crucial to the understanding, not only of
the project of this text, but of Rousseau's writing
as a whole.
He begins with the proposition "Always more suffering
than enjoyment; this relation between the two is
common to all men. Man's felicity on earth is, hence,
only a negative condition; the smallest number of
ills he can suffer ought to constitute its measure."S
The reason for this is to be found in the conception
of man's existence on earth as a compound and divided
state, riven with tensions and to be contrasted with
two fundamental sources of antagonism: the strain of
freedom constrained in a finite body; and the problem
of individual and society. These are specified by
Rousseau through the doctrine of passion, and most
particularly through that of the most important of
the passions, amour propre, self love mediated
through others.
The idea of unhappiness, which has'been given
priority over that of happiness, a relation that will
b. reversed in ~he context "of a consideration of
nature, is analysed in terms of the proportionality
of desire and power.
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Every feeling of pain is inseparable from the
desire to be delivered from itj every idea of
pleasure is inseparable from the desire to enjoy
it; every desire supposes privation, and all
sensed privations are painful. Our unhappiness
consists, therefore, in the disproportion between
our desires and our faculties. A being endowed
with senses whose faculties equalled his desires
would be an absolutely happy being.6
This ideal of a balance of power and desire is
recurrent through all of Rousseau's writing. Human
wisdom is in "diminishing the excess of the desires
over the faculties and putting power and will in
perfect equality"7 As he notes in the passage under
consideration there are two ways in which this might
be achieved, diminishing the desires or extending the
powers. In mapping out a strategy for achieving his
end Rousseau must offer some suggestion as to how
this might be achieved. This will involve accounts
both of the formation of desire and of the
development of human power, and of the relation
between these. The key to this is the distinction
between the natural and the artifi¢ial.
The natural in Rousseau has the status of a reductive
ideal. The natural man is integral, simple, and
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happy. His opposite is the social man, partial,
complex, and unhappy: "Natural man is entirely for
himself. He is numerical unity, the absolute whole
which is relative only to itself or its kind. Civil
man is only a fractional unity dependent on the
denominator."S The education of Emile is intended to
recreate this natural man in the modern world. But:
"There is a great difference between the natural man
living in the state of nature and the natural man
living in the state of societY."9 It will be
necessary below to return to the latter case, but to
understand it, it is necessary first to grasp the
distinction between the natural man in the state of
nature and "civil man".
[N]ature, which does everything for the best •• in
the beginning •• gives [man] with immediacy only
the desires necessary for his preservation and the
faculties sufficient to satisfy them. It put all
the others, as it were, in reserve in the depth of
his soul, to be developed there when needed. Only
in this original state are power and desire in .
equilibrium and man is not unhappy. As soon as his
potential faculties are put in action,
imagination, the most active of all, is awakened
and outstrips them. It is imagination which
extends for us the measure of the possible,
whether for good or bad, and which consequently
excites and nourishes the desires by the hope of
satisfying them ••• [O]ne exhausts oneself without
getting to the end, and the more one gains in
enjoyment, the further happiness gets from us.10. .
In this paragraph Rousseau expresses the essence of
the doctrine of the state of nature as developed in
the 'Discourse on the Origins of Inequality'. In that
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work he develops an extremely radical version of the
state of nature hypothesis that distinguishes it
sharply from that of a liberal like Locke. Rousseau
breaks with a liberal and individualistic state of
nature argument by effectively identifying the human
and the social.11 The natural "man" is in fact a
proto-human, incapable of thought, of language, of
recognising others like himself as such, even of the
continuous existence through memory that constitutes
the identity necessary for moral being. "His soul,
which nothing disturbs, is wholly wrapped up in his
present existence, without any idea of the future,
however near at hand."12
For this simple forest creature power and desire are,
as indicated in the passage quoted above from Emile,
perfectly balanced: "The produce of the earth
furnished him with all he needed, and instinct told
him how to use it." 13 There is an il1lDediacyhere and
a finitude, which prevents the opening of the space
of desire, of the privation presupposed by desire.
Equally this precludes the gap between self and world
in which labour exists. Instinct, either his own or
that of'other creatures appropri~ted in imitation14' .~
was sufficient. This pre-human lives in undisturbed
harmony with himself and with his world. He is finite
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and capable of the kind of complete satisfaction that
his modern successors can never know.
He is, however, to be distinguished from the animals
by the possession of certain faculties "in reserve in
the depth of his soul"l5:
I see nothing in any animal but an ingenious
machine •• I perceive exactly the same thing in
the human machine, with this difference, that in
the operations of the brute, nature is the sole
agent, whereas man has some share in his own
operations in his character as a free agent. The
one chooses and refuses by instinct, the other
from an act of free will: hence the brute cannot
deviate from the rule prescribed to it, even when
it would be advantageous for it to do so; and, on
the contrary, man frequently deviates from such
rules to his own prejudice.l6
It is this freedom of the human even in his primitive
state where: "To will and not to will, to desire and
to fear, must the first, and almost the only
operations of his soul"l7which allows him first to
imitate other animals and later to develop labour
processes and the dormant faculties of his soul. It
is expressed in the possibility of transforming
himself and his world that Rousseau calls his
"perfectibilitY"lS·
Crucial in this is the transformation of the nature
of desire. The simple physical wants of the human
animal are acted upon by the imagination to produce
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the passions. "As soon as his potential faculties are
put in action, imagination, the most active of all,
is awakened and outstrips them. It is imagination
which extends for us the measure of the possible,
whether for good or bad, and which consequently
excites and nourishes the desires by the hope of
satisfying them."l9
This contrast between natural need and imaginative
desire is drawn especially clearly in the 'Discourse
on the Origin of Inequality', where the mutual action
of reason and passion is spelt out, "The passions ••
originate in our needs, and their progress depends on
that of our knowledge ••• [S]avage man being
destitute of every species of enlightenment ••• his
desires never go beyond his physical needs."20
It is imagination that opens the gap between desire
and power with which this section began, and does so
necessarily. "The real world has its limits; the
imaginary world is infinite."2l Once the soul is
activated a tension is set up between its freedom,
most particularly its freedom to imagine, and the
finitude of the' "real worldM., This tension is felt
most acutely as insatiable desire, since it is in the
nature of the passions, driven as they are by
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imagination, that human power will not be able to
satisfy them.
The Primary Passion: Amour-Propre and the Desire for
Mastery.
Of the passions one stands out; amour-propre,
passionate self love, "the first and most natural" of
themZZ which is to be distinguished from amour de
soi-meme, the natural love of selfZ3:
Amour-propre is a purely relative and factitious
feeling, which arises in the state of society,
leads each individual to make more of himself than
of any other, causes all the mutual damage men
inflict on one another, and is the real source of
the 'sense of honour'. This being understood, I
maintain that, in our primitive condition, in the
true state of nature, amour-propre did not exist;
for as each man regarded himself as the sole
observer of his actions, the only being in the
universe who took any interest in him, and the
sole judge of his deserts, no feeling arising from
comparisons he could not be led to make could take
root in his soul.Z4
Amour-propre is the most natural, and the most social
of the passions. In the structure of amour de soi-
meme it is possible to distinguish two distinct
moments, both of which are involved in the
transformation of need into passion. First there is
that part of it'which may be seen as the "instinct
for self preservation", the bridge between a felt
need and action. It is that which unifies the self
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sufficiently for it to survive: "Since each man is
specially entrusted with his own preservation, the
first and most important of his cares is and ought to
be to watch over it constantly. And how could he
watch over it if he did not take the greatest
interest in it?"25 This self-preservative function is
distorted by the corruption of need, so that men
consume what is bad for them, a theme Rousseau often
returns to.
Even more serious, though, is the fate of the second
component of amour de soi-meme. In the famous
footnote to the Second Discourse, quoted above,
Rousseau establishes an immediate relation to self,
of observation, interest, and judgement. This might
be called a naive self-satisfaction. The primitive
man is held to be unaware of the existence of others
like himself, and certainly incapable of
distinguishing between them. He does, however,
compare himself to the animals he encounters, and
finds himself superior. "Thus, the first time he
looked into himself, he felt the first emotion of
pride; and at a time when he scarce knew how to
distinguish lhe different orders of beings, by
looking on his own species as of the highest order,
he prepared the way for assuming pre-eminence as an
individual. "26
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With the development of the social order the
primitive unity of amour de soi is disrupted. It is
no longer possible to regard oneself as one's sole
observer and judge. Others are seen and compared. and
this leads to competition, to the desire to recover
the pre-eminence of original self-love. which. as
Emile makes clear, we all experience as children.
"This sentiment. preferring ourselves to others. also
demands others to prefer us to themselves, which is
impossible"27 The logic of amour-propre leads to a
struggle for mastery, which seeks not merely
obedience and servitude. but adoration. No power can
be sufficient. This is the origin and motor of the
process of increasing inequality traced in the
discourse, the outcome of which is despotism, the
maximum concentration of power.
Savage man, when he has dined, is at peace with
all nature. and the friend of his fellow
creatures •••• The case is quite different with
man in the state of society, for whom first
necessaries have to be provided, and then
superfluities; delicacies follow next. then
immense wealth, then subjects, then slaves. He
enjoys not a moments relaxation; and what is yet
stranger, the less natural and pressing his wants,
the more headstrong are his passions, and, still
worse, the more.he has it in his power to gratify
them; so that after a long course of prosperity,
after having swallowed.up treasures and ruined
multitudes, the hero ends up by cutting every
throat till he finds himself, at last, sole master
of the world. Such 1s in miniature the moral
picture. if not of human life, at least of the
secret pretensions of the heart of civilised
man'28
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The primitive nature of passion as the imaginative
extension of need into desire is now compounded by a
dynamic of competition. As people come to associate
together. abandoning the isolation of the state of
nature, comparisons become possible, "Each one began
to consider the rest. and to wish to be considered in
turn; and thus a value came to be placed on public
esteem." 29 This is a necessary consequence of the
interaction of the self love of social individuals.
Each demands that others esteem him as he does
himself. There is a drive to despotism that seeks to
recreate in the social setting the closed and
contented economy of natural amour de soi. In the
above passage Rousseau traces out the effects of this
on more conventionally desiring passions. It is
necessary to own and to enjoy all that there is.
given that for the socialised individual possessions
are an extension of the self.
It now became the interest of men to appear what
they really were not. To be and to seem became two
totally different things; and from this
distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating
trickery, wi~h all the numerous vices that go in
their train. On the other hand. free and
independent as men were before, they were'now. in
consequence of a multiplicity of new wants.
brought into subjection, as it were. to all
nature. and particularly to one another; and each
became in some· degree a slave even in becoming the
master of other men:30 .
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Thus as men come in their association to develop both
their mutual interdependence and the mental apparatus
with which to grasp it, two interconnected psychic
processes take place. On the one hand the self. with
its primal preference for its own interest
undisturbed. sees that as one among many it must
subordinate the rest to itself if it is to enjoy the
mastery that is its original state; secondly it comes
to realise that this aim cannot be openly stated and
pursued. since no other will accept this
subordination without a struggle. From the beginning
of the division of labour it is postulated that each
joins in their own interest. Thus each new
development has to appear at least as if it is in the
common interest.
From this follows a bifurcation of the self. It
becomes necessary to adopt a public persona at
variance with the private one. and formed by the
demands of public acceptance. These two become at
once absolutely different and completely intertwined.
since the private egoism, more and more drained of
content by the public. is the only reason for the
existence of the latter. This reaches its outcome in
the modern metropolitan man who adopts and casts off
roles in pursuit of a success which the affectless
shell that is thus formed cannot enjoy. In becoming
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more and more competitively self seeking the self
becomes less and less substantial: "The man of the
world is whole in his mask. Almost never being in
himself, he is always alien and ill at ease when
forced to go back there. What he is, is nothing; what
he appears is everything for him."31
Amour-propre is thus condemned to agonising failure
for a series of reasons: first the general one that
the infinite desire of imaginative passion is
incapable of fulfilment in the finite world, no
matter what is achieved, more can be dreamt of;
secondly, it is the drive to subordinate others to
the self, which all are feeling, this mutual struggle
defeats all; finally, in the struggle the self is
changed, and divided into an inner self, which must
disguise its nature, its desire for mastery, and a
"mask" of benevolent interest in others. Hence even
if mastery is achieved it is that of the mask, which
the inner self is at a distance from. To this dilemma
Rousseau announces a solution, the denaturing that
creates the citizen.
Denaturing: man and c~tizen.
In the social order self love becomes amour-propre
and the happy isolation of the natural state is
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replaced by the agony of the struggle for mastery.
There is a contradiction between natural
individuality and the social state. Thus: "Forced to
combat nature or the social institutions, one must
choose between making a man or a citizen, for one
cannot make both at the same time."32 From this it
follows that:
Good social institutions are those that best know
how to denature man, to take his absolute
existence from him in order to give him a relative
one and transport the I into the common unity,
with the result that each individual believes
himself no longer one but a part of a unity and no
longer feels except within the whole.33
The impossible desire for mastery that characterises
amour propre is to be defused by the creation of the
republic as an artificial individual. Each citizen
will participate in the mastery of the state and thus
be spared the struggle to overcome all others in the
arena of civil society. If each freely surrenders his
rights to the sovereign state and receives ,in return
freedom from domination except by the state then the
war of all against all can be brought to an end.
Rousseau's political writings are dedicated to
outlining the character of such institutions and
exploring their possibility. There are two essential
conditions that must be fulfilled if this creation of
the citizen is to succeed: a national consciousness
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must be created that leads to the identification of
the self with the Republic: "Every true republican
has drunk in love of country •• along with his
mother's milk. This love is his whole existence ••
when he is solitary he is nothing."34 This passion is
not only fierce but exclusive, a true nation will
give the souls of its citizens, "a national
physiognomy which will distinguish them from other
peoples, which will prevent them from mixing, from
feeling at ease with those peoples, from allying
themselves with them."35
Secondly this passionate unity, which by identifying
its citizens with their nation allows them to feel a
unity of purpose is to be expressed in the rule of
law. This is the subject of the Social Contract,
which cannot be fully understood without grasping the
importance of patriotism as the affective ground of
the general will. Rousseau sets out the way that the
nation, created by the great legislator, Moses,
Lycurgus. Numa. or Solon. governs itself. The key to
this being "the total alienation of each associate,
together with all his rights, to the whole
community. "36
The community, bound passionately by patriotism and
rationally by the contract acquires a general will,
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which expresses the common interest of the nation.
The acts of this will are laws, equally binding on
all citizens. The nature of law demands that it have
the form of abstract universality and hence the
creation of the institution of "government" to enact
particular decisions under the law. This latter
necessity undermines republican institutions in such
a way that all political entities. no matter how well
consti~uted, are doomed to decay.
This fatality in the nature of the state is spelt out
in the often neglected Book III of the Social
Contract which deals with the problem of government.
The necessity of executive acts mean that the
government must be separated from the sovereign.
whose nature forbids particularity in its decisions.
This requires a new body that will. "serve as a means
of communication between the State and the Sovereign,
and do for the collective person more or less what
the union of soul and body does for man."37 The
distinction of State and Sovereign refers back to the
chapter on the social contract in Book II where it is
stated that the Republic, the public person created
by the contract is called the "State when passive,
,
Sovereign when' active,"38 which recalls the dual
nature of the single person set out above, which will
receive greater attention below.
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The duality of active will and passive body is
replicated within the corporate person of the state
and leads to the necessity of government as the
agency that will mediate between them. This in turn
leads to the decline and destruction of the
legitimate political order of the contract. Chapters
10 and 11 of Book III are entitled, 'The Abuse of
Government and Its Tendency to Degenerate', and 'The
Death of the Body Politic'. Rousseau argues that the
concentration of will in the executive or "prince"
creates a powerful particular will which exerts
itself against the general will of the sovereign.
"[Slooner or later the prince must inevitably
suppress the Sovereign and break the social treaty.
This is the unavoidable and inherent defect which,
from the very birth of the body politic, tends
ceaselessly to destroy it. as age and death end by
destroying the human bodY'"39
While this is inevitable it is possible to prolong
the life of a republic by the creation of the best
possible institutions. Howe'ver all states die as a
result of this inbuilt tendency, inherent in the very
nature of the political entity.
In the modern world. however, this problem does not
arise. Modern Europe is inhabited by "these men of
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our days" the bourgeois, who are neither men. nor
citizens.40 The most fundamental cause for the
bourgeois malaise is Christianity, which by stressing
the universal humanity has rendered impossible the
particular loyalties of the patriotic citizen. As the
tutor proclaims to Emile after their travels through
Europe, "One aspires in vain to to liberty under the
safeguard of the laws. Laws! Where are there laws and
where are they respected? Everywhere you have seen
only individual interest and men's passions reigning
under this name."4l
These bourgeois are entirely in the grip of amour-
propre. The modern world is inhabited by men who are
neither naturally independent. nor politically
subsumed, but caught in the trap of the struggle for
mastery.
From these contradictions is born the one we
constantly experience within ourselves •.Swept
along in contrary directions by nature and by men.
forced to divide ourselves between these different
impulses. we follow a composite impulse which
leads us neither to one goal nor the other.42
Thus the modern man is doubly compound. The soul's
infinity presses against the limits of the real.
while the universalism of the soc.LaI and the
particularism of the individual cannot be brought to
rest at either pole. This double contradiction is
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felt above all in the ceaseless and impossible
striving for "mastery of the world". In Emile
Rousseau seeks a way out of this painful situation
through the education of a modern natural man.
Masters acutely observes that this disability of the
bourgeois is mirrored by the natural man, whose
education is the subject of the next section. His
amour propre is extended and educated to create a
universal human sympathy. This makes it impossible
for him to participate in a political unity like the
Republic of the Social Contract, since that rests on
a fierce and exclusive attachment, but avoids the
difficulties that follow from the competitive self
love of the bourgeois. Moreover this escape is
available to an individual while the political
solution is possible only collectively. Emile
represents the best chance for the modern European.43
Recreating Integrity: Compassion and The Education of
Conscience.
Since politics is impossible in modern bourgeois
Europe Rouss~au sets out an alternative way to
achieve his end. As argued at the beginning of this
chapter this is to promote happiness, primarily by
minimising pain. The central source of this pain is
CHAPTER ONE Page 39
the insatiable desire of passionate man, and above
all the desire for mastery generated by amour propre.
Amour propre is to be managed in such a way that it
no longer leads along this path. The key to this is
the understanding that its problem is its dependence
on others. If some way could be found to satisfy
amour propre without relying on the opinion of
others, socialised man could recover a large part of
the independence of natural man.
The way that this is to be attempted is through the
education of conscience. In the Second Discourse
Rousseau identifies "two principles prior to reason.
one of them deeply interesting us in our own welfare
and preservation, and the other exciting a natural
repugnance at seeing any other senSible being. and
particularly any of our own species, suffer pain or
death." 44 These are the amour de soi which is
transformed into amour propre and the compassion
which is to balance it.
The problem of conscience is another deeply
controversial one in the literature. Again the best
summary of recent debates is to be found in
. '.
Horowitz45' although this is marred by the aurho'r ' s
own somewhat eccentric Freudian (or Marcusean)
reading. In general it can be said that there is a
CHAPTER ONE Page 40
neglect of the problem of conscience, and a
downplaying of its importance in the politically
oriented interpretations, while the readings which
give more weight to the psychology and to religious
belief46 give this problem a central position.
The education of Emile is to make him free of
dependence, and above all dependence on the opinions
of others. "[T]he eternal laws of nature and order do
exist. For the wise man they take the place of
positive law. They are written in the depth of his
heart by conscience and reason. It is to these that
he ought to enslave himself in order to be free."47
This statement, put by Rousseau into the mouth of the
tutor at the closing stage of Emile's education,
summarises its purpose. Since positive, political law
is impossible in modern Europe, its place is to be
taken by inner morality. The integrity of the natural
man is to be replicated in the good conscience of his
civilised counterpart. This is a preservation and
enhancement of mere natural goodness, which is to
become virtue.
In Book IV of Emile, Rousseau gives two distinct and
complementary versions of his teaching on conscience.
First, in his own voice he sets out the way in which
imagination, compassion, and amour-propre are to be
"
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manipulated to make Emile conscientious. Second, the
Savoyard Vicar sets out the way in which the
conscience is "natural" to the soul, as instinct is
to the body. A consequence of this to which the Vicar
gives great prominence, is that, just as instinct
would retain its purity if the body were not joined
to the soul, conscience would be unchallenged if the
soul could free itself from the body.
There is a significant difference, although not
necessarily a contradiction between the two
derivations of conscience. Emile's tutor aims to
create a self-satisfaction founded on a conviction of
the superiority enjoyed by he who is independent. The
Vicar teaches that conscience is natural to the soul
and lost touch with due to the passions, "the voice
of the body". In one case conscience, the inner
voice, is the voice of an assured superiority, in the
other it is simply the voice of soul. As argued in
the introduction the position of the Vicar is the
basis for the practice of the tutor.
The conscientious man is free from reliance on the
opinion of others and judges his own worth. as did.
the man in the state of nature. This makes him
integral and self-sufficient and allows a happiness
secure from all outside influence. It is this
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happiness that provides the ground of Rousseau's
argument. he does not. as Kant would later. make the
principle of morality one of duty. For Rousseau right
action is based on a realisation that it and only it
can make one happy. If the strongest desire is to act
according to the dictate of conscience then power
will always be adequate. Given the belief that the
acquisitive actions of the bourgeois are driven by
amour-propre, the passion for mastery, the
replacement of the respect of others by self-respect.
which is the essence of conscience, is liberating.
This is to be achieved by teaching Emile to feel so
superior to the men that he encounters that he may
"pity them and not want to resemble them."48 This
cannot be achieved by direct communication of the
truths set out in the writings of Rousseau. the young
would not be capable of understanding them. and by
the time they did it would be too late. corruption
would be irreversible.49 Hence this pivotal moment in
Emile's education must, like others before and after
it take the form of deception and manipulation.
In the course of his outline of the way in which this.. -
•may be achieved Rousseau writes that:
It is man's weakness which makes him sociable; it
is our common miseries which turn our hearts to
humanity; ••• A truly happy being us a solitary
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being. God alone enjoys absolute happiness ••••
[O]ur common needs unite us by interest, our
common miseries unite us by affection.SO
It will be shown below that one weakness above all is
responsible for sociability, and is the precondition
for the birth of the amour propre which is here to be
manipulated, this being the need for a sexual
partner. In the meantime it is important to note that
the compassion that is to lead to conscience is to
become an "affection" founded on psychic
independence.
It is noticeable that the "natural" derivation of
this independence largely avoids the use of the term
conscience, which figures prominently both in the
'Profession of Faith' and in the confessional texts,
as well as La Nouvelle Heloise. This reinforces the
view adopted here that it is to be thought of as
subordinate to its philosophical comprehension in the
Vicar's lengthy statement, from which it nevertheless
maintains a certain independence.
Emile's education in compassion begins by exposing
him to the suffering of others: "If the first sight
that strikes. him is an object of s·adness, the first
return to himself is a sentiment of pleasure."Sl
Because pity is felt only for those seen to be "more
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pitiable"S2 than ourselves the return from the
imaginative projection of pity is to a situation
rendered more attractive. The key to the moral
significance of pity is that by pitying others Emile
learns to be satisfied with himself.
This theme in Emile recalls other texts, most notably
the Second Discourse, which accord pity a crucial
position as the natural basis of morality. The
classic discussion of the "economy of pity", and one
to which the present study is much indebted is in
Derrida's Of Grammatology.53 There Derrida marks the
centrality of imagination in Rousseau's account of
pity, linking it to freedom and perfectibilitY'S4 and
further traces the connections between this theme and
that of sexual difference, stressing the importance
of maternitY.55 Derrida does not, however, accord
sufficient importance to the excessive and
uncontainable moment of freedom in Rousseau, and
indeed reverses the hierarchy of concepts suggested
here. For Derrida imagination is given priority as
the "condition of •• liberty."S6
The first stage in Emile's education is to expose
him, when he first becomes interested in the world
beyond his immediate environment, to scenes of
poverty and want. Provided this is done carefully and
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moderately it will lead to a self-satisfaction that
expresses itself in benevolent concern about those
less fortunate.57
The next stage is the study of historY58 which aims
to show that the rich and successful are no less
miserable than the poor. They are driven by inflamed
amour propre into a restless and insatiable quest for
glory. which can end only in failure. History is the
chosen medium for this lesson because the careers of
these men are both finished and disclosed. This
allows the tutor to show Emile the dissatisfaction
behind the public show. The pity Emile feels for the
great is based on his own self-satisfaction, which he
contrasts with their other-directed search for
completion through the domination of others.
Nurtured in the most absolute liberty. he
conceives of no ill greater than servitude. He
pities these miserable kings. slaves to all who
obey them •••• He would pity even the enemy who
would do him harm. He would say to himself. 'In
giving himself the need to hurt me. this man has
made his fate dependent on mine. '59
This independence of the opinions of others is the
core of Emile's moral education. from which Rousseau
excludes religion. He believes that children are not
ready to understand the import of religious teaching
and that they will of necessity distort them. "The
great evil of the deformed images of the divinity
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which are drawn in the minds of children is that they
remain there all their lives".60 Now that Emile's
moral character has been formed it is possible to
introduce the philosophical reli~ion that ~rounds it.
This is accomplished in the 'Profession of Faith of
the Savoyard Vicar'.6l
The status of this text has been a matter of some
dispute, since many interpretations of Rousseau.
basing themselves on the political critique of
Christianity in the Social Contract, see him as being
an opponent of religion. This accords with a ~eneral
tendency to concentrate exclusively on the political
dimension of Rousseau's thought. It is argued here
,
that Rousseau sees the republican denaturing of man
as impossible in modern Europe and that the nurturing
of individual conscience is offered as an
alternative. What is more it is argued that the
religious philosophy of the Vicar is the necessary
ground of this possibility. The arguments in favour
of an identity between Rousseau's views and those of
the Vicar are admirably summarised in Masters62 and
developed at greater length by Hendel.63
The core of the philosophy of the Vicar consists
first in the affirmation that there is a Being
responsible for the creation and ordering of the
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universe, to which must be attributed intelligence.
power, and will and which is to be called God and
about which further speculation is useless.64
Secondly it embraces an anthropology:
In meditating on the nature of man. I believed I
discovered in it two distinct principles: one of
which raised him to the study of eternal truths.
to the love of justice and moral beauty ••• while
the other took him basely into himself. subjected
him to the empire of the senses and to the
passions which are their ministers ••• I said to
myself. "No. man is not one. I want and I do not
want; I sense myself enslaved and free at the same
time·"65
Having introduced this dualism of the human being the
Vicar discusses the views of the materialists:
rThey arel deaf to the inner voice crying out to
them ••• Something in you seeks to break the bonds
constraining it. Space is not your measure; the
whole universe is not big enough for you. Your
sentiments. your desires. your uneasiness. even
your pride have another principle than this narrow
body in which you sense yourself enchained'66
The Vicar offers as proof of this duality the sense
of one's freedom: "No material being is active by
itself. and I am. One may very well argue with me
about this; but I sense it. and this sentiment is
stronger than the reason combatting it ••• rMly will
is independent of my senses."67
'.
Later he makes clear that all evil and suffering are
to be ascribed to this dual nature of the human
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being: "fWlhen •• delivered from the the illusions
given us by the body and the senses ••• then the
voice of conscience will regain its strength •• the
pure delight of satisfaction with oneself"68
This account has two moments to which attention must
be drawn here: the contrast between the expanding and
uncontainable nature of the soul and the limits
imposed on it by the body; and the the way in which.
when free of these limits the soul can listen to the
voice of· the conscience and thus achieve the "pure
delight of satisfaction with oneself".
Conscience is the voice of the soul; the passions
are the voice of the body. Is it surprising that
these two languages are often contradictory? And
then which should be listened to? Too often reason
deceives us ••• But conscience never deceives; it
is man's true guide. It is to the soul what
instinct is to the bodY.69
It might seem that this account of conscience as the
"voice of the soul" conflicts with the morality of
self-satisfaction. However it is more reasonable to
see each as the condition of the other. The "natural
man in the state of society" is taught to be
independent of the opinions of others. but the moral
core of his self-judgement is provided by conscience.
Compassion itself. which' pr~vides the grou~d for .
Emile's moral education depends on the working of
imagination. which is a faculty of freedom.
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Emile's One Passion: Sex and Sociality.
Emile has been taught to rely on his own judgement
instead of that of others for self-satisfaction. This
might seem to make him absolutely independent.
However there is one natural need that involves him
with others and which even Emile continues to feel.
This is the sexual urge. Moralised as love this is to
be Emile's one passion70. Speaking to his tutor
shortly before his marriage to Sophie he says:
If I were without passions, I would, in my
condition as a man, be independent like God
himself; for I would want only what is and
therefore would never have to struggle against
destiny. At least I have no more than one chain.
It is the only one I shall ever bear, and I can
glory in it. Come, then, give me Sophie, and I am
free·71
Emile's unification with Sophie at the end of Book V
is the end of a long detour begun at the beginning of
Book IV, which this exposition has suppressed. It was
the onset of sexual desire at puberty that introduced
Emile to the social passion of amour propre , and the
education of this passion into independence was
always predicated on this. His sexuality was what
made him social, and the finding of a wife for him is
the core ,of the second half of the book.
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CHAPTER TWO: SEX AND SOCIALITY.
The second chapter of this thesis argues that
sexuality and maternity are the core of sociality and
develops the implications of this. In particular it
covers the sharp distinction made by Rousseau between
the morality of conscience and independence, outlined
in chapter one, and feminine ethics. Women are held
by Rousseau to be properly dependent on men. For them
the opinions of others must be a prime consideration.
This he traces to the necessity of ensuring the
identity of fathers.
There is another dimension to this. In the state of
nature both sexes experience the sexual need, and one
must see puberty as having the same implications for
girls as those for boys. The outcome of sexual
activity is, though, very different in the two cases.
Pregnancy and maternity make it much more serious for
women, and in this one should identify one of the
origins of the social order in Rousseau. It is
possible to see him as claiming that women are
naturally social. This is a deeper meaning of his
double ethical standard.
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What is more this goubling allows him to make
marriage a mediating institution. that goes some way
towards closing the gap between individuality and
sociality. At the end of Emile. as outlined at the
close of Section One. Emile's education is completed
with the birth of his first child. In this marriage
there is a complex interplay between the sexes of
domination and influence. Rousseau establishes a
mutual interdependence of the sexes that allows each
to be one half of a unity that brings the poles of
the social and the individual into harmony.
The tensions. between soul and body and between
individuality and social life, dealt with in Section
One are masculine. Femininity is conceived of quite
differently by Rousseau. Women are defined in his
thought by maternity. which he sees as making them
"naturally" s9cial, and loving, and as imposing an
entirely different ethic upon them. Where men are to
obey the voice of conscience, which speaks from the
soul. disdains the opinions of others, and must put
aside the body and its passions. women are to obey
the dictates of opinion and of men •..
From •• habitual constraint comes a docility that
women need all their lives. since they never cease
to be subjected either to a man or to the
judgements of men and they are never permitted to
put themselves above these judgements'72
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The key here is the joining of the two sexes into the
unity of the marriage while accentuating the
differences between them. In this way the poles of
the oppositions can be mediated by marriage while
held apart by sexual difference. The basic unit of
society becomes the family. The nature of marriage,
the differences between the sexes, and the ill
effects of the erosion of this difference are treated
in a large number of texts with slightly different
emphases. There is the myth of origins in the Second
Discourse; the sketch of the ideal preparation for
and beginning of adult married life in Emile; the
description of the household of the Wolmars in La
Nouvelle Heloise; the dissection of the problems of
contemporary metropolitan life there and in the
'Letter to d'Alembert'.
From these emerge the following conclusions: first
that the homogenisation of the sexes leads to a
decline in morality that threatens the very existence
of society; second that the difference between the
sexes has a natural basis in maternity but must be
carefully cultivated; third that femininity is the
bearer of sociality in its passive and emotive
dimension, while autonomy and individuality are the
preserve of men.
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This division can only be effective if the means of
mediation is. Here Rousseau invokes the force of
habit. The family has this habitual attachment as its
core and ontogenetic origin as is spelt out in the
Second Discourse, but there is also the force of
virtue and duty. The family is the most fundamental
institution of society for reasons already explained
and the "instinct for recognition of the good" that
is conscience reinforces the habitual attachment
whose origin in self love ~s set out in Emile.
In the case of women there is a third force, and they
carry most of the burden of this preservation. This
third force is public opinion. For men the legitimate
notion of honour is an autonomous one resting on
conscience but women, for reasons again derived from
maternity, must also conform to the judgements of
others. Thus a notion of honour detached from, or at
least added to, that of conscience expresses the
social character of femininity, and as sexual honour
which is its chief component, is the key to the
stability of the family, since it allows the
attachments of paternity.
All of this is possible only through marriage. Men
and women can become the very different beings they
should be only if they are joined to form a new
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whole. The ethical and moral principles have been
polarised along lines of sex and then joined by
conjugal love. The two poles of this relation can
then complete one another in their complementarity.
There has been much work, most of it feminist, on
Rousseau's doctrine of sexual difference in the last
fifteen years, and the present study is indebted to
this research. Susan Okin's book on Women in Western
Political Thought has been especially influential as
an early entrant to this field, and Carole Pateman's
Sexual Contract is another important contribution.
There is an emergent consensus around the view, put
forward by Okin, that Rousseau naturalises women's
sociality and hence excludes them from both
citizenship and the possibility of Emile's "natural"
autonomy. This view has been contested by Joel
Schwartz in his influential The Sexual Politics of
Rousseau. There he argues that those who see Rousseau
as misogynistic fail to see the complementarity of
the sexes in his thought and the extent to which this
is artificial. Rather than naturalising masculine
domination Rousseau is said to argue for the creation
of an artificial difference that mediates the natural
and the social.
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In response it must be, said that in his attempts to
show the complementarity of the sexes and the
complexity of the patterns of authority between them
in Rousseau's work, Schwartz ignores the extent to
which these are organised in light of a goal of
securing certain goods for men, and the
naturalisation of this aim. In general this thesis
may be said to accept the essentials of the feminist
analysis of Rousseau, and to argue that this should
be understood in relation to his philosophical
anthropology.
Sexuality and the Socialisation of Men.
In the first chapter of this thesis the socialisation
of the independent man was assumed rather than
explained. In both versions of this process, that
from the radical state of nature, and that of the
adolescent, the force that drives it is sexuality.
This is the need that breaches the independence and
self-enclosure of the male.
To follow Rousseau's argument concerning the
character of sexual relations in the state of nature..
one must first recall the distinction he makes
between passions and needs [besoins]. The latter are
the simple demands of the body while the former,
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originating in them have been transformed by the
action of the understanding and the imagination. "Now
savage man, being destitute of every species of
enlightenment, can have no passions save those of the
latter kind: his desires can never go beyond his
physical wants. The only goods he recognises in the
universe are food, a female, and sleep: the only
evils he fears are pain and hunger."73
The remaining problem for Rousseau to dispose of is
the nature of the relations between these creatures.
Briefly stated his contention is that they
"maintained no kind of intercourse with one
another."74 Each was self sufficient and had so
little to do with others of his kind that he was
hardly aware of their existence.
That this is so is a necessary consequence of
Rousseau's conception of man in the state of nature.
This man is reduced to the status of an animal, of
the body. In the course of this reduction Rousseau
distinguishes between "the physical and moral
ingredients in the feeling of love" and attributes to
man in the state of nature only the physical part
whi6h is "that general desire that urges'~he sexes to
union with each other."75
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The sexual encounters resulting from this desire lead
to no more permanent union and the children that
result from it are cared for by the mother alone
until they are old enough to leave, forget and be
forgotten by her'76 A more settled family unit is the
outcome of a process of development whereby the
isolated individuals of the state of nature in
cooperating with one another developed their latent
faculties and became enlightened and industrious.
Finally they learn to construct a dwelling place for
themselves and "This was the epoch of a first
revolution. which established and distinguished
families, and introduced a kind of property."77
Despite first appearances the state of nature does
contain the potentiality for the development of
society, and this potentiality inheres in the
difference between the sexes. There are just two
moments in the radical state of nature where the
absolute self-sufficiency of amour de soi breaks
down, these are sexual desire and infancy. In each
case it is need for a woman that makes the breach.
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Habit, Sexuality, and the Family.
Return to the second Discourse and look more closely
at the origin of the family as set out in that work.
There the "unromantic" nature of the family is given
less prominence than it is in the 'Essay on the
Origins of Language'. Conjugal love is mentioned as
one of the expansions of the heart consequent on the
new way of life inaugurated by the hut building. What
is crucial is the way in which the family emerges.
The "habit of living together" produces the feelings
that form the basis of the family, but what accounts
for the habit?
Rousseau does not spell this out but in the radical
state of nature there are some clues, and the
conclusion they lead to will be supported by evidence
from elsewhere. In the state of nature it is need for
a woman which causes the only temporary associations,
and when, in this context Rousseau distinguishes the
physical and moral in the feeling of love he adds;
"It is easy to see that the moral part of love is a
factitious feeling, born of social usage and, and
enhanced by the.women with much care and c~everness,.. '
to establish their empire, and put in power the sex
that ought to obey." 78
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Although the immediate cause of the development of
the family and the consequent "expansions of the
human heart" is the building of the huts, there are
deeper roots of this new sociality in the preceding
stage. Femininity is social in itself.
Sexuality first. In the First Part Rousseau
recognises that his pursuit of the absolute limit
means that the family must be excluded as artificial.
The natural man lives without even this intimate and
apparently natural society. Sexual union must be
thought as fleeting and accidental, the result of the
momentary pressure of an unmodified bodily need. This
need is specifically separated from any passion or
emotion and made an entirely general and non-personal
matter. Any member of the other sex will meet the
requirements of the primitive human being.
The male thus avoids any involvement in the
reproductive process beyond the act of sexual
intercourse and the integrity of his self-enclosure
is nearly maintained. For the female the matter
cannot be quite so simple, and it is in maternity
.
that the first real breach in isolation occurs. The
mother is thought of as standing in a relation of
mutual dependence with her offspring, as she must if
it is to survive. Not only does it need her
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protection and nourishment but she must be given some
motivation for providing it. A maternal instinct or
" .. ~
need is posited that will be the core of the first
human societies. The identification of femininity and
sociality will be a central theme in this reading of
Rousseau. Love it must be noted is an essentially
feminine phenomenon.
This feminine principle can only operate on the basis
of advances in the labour process. Under the
influence of new difficulties the human beings begin
to discover the advantages of cooperation and from
this develop new techniques and abilities. The first
great technological development is the artificial
shelter and from this follows a new and settled way
of life. The change from a wandering to a fixed way
of life in turn allows the operation of the feminine
social principle. Men and women, specifically fathers
and mothers, share a hut and this promotes the "first
revolution in the human heart", the creation of the
feelings of conjugal and paternal love.
There is some slight ambiguity in Rousseau's work at
this point. The Second Discourse is the only text
where Rousseau goes to the limit of the radical state
of nature. A number of other writings, especially the
'Essay on the Origins of Language' take up the story.
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The fundamentals are common however. The first
families are the product not of passion and desire
but of habit. In the context of the story so far this
is clear. If these feelings are artificial they
cannot be present at the origin of the society of
which they are a product.
This first family is thus a closed unit, founded on
habit and bound together in stable and peaceful
coexistence by a love that is the product and not the
cause of the ties between its members. This remains
the picture of the family that Rousseau presents in
all his subsequent writings, with the difference that
a new kind of emotion, brought into being by the
further development of this new mode of life will
intervene between one family and that formed by the
succeeding generation.
The "age of huts" that follows from this first
revolution is characterised by the independence and
self sufficiency of the family units. "Every family
became a little societY"79 From remarks later in the
Discourse it appears that these familiesaO are to be
thought of as ..subsisting by hunting and gathering
with the men going into the forest while the women
stayed with the hut and children. This simple life
required and involved no contact between families and
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in the Essay Rousseau suggests that;
There were marriages but there was no love at
all ••• Each family was self-sufficient and
perpetuated itself by inbreeding. Children of the
same parents grew up together ••; natural
inclination sufficed to unite them. Instinct held
the place of passion; habit held the place of
preference·a1
Thus these first families, although they caused "The
first expansions of the human heart", the habit of
living together giving rise to "the finest feelings
known to humanity, conjugal love and paternal
affection", did not arise from or generate romantic
love. The next stage in the story, found in both the
Discourse and the Essay is the birth of this passion.
This "age of huts" is most properly thought of as the
last phase of the state of nature and not as part of
the state of society, as is made particularly clear
in the 'Essay on the Origins of Language'. At this
point amour propre and the passions are yet to be
born, instead we have small units, bound by ties of
habitual and gentle affection. The family of the age
of huts is the archetype for an ideal family which
forms a society so intimate that it can properly be
thought of ,as private, as of a fundam~ntally
, ,
different nature from the public space where amour
propre is necessary.
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Maternity, the Sociality of Women, and Feminine
Ethics.
In the state of nature there is one small society
that forms the nucleus of the proto-society of the
age of huts, that of the mother and child. Rousseau
makes it quite clear that we are regard the new loves
of the first revolution as a female stratagem
intended to bind the father to this unit. A form of
maternal love is introduced in the account of
"natural" childcare and it is this that forms the
germ of all the subsequent social development. The
socio-cultural development has as its ultimate ground
maternity. This may seem a large claim to make on
such thin evidence so the next stage is to establish
that Rousseau explicitly and consistently has two
ethical codes, for men and for women, and that the
key to this difference is that men are autonomous and
independent and women social by nature.
Although never spelt out it can be argued that in
women the route of derivation of the passions from
amour de soi passes through maternal feelings rather
.than amour propre. The key to Rousseau's.ethics ~or
women is that the opinion of others is and should be
the governing principle of their actions. This is
not, however, as it would be for masculine amour
CHAPTER TWO Page 64
propre, in order to regain a mediated satisfaction
with themselves, but rather in order that doubt
should not be felt as to the paternity of their
children. Paternity is the cement of the family.
The fullest and most explicit discussion of
Rousseau's views on the place of women and the proper
rules of their conduct comes at the beginning of Book
V of Emile, in the passage 'Sophie, or the Woman'.82
Here Rousseau sets out the ends and means of the
creation of Sophie, the woman who is to complete
Emile.
After having tried to form the natural man, let us
also see how the woman who suits him ought to be
formed"83. She is the female counterpart of the
"natural man in the state of society". She is to be,
from the first considered in her relation to man: "In
the union of the sexes each contributes equally· to
the common aim, but not in the same way •••• One
ought to be active and strong, the other passive and
weak ••• it follows that woman is made specially to
1 "p ease man. 84
.. .' ..
Where man was in the beginning independent and became
related to woman only with puberty, she is defined by
that relation, and by its consequence for her in
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maternity:
There is no parity between the two sexes in regard
to the consequences of sex. The male is male only
at certain moments. The female is female her whole
life, or at least during her whole youth.
Everything constantly recalls her sex to her; and
to fulfil its functions well she needs care during
her pregnancy; she needs rest at the time of
childbirth; she needs a soft and sedentary life to
suckle her children; ••• She serves as the link
between them and their father; she alone makes him
love them and gives him the confidence to call
them his own'S5
This..recalls the socialisation of men from the state
of nature. The man is attached to the primary unit of
mother and child by links of affection fostered by
the woman in order to provide the care set out in
this passage. What Rousseau now emphasises is that
paternity is guaranteed only by the strict sexual
fidelity of mothers. The control of sexuality is the
key to his feminine ethics. The unfaithful woman
"dissolves the family and breaks all the bonds of
nature. In giving the man children who are not his
she betrays both'"S6' Not only must she actually be
faithful, but, in order for the conviction of
paternity to be strong, her husband must believe that
she is.
It is important, then, not only that a woman be
faithf~l, but ·that she is judged to be faithful by
her husband, by those near her, by everyone. It is
important that she be modest, attentive, reserved,
and that she give evidence of her virtue to the
eyes of others as well as to her own conscience •
••• To maintain vaguely that the two sexes are
equal and that their duties are the same is to
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lose oneself in vain declaiming.a7
From all these considerations it follows that:
"Opinion is the grave of virtue among men and its
throne among women."aa
If this doubling of ethics is compared to the
analysis of masculine morality in Chapter One what
emerges is that in the private morality of Emile
Rousseau has duplicated some of the key factors in
the primary distinction he made between "man and
citizen". The natural man is wholly independent,
while the citizen is given up to the social. If Emile
is to react to the dilemma of the b~urgeois exclusion
of the political possibility by replicating in the
social the independence of the natural, Sophie is to
complement this by a private version of the social
bond. Feminine dependence on opinion is the
expression of a female sociality, which is rooted in
maternity.
Men, brought into the social by their sexual desires
and held in a social unit by paternity and the habit
of conjugal love, are thus socialised by femininity.
This·allows them to be both social and ~ndep~ndent.
This is further facilitated by the way in which
CHAPTER TWO Page 67
women, while dependent on men are to govern them. In
this way masculine independence can be domesticated.
In this new entity created by the unity of the sexes,
men are to have the authority, as they must if the
moral autonomy at the heart of Emile's education is
to be preserved. But women are also to plat their
part. Love is described in the Second Discourse as a
feminine invention designed to secure dominance over
men. In Emile he makes clear that this is to continue
to operate in his naturalised modern marriage.
"Woman, who is weak •••, estimates and judges the
forces she can put to work to make up for her
weakness, and those forces are men's passions.
She must have the art to make us want to do
everything •• necessary or agreeable to her."a9
...
The art that allows this is "guile", the ability to
manipulate men's passions, through the superior
understanding of the heart and of the way to guide
it. "Guile is a natural talent with the fair sex,"90
which should be developed by them. "She must •• make
a profound study of the mind of man •• learn to
penetrate their sentiments •• know how .to communicate
to them •• the sentiments she wishes •• without
appearing even to dream of it."9l "It is by means of
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this superiority in talent that she keeps herself his
equal and that she governs him while obeying him."92
A new moral being is created through this dialectic
of obedience and government.
The social relationship between the sexes •••
produces a moral person, of which the woman is the
eye and the man is the arm, but they have such a
dependence on one another that the woman learns
from the man what must be done and the woman
learns from the man what must be done •••• Each
follows the prompting of the other; each obeys and
both are masters.93
The Two Loves.
This section is concerned with the further
complications that arise with romantic love, which
represents nothing less than the repetition at a new
and higher level of the dialectic that the mediation
of sex and marriage seemed to have brought to a
close. This theme is excellently treated in Schwartzi
book on The Sexual Politics of Rousseau, which
however suffers from two major defects. First it
ignores problem of freedom, although it gives much
prominence to that of the imagination, and secondly,
in its concern to defend Rousseau from feminist
." attack it ignores tbe extent to whJ.ch women are
subordinated to men by its subject.
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Conjugal love was the habitual attachment to a
regular sexual partner, it was a consequence and not
a cause of the cohabitation of the man and woman of
the age of huts. The next important development is
the creation of a new kind of love in which the
imagination plays the crucial role. This may be
called romantic love. Here the definitive
characteristic is an over-valuation of the object of
desire preceding sexual union.
It should be stressed that this creation of an ideal
object which is superimposed on the real is, to a
greater extent than conjugal love, a
characteristically male love. Its birth is described
both in the origins myth of the Discourse and the
Essay and the education myth of Emile. The former
describes its creation as a stage in the development
of the species, the latter the assumption of it by a
subject who is history's heir.
There is a crucial difference in the two cases, which
is the difference between the state of nature, the
naturally natural, and the state of society in which
Rousseau wants to create an artifi~ially natural man.
In this latter case romantic love comes before its
natural basis. "Nature's instruction is late and
slow; men's is almost always premature. In the
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former case the senses wake the imagination; in the
latter the imagination wake the senses".94
Amour propre has no place in the intimate society of
the age of huts. The birth of romantic love and of
this new relation to self take place together, since
each is the product of a process of comparison. The
families living close together are held to share some
resource, such as a water hole, and the young people
gathering there in the course of their chores form
the first public space.
They are presented with a variety of possible sexual
partners and are able to form preferences. This in
turn leads to a competitive display of talents in the
"fete", in singing and dancing. The self begins both
to compare others and to regard the self as an object
to be judged by them. Love, amour propre, and art are
all born together in this moment.
The relationship between the two forms of love is
from the very start a difficult and even a
conflictual one. The peaceful and contented life of
.. the age of huts is destroyed by this new passion
which is powerful, competitive, and creates
attachments outside the family. This pattern is
repeated in the case of Emile, which closely
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resembles the foregoing. Before puberty he is free
from amour propre and dwells entirely within the
private world created for him by his tutor. The onset
of sexual desire makes it necessary that he go out
from here into the "world" and creates amour propre
by giving him a new relation to the opinions others
have of him.
Again an independent male is brought into society by
sexual need for a woman, and again he is bound in the
end by his attachment to his partner, in Emile and
Sophie's marriage which puts an end the former's
wandering and rootless existence, fixing him
spatially and morally. The marriage of Emile and
Sophie is to reconcile the two forms of love.
Romantic love depends on the creation of illusions
about its object. She is held to be unique and
incomparable. Indeed she ceases to belong to her sex,
becoming the only possible sexual object, the sole
source of satisfaction. The problem with this love as
a mediator in the way that conjugal love has been
seen to be is that these illusions are by their
nature fragile ~nd temporary. They cannot survive the
intimacy of the married state and a marriage founded
on them can only be a member of a series. Unless the
habitual conjugal love can replace passion then a new
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passion will. This process of replacement is the
responsibility, as one would expect, of women.
Conjugal love is feminine as romantic love is
masculine. The former is "ethical", at its root is
the stability and responsibility at the core of
society. If romantic love is the "bait" that draws
men into the social field familiar love is the hook
that holds them there. The way in which the
transition is to managed by women is spelt out by
Rousseau, or by Emile's tutor, at the end of that
book in his advice to the newly married Sophie. By
the exercise of the feminine virtue of "pudeur" or
modesty she is to hold Emile at sufficient distance
sexually to keep his desire for her and illusions
about her for as long as possible. This will hold his
attention and allow the habit of affection to grow in
order to replace passion when it ineVitably passes
away. The mediation of the loves is to be modesty,
which will allow habit to conquer passion.
The Natural Origin of Romantic Love.
In each case it is romantic love that disrupts a
familial scene. Begin with the Discourse. In the
state of nature there is no family organisation at
all. Each individual is self-sufficient and self-
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enclosed. The only contact between these individuals
is occasional and fortuitous sexual encounters, in
which they respond only to the weak and momentary
impulsion of the body's needs. The identity of the
sexual partner is a matter of indifference, it is the
sex only that matters.
Love and competition are born together in the same
moment. In the Discourse the "fete", the communal
exhibition of the talents that the competition for
approval gives rise to is "the first step towards
inequality, and at the same time towards vice. From
these first distinctions arose on the one side vanity
and contempt and on the other shame and envy"9S. In
keeping with the general pessimistic tone of the
Discourse, which Rousseau would later ascribe to the
influence on him of his then friend Diderot, the
breaking of the closed family by love is the first
step on the social road to ruin, introducing the
amour propre responsible for the woes of the human
condition.
In the Essay by contrast, although this dark outcome
is hinted at the tone is very different. It is the..
joys of the festival that are gi~en prominence, the
singing and dancing are ascribed not to the
competitive urge but rather seem to be the outpouring
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of the pleasure and desire that the first feeling of
love brings with it. Of course this is true, if less
directly in the Discourse account but here
competition drops out of sight, as it does in the
related passage in the 'Letter to d'Alembert' where
Rousseau recalls the spontaneous festivities of his
Genevan youth.
To sum up, the disruption of the family by romantic
love is given a prominent place in Rousseau's myth of
the origin of society. The first society of human
beings is a closed family, without connection to its
neighbours and perpetuating itself through
inbreeding. Only later and in consequence of the
settled way of life of this family does the
comparison necessary to love develop. When it does
so, so too does competition and jealousy, the first
cause of conflict between human beings. On the other
hand this passion also brings with it the development
of the first arts and the widening of the social
sphere.
This new passion is a modification of sexual desire.
Its essence is the fixation of this desire on a .. .
single individual to the exclusion of all others, but
this is only a first characterisation of it. This
fixation comes about through a process of comparison
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which results in one individual being elevated above
all others. This elevation has far reaching
consequences.
The comparative character of love is a two way force.
The elevation of the object of love implies the
demand to be so elevated by it. Thus there arises the
desire to shine in the eyes of others that transforms
the relation to self and the relation to others. This
new desiring relation implies jealousy and
competition and the need for admiration if one is to
be content with oneself. A new kind of dependence
comes into being in the self regard Rousseau calls
amour propre.
Romantic Love in the Education of Emile.
The boy child, protected by his tutor is able to
replicate the self absorbed independence of the·
"savage". At the beginning of Book Four of Emile
Rousseau tells us that; "We are so to speak born
twice: once to exist and once to live; once for our
species and once for our sex·"96 This second birth
Qccurs at pube~ty and its cause ~s the ogset of
sexual desire.
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First of all from love derive all other passions;
"All his relations with his species, all the
affections of his soul are born with this one."97 In
fact the infant has been attached already to those
who cared for it, but this is described as an
instinctual rather than a passionate attachment. It
derives from the habit of feeling pleasure in
connection with the presence of those who meet the
infant's needs98 and thus is comparable to familial
affection • It derives form the primitive feeling of
amour de soi, having no cause to feel the need to
attract the attention of others and thus to compete,
This new passion, though entails a desire oriented
towards a person independent of us whose love must
therefore be won.
The second characteristic of Rousseau's account of
sexual love is that it is not natural, and that in
the ways that one would expect from the account of
natural sexuality in the Second Discourse. "Far from
arising from nature love is the rule and bridle of
nature's inclinations. It is due to love that, except
for the beloved object, one sex ceases to be anything
for the other.~99 The natural urge to union ·is
controlled by that moral part of love that fixes
desire to a specific object. This involves the
operation of the imagination, which embellishes the
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loved object with all kinds of excellences most of
all one presumes as the source of pleasure that no
other could provide. This imaginative aspect of the
feeling of love is exaggerated in Emile's case by the
creation of a love object without the existence of a
real object as its referent. Emile is caused to fall
in love with a girl he has never met.
Third, and here again the individual repeats the
history of the species, competition originates in
this particularised desire. "One wants to obtain the
preference that one grants. Love must be reciprocal.
To be loved, one has to make oneself more lovable
than another. more lovable than every other. at least
in the eyes of the beloved object. This is the source
of the first glances at one's fellows; this is the
.
source of emulation. rivalries and jealousY."lOO From
this comes the amour propre which will henceforth be
the dominant force in the individual's life.
Here again an initial enclosure in the family circle,
untroubled by the passions. by love or by amour
propre, is disrupted by a desire that gives rise to
..tbe need to compete, to stand out. It is in'Book Four·
that under the impact of adolescence and the need for
a companion that Emile is introduced to the society
which only now can offer him anything.
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Emile is caused to fall in love with a purely
imaginary object, rather than project onto a real
one. This is effected before his entry into society,
which is itself driven by the emergence of the need
for a partner at puberty. That he is clearly aware of
the instrumentality of his social contacts, in the
search for the match of his wife-image, protects him
from the force of amour propre. He does not lose
himself in the striving for the recognition of the
crowd since the one whose recognition is to suffice
is already present to his imagination. This has its
dangers in that he might lose all contact with
reality, a possibility Rousseau spells out in the
story of the "girl like Sophie" with her fatal love
of Telemachus. In the case of Emile and Sophie this
does not happen because they have been prepared for
one another.
In this crucial moment Emile's tutor does everything
he can to delay the birth of love. This is in order
to gain time to work on Emile's compassion in the way
outlined above, but also in order to limit the part
played by imagination in the origin of love, and the
weight of other, less violent passions in Emile's
character·lOl Finally this method has the further
advantage that it allows the manipulation of Emile's
imagination in such a way that he does not project
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his ideal on to a real person but has it created for
him without reference to anyone. "One must use a
great deal of art to prevent social man from being
totally artificial."102
Rousseau maintains "that if one waits, •• if one then
expounds the laws of nature in all their truth;"103
it is possible to instill along with the first idea
of love its moral dimension. This is held, by
intensifying the passion to increase the pleasure.
Finally the object of this love is described to
Emile. In creating an imaginary object the tutor
succeeds in preventing attachment to real ones.
It is unimportant whether the object 1 depict for
him is imaginary: it suffices that it make him
disgusted with those that could tempt him •••• And
what is true love itself if it is not chimera. lie
and illusion? We love the image we make for
ourselves far more than we love the object to
which we apply it.104
Thus far it would appear that Rousseau is an enemy of
sexual love, that he admits its inevitability and the
necessity of managing it to cause as little harm as
possible but that he can see nothing good in it. From
the perspective of the natural man this is indeed the
case. After all "Every at~achment is a sign of
insufficiency •••• A truly happy being is a solitary
being."105 But Emile cannot be such a being, he is a
"someone", a man of the state of society and "1
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cannot conceive how someone who needs nothing can
love anything. I do not conceive how someone who
loves nothing can be happy"106
Further Emile's morality is to be reinforced by his
love for Sophie. This is because love builds up an
image of perfection: "There is no true love without
enthusiasm, and no enthusiasm without an object of
perfection, real or chimerical, but always existing
in the imagination •••• But what is real are the
sentiments for the truly beautiful with which love
anima tes us and which' it makes us love. ''107 The
passion of love, if correctly guided, plays a vital
role as the origin of images of perfection created by
the imagination but passionately believed in and
desired.
The honour of women is strengthened in turn by their
awareness of its effect on men. The knowledge that
men will be inspired to honour them and to act
accordingly is an important motive in acting so as to
be able to have this impact. Sophie is "devoured" by
the need to love. lOa
- .
.:
Turning to Sophie the first point of note is that for
Rousseau love defines, and is defined by, women. This
is a constant in his work. It appears in the Second
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Discourse, in the 'Letter to d'Alembert' and in the
section of Emile devoted to Sophie. Love, the
fixation of desire, and hence society itself are
essentially feminine. It is of the nature of
femininity to be other-directed. The self-sufficiency
of the infant Emile is alien to the infant Sophie.
For this reason the experience of love does not make
a revolution for women as it does for men.
There is a story told in connection with Sophie that
illustrates the dangers of the imaginary in love. A
young girl, "just like Sophie", has fallen in love
with Telemachus in Fenelon's novel. She finds that no
real lover can match her imaginary one and the way is
blocked for her to find happiness in marriage.
Passionate love of this kind with its imaginative
basis has its pleasures and dangers. It has a
relation to time fundamentally different from that of
family attachments. Its illusions are dispelled by
the duration that nourishes the other's habit.
Further as a quest for intensity of experience it
validates the exceptional moment over the duration
that is ~~e found~tion of marriag~.
A crucial task is therefore the management of
romantic love after marriage to ensure that it lasts
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long enough for the formation of the habitual
attachment that is to replace it. This is the
responsibility of women: "men are generally less
constant than women and grow weary of happy love
sooner than they do."I09 In order that men not grow
tired of them before habit has grown they must
exercise the art of modesty, which by preventing too
great a familiarity to arise maintains the illusions
necessary for passionate desire.IIO
Conclusion. )
This chapter and the one before have related
Rousseau's anthropological ontology to his teaching
on sex and love. It has argued that he begins from
the proposition that there are fundamental conflicts
in the constituation of men that condemn them to
suffering. These centre on the irreconcilability of
the infinite nature of the soul, especially as
experienced in passionate desire, and the limits of
the body. In particular the social state, if it
cannot be politicised, leads to the passion of amour-
propre, with its desire for a priority that
absolute~y subordinates other,to self. This is the
condition of modern bourgeois man.
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Woman, however, is different. She does not have the
same ontological integrity, is in fact naturally
social, by reason of maternity. This means that
amour-propre, as the socially distorted form of
natural self love, does not have the same force for
her. She is the bearer of the natural and non-
political social principle. From this follows the
ethical principle that places opinion at the centre,
in contrast to the masculine equivalent that must
exclude it.
In this way the sexes come to represent the two poles
of individual autonomy and social cohesion and
responsibility. From this it follows that the
creation of a new moral entity in marriage, in which
these two principles can be mediated by love can
represent a resolution of the problems of the human
condition. In this way conjugal love, whic~ excludes
imagination, can reconcile it with finitude. The
problem here is this exclusion. Love itself has a
strong imaginary dimenSion, which acts as a threat to
the stability of the family. This problem is to be
overcome by the female management of male desire.
','
The conflicts that arise from the compound nature of
man have been twice displaced into the relation
between the sexes and made the responsibility of
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women. First, sociality has been feminised.
Independent men are domesticated by dependent women.
Male integrity is guaranteed by their relationship
with women who tie them to society in the course of
being subordinated to them. When imaginative desire
intrudes on this formation women are given the task
of managing it in order to defuse its threat. In all
this Rousseau makes woman a supplement to man.
These chapters have only sketched these ideas. The
next will examine the text where the are given their
fullest expression. In La Nouvelle Heloise Rousseau
explores the complexities of love in great depth, and
unifies love in the figure of a woman. This makes
this text the richest of all of his writings on this
subject, especially since in Emile, the other
location of an extensive discussion of love, the
structure of the pedagogy imposes certain
limitations. Emile and Sophie are so extensively
manipulated that they do not experience many
phenomena crucial to Rousseau's analysis of the
modern.
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CHAPTER THREE: EXCESS OF LOVE
In Chapters One and Two it was shown that a dominant
theme in Rousseau's thought was the difficulty of
managing masculine freedom, which appeared
particularly in the form of amour propre. This
passion for mastery was interpreted as the resultant
of the action of imagination as the primary faculty
of the free soul on the centre of men's existence,
primitive self love. Conscience was shown to be a
form of free moral self determination that allowed
transformed self love to be returned to the
independence lost in the struggle for mastery.
in the second chapter it was demonstrated that one
form of "dependence" was acknowledged as necessary
and indeed as not essentially compromising male
~ntegrity. This was the "need for a woman", which as
essentially bodily left the self-identity of
conscience intact. This "need" which in the state of
nature is intermittent and weak can become the habit
of conjugal affection without lessening the spiritual
independence of men. This allows the mediation of
free moral con~cience with a social ethic through a.
"sexual division of labour" in the ethical field.
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This mediation is disturbed by the phenomenon of
romantic love, which in bringing imagination into the
sexual relation disrupts the calm of the familial
basis of a social order that can accommodate morally
self-determining men. Women are then made
responsible, through the teaching on modesty, for the
manipulation of masculine desire so that romantic
love can be domesticated.
In this movement women have been made responsible for
the preservation of a social framework within which
masculine freedom may be expressed. Apart from the
clear difficulties with the idea of a freedom
dependent on a less than free other for its
conditions, a dependence involving a manipulation of
illusions, this has left unexplored the character of
femininity. Woman has been invoked as a "supplement",
to borrow a term of Starobinski's taken up by
Derrida, but her own being has not been defined.
Sophie, for example is explicitly educated with the
needs of Emile uppermost.l ·Indeed as was noted in the
section on feminine ethics in Chapter One, the
essence of femininity, in direct opposition to
masculinity ~ust be its oth~r-directedn~ss.
The present chapter turns to the problem of
femininity in Rousseau's thought, through his novel
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La Nouvelle Heloise, which is unique in taking a
woman as its centre and organising itself around her.
This novel has as its themes the nature of love,
which is defined here, as elsewhere, as the key to
the nature of woman. It will be shown that the
structure of masculinity has a correlate here.
Chapters One and Two argued that the soul, through
the action of imagination, repeatedly exceeded the
bounds set by first the body and then the social.
Here it will be shown that where self-love was both,
as amour propre, the source of, and as conscience,
the solution to, this problem in masculinity, the
feminine "need to love" is both the solution (for
masculinity) and the problem (for femininity). The
first was the conclusion of Chapter Two, femininity
as need to love was the supplement necessary for
masculine freedom. This will be shown again, from the
feminine perspective, by Julie as centre of the
community of Clarens, where two men who are otherwise
without social ties are bound tightly to this most
social of households by their attachment to Julie.
Julie's death is the culmination of a ,process by
.
which she spiritualises love until it can no longer
be contained on earth or in life. Julie's need to
love eventually exceeds the possibilities offered by
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the finite. Argument is possible here, as it is in
the case of conscience, as to whether this is not a
return to nature rather than an excess in the
direction of spirit. Indeed this has been perhaps the
dominant, and even assumed interpretation of Julie in
recent years. A Freudian inspired criticism has seen
in Julie's death the return of the repressed rather
than the excess of the spirit.2
This line of argument begins from Julie's affair with
her tutor and argues that her mysticism in the last
part of the book represents a consolatory illusion
which sublimates the repressed sexual energy that the
social prohibition of her desire has repressed. What
this reading has neglected is the struggle over the
definition of their love between the couple at the
beginning of the novel. Julie's love has always been
soulish rather than sexual and she sees sex as an
intrusion. It divides her from herself and has its
source outside the core of her being. While her
lover's passion has its roots in the body, in sexual
desire, hers is an emanation of her essence, of her
need to love. The beginning should be read from the
standpoint ·of the end rather than vice-ve~sa.
This is the position adopted by Starobinski in his
classic study. "Julie's death, and her profession of
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faith, open up a new ideological dimension and.
indicate a radical departure from the ideal embodied
in Clarens, that of a balanced human society. All
human order is called into question."3 Julie's death
is an opening, not a closure, it represents a new
beginning, not a defeat at the hands of the law of
the father. What it does indicate a failure of is
Rousseau's synthesis as presented in Chapter One. The
need for love has itself exploded the social order it
was to guarantee.
Masculinity cannot rely on the feminine to resolve
its problems. Later it will be suggested that in
Rousseau there is in the end no hope for the
masculine, and that Rousseau's own claim for himself,
that he embodies both the masculine and the feminine
principles is the only response available to him. Why
this response involves the flight from humanity
represented by the Reveries will be con~idered in the
last chapter of this thesis. The present chapter will
confine itself to setting out, in the context of a
reading of La Nouvelle Heloise, the way in which
femininity exceeds the social.
This will involve following Julie's story as the
development of her need to love, and her struggle to
meet it. It will be shown that it proceeds from her
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soul and that it partakes of the characteristics of
the soul substance, most particularly of its tendency
to exceed any limit, and to be incompatible with
those imposed both by the body and by the social. It
is to be distinguished sharply from the masculine
passion experienced by her lover. This distinction is
clear from the beginning, as they struggle over the
way in which they are to manage the conflict between
their love and Julie's position in her family, and it
becomes clearer in the different ways in which their
loves react to the manipulations of Wolmar. Saint-
Preux' love can be made compatible with the order of
Clarens, Julie's, despite being, or perhaps because
it is, the core of that order, cannot.
The first section of the present chapter examines the
course of the affair between the lovers, showing that
a struggle over the nature of their love is its
dynamic. This allows an analysis of the differences
between Julie's love and masculine passionate love.
It also involves a discussion of the relation between
love and social-familial responsibility for Julie.
This is a complex matter, and a fuller account
becomes possible in th~ second ·section. This covers
the "rebirth" of Julie which follows her marriage to
Wo1mar. Here an extremely complicated tangle of duty,
virtue, family love, and religion, allows Julie to
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cure herself of the sexuality contracted during her
affair and to create a new balance which combines the
familiar and the mystical to enable her to meet her
need to love at a higher level than previously.
The third section examines the way this structures
the life of the Wolmar household at Clarens, and
Julie's role in holding this community together. This
allows a deeper understanding of the character of the
feminine social ethic, in particular of its relation
to time. The imperative of Julie at Clarens is
duration, the repetition of the present in the
future. This is contrasted to both the romantic love
that dominated the first part of the book, which
emphasises the ecstatic moment, and to the religion
that underpins and comes finally to overwhelm the
ethical Julie, which presses towards the infinite.
Finally the fourth section of the chapter turns to
this, examining the last part of the book in which
the collapse of Clarens comes with Julie's willed, or
at least welcomed death. The relations of religion,
love, and ethical life are examined here and the
dynamic of spiritual. excess that destroys the
synthesis embodied at Clarens spelt out.
CHAPTER THREE Page 92
The Struggle Over Love
La Nouvelle Heloise begins where Chapter Two ended,
with the conflict between romantic love and the order
of the family, and the mediation of this conflict by
a woman. Here this mediation does not take the form
of the manipulation of desire to prolong it, since
marriage is closed off. Instead it becomes an attempt
to desexualise love to evade the social sanction of
illicit liaisons. This is a sacrifice for Julie's
lover, but for Julie is a preservation of love from a
danger posed to it by consummation. She argues that
her involvement in a sexual relationship involves not
a change in her mode of loving but an annihilation of
herself and the taking on of a shadow existence
through her lover. This means that she takes on his
definition of love but it is not taken into herself.
This is preceded by a period in which he accepts her
idea of love as congruence of souls and at this stage
Julie is already expressing love as a need of her
soul, a theme that will acquire more prominence
later. The emphasis in this section is first on the
difference of the two lovers' understandings of what
.
love is, how it relates to social life, and the
results of Julie's accepting the terms set by her
lover.
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This contrast between two forms of love demands
consideration of two differences between the lovers.
Julie as eminently social while her lover is almost
entirely excluded from the social world, and their
attitudes to the necessity of social sanction reflect
this. On the other hand there is a rhetoric of the
soul that also divides them radically. She is
"celestial", while he "creeps upon the earth."4 She
insists that their love could only be sullied and
demeaned by sex, while he argues that this is a
natural part of it. It is tempting to reduce this to
the ideological veil for the social, especially when
the social for Julie is reducible to love for her
father. This is the strategy of Freudian readers.S
,.
This ignores the term which unites the two by tracing
them back to Julie's need to love, and its feminine
nature. For Rousseau femininity functions as the
natural ground of social life, acting on men through
the transformation of sexual desire. The ground of
this functLon is the need to love, which must,
therefore be seen as as natural, and as definitive as
self-love is for men. This love is not a passion, as
is that of 'inen, and it has a fundamentally different
nature from passionate love. It is inclusive rather
than exclusive, it is realistic rather than driven by
illusion, and it lasts unlike temporary male love.
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This section will demonstrate that the loves of these
two exemplary individuals exhibit these differences.
This will be achieved first by an analysis of their
relationship during the period of their love affair,
and then by examining the way in which Saint-Preux'
love is manipulated to make it compatible with the
order of Clarens~ This prepares the way for the
analysis of the very different process that
"purifies" Julie's love, allowing her transformation
.into the mistress of Clarens.
The beginning of the affair with a mutual declaration
of love is regarded by Julie as the end of her life
and the destruction of her honour. It disrupts the
peaceful flow of her "industrious simplicitY."6 She
is right about its catastrophic implications, but the
initial despair is premature. There is a long period
in the early stages of their relationship when she is
able to impose her conception of honour on her lover
and hence to allow the reader a vision of it. Its
essence is the idea of a love freed from the bodY.7
After her terror at a love she feels dooms her she
finds that its character is such that she is safe,
"my too tender heart hath need of love, but my senses
have no need of a 10ver."S This statement is a
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crucial one. Rousseau excludes reference to passion,
and to contrast the need of the heart for love to the
need of the "senses" for lover, which as was shown
above is the basis for masculine love. Despite his
respect for Julie her lover has pressed for them to
progress towards the "natural" outcome.9 In accord
with the asocial nature of his sex he is disdainful
of all considerations deriving from her position. As
he notes she is securely embedded in her community
while he is an outsider without roots.
ry]ou are surrounded by people who cherish you and
who adore you: the cares of a tender mother, and a
father of whom you are the only hope; the
friendship of a cousin who seems to breathe only
for your sake; a whole family of which you are
the ornament; an entire town proud to have seen
you born: these all occupy a part of your
sensibility; and what is left for love is but a
small part compared with what is ravished from you
by blood and by friendship., But I, alas! a
wanderer without family and almost without
country, have no one but you on earth, and love
alone must take the place of a11.10
It was noted above that he acknowledged that his love
was inseparable from sensual desire, now he stresses
the extent to which it forms his only connection, the
one breach in his isolation. It is clear that his
love conforms to the pattern traced in the previous
chapter, while' hers' is of a radically different' kind.
He imposes his kind of love on Julie through the
violence of his sufferings. At crucial junctures he
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threatens suicide to extort from her that she will
not cede voluntarilY.ll She regards the sacrifice of
her honour as equivalent to her own destruction, as
worse than death'12 but is willing to make this
sacrifice to preserve his 1ife.13 Julie's love is
asexual, but the logic of their relationship is such
that intimacy becomes inevitable. His desire
overcomes her reticence through the combination of
his threats and her knowledge, withheld from him, of
the impossibility of its legitimation by marriage.
Julie's claim is that the consummation is the result
of her compassion for her lover, not of her own
desire. Her father's promise to his friend Wolmar has
meant that she must "either •• kill my parents,
discard my lover, or ruin myself;" Her decision is,
by sacrificing her honour effectively to end her
life, as she believes: "if I am to live, it.is only
to be miserab1e".14 This contention, that for her
sexual desire is subsequent to love, and that its
birth is artificial is one Julie insists upon at all
stages, including her reconsideration of their affair
after her marriage and return to social virtue •.
The effect of the consummation is Julie's destruction
as an independent moral entity and sUbsumption into
her lover. He makes this an alternative to social
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being: "Why cannot I •• collect my whole soul into
thee alone, and become, in turn, the universe to
Ju1ie?"15 She, while unwilling to go so far, regards
her moral identity as lost through her "fall", but
reborn through identification with him: "Since I am
no longer any thing, be thou my whole existence. The
,
only honour I have left is wholly centred in thee."16
In the affair two distinct and opposed experiences
and forms of love are being mediated. On the one hand
there is that of the tutor, a distillation of the
nature of male passion, on the other that of Julie.
the first sketch of the quite different female love
that the rest of the book will develop. In each of
the two stages their relationship passes through one
is dominant with the other as a subordinate moment.
At first Julie is able to resist consummation and can
enjoy a calm and asexual love in which she can find
fulfilment and happiness. This she remembers as a
period of the greatest possible happiness. Her lover,
though accepting her definition of love insists that
their love cannot be complete without sexual union •
.'
In accepting her terms he is making a sacrifice.
When he has his way this structure is reversed. Julie
has sacrificed herself, having now to find her moral
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identity in him. When sexual satisfaction is finally
available, on the "night of love", the "putting to
sleep of desire" returns them to something very like
the pure love of the first stage. The tutor is now
able to experience something like Juliets spiritual
love, and acknowledges its superiority.
A masculine romantic love, founded on sexual desire.
exclusive and full of, the illusions of its
passionate, imaginative character is asocial, except
in so far as it binds a man to a woman rooted in the
social field is also impatient of the flow of shared,
human, social, time, privileging the ecstatic moment
of sexual pleasure, an experience that returns the
lover to the instant of the state of nature. This is
contrasted with a feminine love that is calm and
lasting, free of illusion, and compatible with life
in a community. This love, the essence of Rousseauean
femininity, is a need of t~esoul. comparable to the
self identity of masculinity, figured in amour de
soi, and finding its expression in the moral autonomy
of the man of conscience. The next section will
examine the development of this latter love through
Julie's marriage, conversion, and ·rebirth in virtue.
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Return to Virtue
In this section the process by which Julie returns to
herself, recovering the honour and ethical existence
she has sacrificed is analysed for the light it
throws on the nature of her, of feminine, love. Here
the entanglement of ethical duty, familial love, and
the question of the opposition of body and soul will
become somewhat clearer, even if the balance between
these cannot, finally, be sustained.
Her recovery has three stages. A crisis occurs that
causes the exile of her lover. The possibility of
fleeing with him is raised for Julie in the most
attractive way. Edouard Bomston, the English noble
who has befriended them, offers refuge, and a
fortune. They are to marry and establish themselves
as an exemplary couple on an estate that he will give
to them. This offer Julie refuses.
With her marriage impending Julie develops smallpox,
and on hearing of this her lover rushes to her
bedside, deliberately infecting himself with the
disease he believes will kill her. When she ,recovers
and learns of his action the last bastions of her
resistance to him give out. She swears undying love
to him, despite having already agreed to marry the
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man of her father's choice. She now feels that an
absolute annihilation of her honour has taken place.
She is even ready to contemplate the possibility of
adultery, the very core of feminine wickedness.
Finally, during the wedding ceremony itself a total
reversal takes place. Having sunk (almost) as low as
she could go (after all she has not committed
adultery), she suddenly feels herself reborn. A
religious conversion experience takes place and Julie
is able to see herself as beginning afresh as a
respectable married woman. This extends to a
purification of her love for her former tutor, which
is now said to be such that she need not feel ashamed
of it. Julie has "returned to herself".
It will be shown that in this process Julie's duty is
reduced to the love for her father that is its basis.
Although the Oedipal dimension of this is undeniable
it cannot be reduced to this. Rather it must be seen
in the context established in Chapter Two as the
particular expression of a general priority of the
family in feminine existence. This is shown also in
the way in which Julie, after her marriage, argues
that the love of the first part of the book could not
form the basis for a marriage. The conflict between
passionate and familial love is worked through
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Julie's love of her father and its role in preventing
her elopement and enforcing her marriage.
This process of interaction between social duty and
family love also involves further developments in the
definition of Julie's love on the body/soul axis. A
remarkable reversal takes place. When Julie's fall
reaches its limit, where she prepares to marry one
man while bearing love for another in her heart, her
lover has her heart while her father disposes of her
body. Her obedience is confined to externals while
her interior is plunged into vice. Her escape from
this lies in a new intensification of soulfulness. A
religious conversion allows Grace to penetrate these
innermost recesses of her heart and to purify them.
Her love for her former lover remains but is now free .
of the sexual element that makes it difficult. She
further acquires a new and immediate relation to God.
This will be of increasing importance later. At the
time of her conversion it is pushed into the
background and her religion is an ethical one. God
becomes the guarantor of her social duty.
The process by which Julie the lover becomes Mme. de
Wolmar has involved the intervention both of family
love and of religion to rescue a social virtue that
has nonetheless retained its prime place. Indeed as
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the next section will demonstrate sociality becomes
the very essence of Julie as mistress of Clarens,
subordinating to itself religion, and even the
lovingness that makes it possible.
The crisis that marks the break between the novel of
love of the first half and the ethical experiment of
the second is precipitated by the Baron's getting a
hint of the connection between his daughter and the
commoner who was formerly her tutor.17 This leads to
a scene of extraordinary violence within the family
that culminates with the Baron beating Julie
senseless, causing her to miscarry the child she is
carrying.18 The father intervenes to destroy the
relationship and its unborn fruit. What is even more
striking is the reconciliation that follows. Julie
sits on her father's knee and an embrace follows
whose incestuous overtones are unmistakable and the
subject of a good deal of Freudian comment.19
Following this it becomes clear that Julie's lover
must flee if catastrophe is to be avoided. This sets
the scene for the first stage of Julie's rebirth, her
refusal of the' offer of'sanctuary. It is significant
that the proposal of elopement and the establishment
of a new family, which represents an attempt to
domesticate the illicit passion, comes from Edouard
CHAPTER THREE Page 103
rather than from Julie's lover. He represents a love
that rejects the basic premise of Julie's argument.
the value of duration, of the continuing social
stream. When he has earlier urged elopement they
were to "swear to live and die for each other"'20
with no reference to anyone else. For him the unity
of their souls, their passion, is alone to justify
and form the substance of their life. Edouard, by
contrast, sees them as living a public life, which,
"the people •• will be proud to imitate."21
The domestic idyll presented by Edouard belongs to a
vocabulary alien to the lover. His version of their
future puts them in isolation, free of the ties of
community that Edouard's letter stresses. For Julie
this turning away from the universal has never been
an option. Her willingness to enter into an illicit
relationship was always temporary, a holding action
while she tried to make it legitimate. With the
realisation of the impracticality of this attempt she
has only one choice. That dimension of their
difference that pits duration against the ecstatic
moment, the universal of society against the absolute
individual expresses it~elf in her deCision to stay. :
Edouard has offered her the chance, by breaking with
her own family, to establish a new one. However, she
CHAPTER THREE Page 104
1s prevented from doing so by the thought of the
anguish this would cause her parents, and in one
particularly powerful passage demonstrates a
contradiction between dereliction of her duties as a
daughter and taking on those of a mother. "Oh if [my
parents] could be witnesses to the manner in which I
would fulfil in my turn the duties which they have
fulfilled towards me! ••• and yours, ungrateful
daughter; who will discharge them while you forget
them?"22 Duty she insists, cannot be rationalised in
this context: "Since when has virtue •• weighed up
the rights of blood and of nature? ••• Is it not
already to be guilty to want to go to the point where
one begins to be so, and why would one seek so
scrupulously the limit of one's duties, if one were
not tempted to pass it."
In this stage she continues to associate love and
duty without working out the relationship between
them to the end. The core of her argument must be the
impossibility of re-establishing the order of the
family while disrupting its continuity. The theme of
duration, which is to be so central to her at Clarens
begins to appear. The question of priority between
her filial duty and filial love does not arise, since
these are bound seamlessly together. The nature of
duty itself is ruled out of bounds, the questioning
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of duty is already its dereliction. This self-denial
will collapse in the next stage in which love comes
to exceed and destroy the last refuge of virtue.
After his exile they maintain a clandestine
correspondence in which their love continues to be
given expression, while Julie stands by her decision
to stay and obey her father. She continues to regard
herself as nothing and to place her real life in him.
Further she gives him her promise that she will not
marry another without his consent.24
This situation persists for a time until it meets
with a triple crisis that intensifies the
contradiction Julie has created between the obedience
she gives her father and the continued love she feels
for her lover. Her mother discovers their letters and
shortly afterwards falls ill and dies. She blames the
discovery for this death, although Claire assures her
lover that this is not the case. Secondly M. de
Wolmar returns and her father' demands that she marry
him. Finally, immediately after she has been forced
to write to her lover asking him to release her from. .
her promise Juiie falls ill herself with smallpox.
When her lover hears of this he rushes back from
Paris and deliberately contracts her illness.
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Following her mother's death Julie has written to her
lover asserting the end of their connection.25 After
the "inoculation of love" and the smallpox which they
both survive she writes: "It is too much! •• the
victory is yours ••• This sorrowful heart which, cost
you so dear ••• is yours without reserve; •• it will
remain yours to my dying breath'"26 This surrender
sweeps away, she says "chimerical virtue ••• What are
the vain duties it prescribes in opposition to a
passion which Heaven itself inspired?27 Surprisingly,
the next paragraph tells him not to:
imagine that to follow you I will ever quit my
father's house •••• Duty, honour, virtue, all
these considerations have lost their influence,
but yet I am not a monster: ••• Let a father,
tenacious of his word, and jealous of a vain
prerogative, dispose of my hand according to his
promise; but let love alone dispose of my heart;28
In response to this letter she receives one that puts
forward arguments vindicating adultery, of which she
later says "My heart was so far depraved that my
reason could not withstand your plausible
philosophy."29 This she represents, after her
recovery, as the nadir. "Thus all my noble sentiments
were utterly extinguished; all my faculties were
altered; guilt was no longer horribie in my sight;"30
What keeps her from flight now has nothing to do with
duty. It is simply the clash of her love for her
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lover with her filial love. With Wolmar's return
imminent her father has extorted her agreement to
write to her lover by threatening her with his own
death.31 Where both the idea of virtue and her
father's violence fail, this succeeds. Julie agrees.
As she writes at the time of this crisis:
[S]he whom he expects to be his only comfort
hereafter will not increase the affliction of his
soul, already oppressed with disquietude: •••
Duty, honour, virtue, all these considerations
have lost their influence but yet I am not a
monster: I am frail but not unnatural.32
Julie is not being fair to herself. She has not lost
hold of "duty, honour, virtue," she has discovered
their essence. For her, as a woman, love, and
crucially the socially legitimated love that remains
within the family, is the ethical imperative. In
forcing her into marriage this residual ethical being
saves her from passion. Having taken the decision to
marry Julie is in a contradictory position. The two
forces of filial and sexual love, are involved in a
struggle over of her. "At the very moment I was about
to swear eternal fidelity to another my heart still
swore an eternal love to you".33
In the story she 'tells of her wedding there is a
disjunction of cause and effect. What she experiences
is twofold, a new kind of relation to the divine,
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that true inner religion which will come to dominate
her more and more, and as a consequence of this a
purification of her feelings about her lover. These
are transformed so that they no longer conflict with
her duties as daughter and wife. Her conversion
produces an inner piety which by reforming her in a
virtuous mould has desexualised her love.
The cause of this transformation is the realisation
of the "purity, dignity, and sanctity of marriage
expressed in so lively a fashion in the words of
Scripture, the chaste and sublime duties so important
to the happiness, order. peace and duration of the
human race".34 This is the subordination of religion
to marriage as a social institution and the list of
goods it brings with it. Her lover in his role as
advocate of natural sexuality stresses the instant
over duration. pleasure over happiness and the
connection between this and his role as outsider in
the communal life of Vevey. Here marriage is praised
as the core of that, and of all, communal life.
Transformed by this revelation Julie makes the
marriage vows "not only with my lips but with my
heart"·35 When she makes the experiment of examining
her feelings about Saint-Preux she finds that "I
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still loved you as much, if not more than ever; but I
felt my affection for you without a blush."36
In the church Julie has either seen that to make any
sense of her commitment to her father she must be a
good wife and has found the inner strength to do this
in a heightened piety, or she has undergone a
conversion. brought about as she seems to believe by
Grace, which subordinates the spiritual to a social
ethic. The ambiguity between these two readings is
irreducible. Each also is a moment in a developmental
process, Julie is either repressing/sublimating or
she is passing from a less to a more adequate
expression of her essentially loving nature.
This section thus concludes with Julie having
succeeded, with the help of religion, in purifying
her love in the way she had long been attempting to
and allowing herself to return to the social and
familiar. It is at here that her spiritualisation of
love comes to prominence. Until her wedding Julie has
felt that what she was doing was doubly wrong, she
was betraying her lover and w,as defiling the marriage
ceremony. She was dividing herself in two, her love
for her former lover was unchanged but driven
inwards, while she surrendered her body to another.
She is able to look with new insight on her decision
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not to marry her lover. She feels that this was the
right thing to do even in terms of her own happiness,
and Claire adds that this is true of her lover too.
She summarises with new clarity the contrast between
passionate love, which creates an exclusive relation
between the lovers and fosters indifference to all
else and a conjugal attachment that has as its
essence the fulfilling of the duties of parent'and
member of society. "The intent of matrimony is not
for man and wife to be always taken up with each
other, but jointly to discharge the duties of civil
society ••• Lovers attend to nothing but each other;
•• and all they regard is how to show their mutual
affection. "37
The lovers have no guarantee that they would have
been able to fulfil these duties. Love must pass and
when it does there are few people who are "not
ashamed of having loved each other."38 M. de Wolmar a
phlegmatic and rational man makes a far better
balance to her own loving nature. The working out of
this balance in the creation of the community of
.Clarens depends on both his dispassionate reason and
her loving nature to sustain a form of life that will
exemplify the family as ethical alternative to the
denaturing of the Republic.
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Clarens and Julie's Ethics
There are interpretations of La Nouvelle Heloise in
which the novel becomes an experiment in utopianism,
with the opening and closing sections warnings or
explorations of limits. Where Clarens is seen by the
Freudian inspired interpreters as a grim and
repressive tyranny it is here seen as Rousseau's
ideal. These two are not mutually exclusive of
course, with Shklar's version combining them in her
picture of Rousseau as an authoritarian dreamer.
Schwartz gives a more favourable judgement on
Clarens, Jones see the failure of this utopia as a
crisis that leads from Rousseau's earlier, socially
oriented texts towards the inwardness of the
Reveries. These have in common that they regard
Clarens as the definitive moment of the novel with
the the beginning and end to be seen as explained in
relation primarily to it.39
This type of reading has much to be said for it. What
weakens them is a failure to integrate this insight
with the nature of Julie's death, and the relation
between this and her love. Schwartz in particular,
while recognising the importance of the text in .
synthesising Rousseau's teaching on sex and love
fails to give any weight to the collapse of Clarens,
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while Shklar ignores the crucial question of
femininity. Furthermore Shklar and Schwartz, who have
produced two of the most influential accounts of
Rousseau in recent years have both neglected the
crucial matter of Rousseau's religion, and are hence
blocked from grasping Julie's essence.
Here Clarens is interpreted as setting out the nature
of the feminine ethic which has thus far been alluded
to without being exposited. The key is inclusiveness
and continuity, founded on a calm and enduring love,
expressed in the family. Indeed endurance becomes of
central importance to Julie at Clarens.
Wolmar is an exemplar of one form of masculinity. His
independence is that of reason as that of Saint-Preux
is that of passion. His relations to others are
essentially those of an observer without emotional
engagement.40 He is thus an excellent judge of
character and organiser of structures, but would find
it impossible on his own to generate the irrational,
affective dimension crucial to social cohesion. Julie
has the capability to supply this lack, she has the
ability to inspire love in all who encounter her.
Wolmar provides the masculine reason and authority
while Julie binds the community together with ties of
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love. Their marriage represents the Rousseauean ideal
of sexual complementarity in difference. This can be
seen in the way the organisation of the household is
carefully constructed to make all relationships "pass
through" a relationship to Julie, who is able to act
as its centre by virtue of this ability to inspire.
She plays the classic female role of binding men to
social being. Wolmar has previously been detached ,
wandering and observing, not participating. His love
of Julie changes this involving him as the master of
Clarens. Similarly her lover was isolated and
attached only to her. His love was his only real
social bond, and in combination with Wolmar's
remarkable psychological insight it will resume this
function. Julie will bring him too into the fold.
Wolmar's nature is hinted at from his first
introduction, and emerges in full clarity when he
gives an account of himself on the occasion of the
"profanation" of the grove. The key to it is his lack
of passion: "Being but little susceptible of pleasure
or grief"41 he is immune from the impulsions of the
passions. If he has any ruling pass~on "it is that of
observation". He was born into a high position, but
bored by court life detached himself from it, and
from all fixed position in society. "I successively
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threw myself into all the different situations in
life," becoming an unattached wanderer.42 In the
course of his observations in this rootless existence
his "only active principle •• a natural love of
order"43 is reinforced, and given a new turn. He
gains "a new relish for virtue" by the· pleasure of
contributing to order. This "attached me somewhat
more to myself, and from a natural progress I
perceived that I was alone."44
By this curious process where a love of order has
unified him to the degree that he requires a
companion he "found the want of some connection"
troublesome for the first time. His friend the Baron
d'Etange, on hearing of this offered Julie as
Wolmar's wife. Julie, whose extraordinary ability to
inspire love is a frequently remarked characteristic,.:
"gave me the first, or rather the only emotion I ever
experienced in my life."45 This passion is weak, as
one would expect, but it is irresistible. "How is it
possible", Wolmar asks, "to restrain a passion, be it
ever so weak, when it has no counterpoise?"46 This
one passionate force that makes itself felt in
Wolmar's heart is able to transform him from the
detached observer to the patriarch of Clarens.
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In Wolmar Rousseau presents a variation on the theme
of the independent male brought into the social by
his attachment to a woman. This also gives him the
opportunity to give another version of the
complementarity of the sexes in the new entity thus
formed. As Julie writes just after their wedding: "We
are each of us exactly made for the other; he
instructs me, I enliven him; the value of both is
increased by our union, and we seem destined to form
but one soul between us; to which he gives the
intelligence, and I direct the will."47
In this union no delusion is necessary: "we see each
other in a true light; the sentiment which unites us
is not the blind transport of passionate desire, but
a constant and invariable attachment between two
rational people".48 Her "tenderness" is balanced by
his "composure", to form an entity perfect for the
married state. The end of this state is to "discharge
the duties of civil society",49 and for this love is
not necessary. The product of their union is the
community of Clarens.
The Wolmar household and family is a very different
entity to that of the Baron d'Etange. Wolmar's
dispassionate rule, underpinned by Julie's field of
love, is benign and rational. When she is first
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encountered after her marriage she has been
established three years at Clarens. and stressing her
"dislike of the town, [her] taste for the countrY"50
she announces a change of venue, all the more marked.
given the long series of letters devoted to the
critique of city life that made up her correspondence
with her lover after his exile.
Equally, Clarens, a country house where they have
"converted to use every thing which served only for
ornament" is contrasted to the chateau of Etange,
"old, inconvenient, and gloomY"'Sl The Wolmars have
taken their distance equally from the bourgeois
modernity whose epitome is Paris, and the backward
looking noble prejudice of Juliets father. Their
household represents the project of Emile, the
withdrawal from the modern world, not into the past
but into a controlled nature~·
In this Julie's garden, the Elisee, is a most apt
symbol. It represents a break from the world of her
father, the reintroduction of nature into the world
of the Ancien Regime. In this it is one moment in the...
Wolmars' project at Clarens, also expressed in their
farming their land them~elves, and general placing of
the "useful in the place of the agreeable" in which
the really agreeable gains'52
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The aim of Wolmar in his management of the family
finances and the estate is a balance that allows of
as few changes as possible. "Order and regularity, ••
are alone capable of converting the enjoyment of
[riches] into felicitY."53 Given this the Wolmars
"applied themselves •• rather to improve their
present, than to acquire a greater fortune"S4 They
aim at an equilibrium between expenditure and income
that leads neither to increase or decrease. Further
they try to achieve the greatest degree possible of
self-sufficiency in the estate.55 In this the Clarens
community reproduces the characteristics of
independence and limitation of desire that is
Rousseau's prescription for the natural man in Emile.
In this context the dimension of temporality, which
has so far been noted without being thematised
acquires a new importance. The defining feature of
the ethics of Clarens, which is typical of Rousseau's
feminine ethics, is its validation of the enduring.
Julie's outlook in this phase is described as an
"Epicureanism of the wise". She and her husband
organise their life and their pleasures with a
constant v~ew to the long term. Moderation and.
caution are practised in order that all may be
preserved unchanged.
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Continuity could almost be named as the central
imperative of their ethical system. In this way the
everyday passage of human time becomes the privileged
temporal mode. Life is short, Julie says, "which is
reason for enjoying it to the end, and managing its
duration in such a manner as to make the most of it •
••• It sometimes happens that I break up a party of
pleasure for no other reason than that it is too
agreeable; and, by repeating it another time, have
the satisfaction of enjoying it twice."S6
To this end she pursues a general regime of restraint
and moderation. which severely rations all her
pleasures, not because she is opposed to pleasure,
but in order that it may be enduring. "She will have
it that everything which pleases the sense, and is
not necessary to life, changes its nature, whenever
it becomes habitual; that it ceases to be pleasant in
becoming needful."57 This "voluptuous temperance"'58
the principle underlying the whole way of life at
Clarens, could not be more starkly opposed to the
viewpoint of passion. This, as shown in the course of
the love affair in the first part of the novel,
o \
prefers the moment to duration.
At Clarens, all is so organised that the present is
like the past, and the future will repeat the
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present. The order of Clarens endures, because it is
well modulated. As Saint-Preux says in the midst of
the labour of the wine harvest: one "goes to bed,
content with a day passed in labour. cheerfulness.
and innocence. which he would willingly begin again
the next day, the next after that, and every day to
the last of his life"59
Here is the "simple and industrious life" that was
Julie's desire before the corruption of her heart by
love, before she "drank the fatal poison" of passion.
She has returned from the ecstasy of passion to the
mundane and domestic, and with the help of her
husband will domesticate her former lover. Wolmar
"cures" Saint-Preux. making his love compatible with
Clarens.
The cure of Saint-Preux carried out by Wolmar
involves not the purification that Julie both at the
time of her weddin,g and later in her correspondence
with Saint Preux claims as her own, but a
dissociation of two distinct experiences of love.
Wolmar works to persuade Saint Preux that Julie de,
Wolmar is a different person from Julie d'Etange and
that he would be mistaken if he imagined he had the
same feelings for these two women. Saint-Preux' love
for Julie is not altered but is displaced into memory
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and imagination where it belongs, leaving a space in
the present, in perception and action, for a
different, a quasi-familial love. Wolmar is Saint
Preux' father as well as a divine being, Julie is
Saint Preux' sister, both she and Claire are his
mother.
Saint-Preux' love is an extreme case of romantic
passion, and has its natural home in the imaginary.
Wolmar's procedure is to exploit the pastness of the
love to force it into memory and to dissociate it
from the present. When Saint-Preux returns Wolmar
stages a series of scenes the purpose of which is to
dramatise the difference between the contemporary
Mme. de Wolmar and the remembered Julie d'Etange.
This latter is the imaginary product of the
passionate love of the past. Her image would have
been tarnished and destroyed if compared to the real
Julie, but since she no longer exists to be compared
to her ideal image, love of her cannot be
disillusioned. Wolmar's aim is to separate this
vanished girl from Mme. de Wolmar in Saint-Preux'
.
mind. His love is to be preserved in memory, and
severed as far as possible from any real referent. By
this means Saint-Preux' love can be sustained and
defused.
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When his cure is complete Saint-Preux sees himself as
morally reborn, as Julie did after her conversion
experience in Church. He writes to Wolmar: "I was
dead to virtue, to happiness, and owe to you the
moral life, to which you have raised me."60 Like
Julie's parallel collapse and rebirth this has taken
the form of a progressive demoralisation, which at
the moment of crisis reverses itself and leads into a
new birth. The differences are vital, chief among
them being; first. that Julie has no help, she is
alone and sees God alone as intervening in her
salvation, while Saint-Preux is guided, or even
manipulated by Wolmarj second, Saint-Preux accepts
entirely Wolmar's version of what has happened to his
love. while Julie rejects it and substitutes a more
spiritual and refined account.
The first stage is the episode of the Elisee, the
enclosed garden in which Julie has created the
illusion of nature.61 Saint-Preux is reminded that
the groves are tied to the past by the memory of the
first kiss the lovers exchanged in them. The
differenc~. between the groye and the Elisee is the
difference between the two Julies. The Elisee "has
been planted by the hands of virtue."62
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Wolmar's pla~_is based on the violent separation from
the past imposed by the nature of the end of the
relationship.63 Saint-Preux must be made to recognise
this in order that this separation can be the means
by which his love is preserved and yet made safe.
This is to be achieved by forcing him to face the
changes that have taken place.64 Julie continues to
occupy the central place in his heart:
You have always exerted the same sovereign power;
but its effects are now different from what they
were: •• a peaceful serenity has succeeded to the
storm of the passions; my heart, modelled by
your's, loves in the same manner, and becomes
tranquil by your example. But in this transitory
repose I enjoy only a short truce with the
passions; and, though I am exalted to the
perfection of angels in your presence, I no sooner
leave it than I fall into my native meanness.65
His attachment to virtue still depends on his love
for her, but now mediated by a complex system whereby
his imaginary love is restrained by the effect of her
real influence. He is still tied to the body and its
forces, but now, through the process of driving his
passion entirely into the imagination, it is able to
take on some of her "celestial" properties •
.~
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Julie's Path To Death.
This final section of the present chapter argues that
in Julie's death the contradictions of Rousseau's
teaching on femininity become clear. Where the
contradictions of masculinity were displaced onto
women, no escape is possible for Julie, for Woman. In
her death and the collapse of Clarens it becomes
clear that Rousseau's anthropology is incompatible
with any social, or human, order. It will later be
argued that this is a problem with the kind of
freedom he ascribes to human beings, and the relation
between body and soul it establishes.
To demonstrate the significance of Julie's death this
section reprises her story, with the emphasis on the
way in which it has this death immanent in it from
the beginning. In earlier sections Julie's feminine
nature was still being defined largely through a
contrast with masculinity. This preparation now
allows a closer focus on femininity itself.
In the first phase the struggle between a pagan
soulfulness and a romanticised "natural" sexuality is
. .
the reflection within romantic love itself of a
series of conflicts. Love asserts itself against a
repressive social order. The struggle within the
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relationship of the lovers is determined by gender;
Julie, as woman, is bound by the social regulation of
sexuality while her lover is not. Julie has, under
the influence of this code, to contend with her own
sexual desire. All of these conflicts are expressed
in terms of the dualism of body and soul. Sexual love
is rejected in favour of a "pure" spiritual love.This
was traced in the first part of the present chapter.
Here the emphasis is on Julie's struggle with herself
and the conception of love expressed by her in it.
This romantic love prefigures the course of the rest
of her life. The rejection of sex and affirmation of
a community of souls is closely related to her
dispassionate marriage and passionate religion.
The earliest phase of her relationship with her tutor
is marked by an initial panic on her part, followed
by a new confidence in herself. She writes that her
"passions can rest satisfied without a lover."66 Even
when reviewing this stage from the safe haven of
marriage she still contends that at first her desires
were "innocent" and that her heart was "corrupted"
only after the first kiss in the grove at Clarens.67
In her state of innocence she "can conceive of no
..
paradise on earth equal to the union of love and
innocence."68 She believes that their love is born of
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a likeness of souls, of which bodily attraction is
only a sign: "The love I felt could not arise but
from a mutual conformity and harmony of sou1s."69 Her
lover compares to an angel: "it would seem that your
soul is too sublime for human passions"'70 This is
taken by Julie to be the natural state for her soul.
No one doubts the force of sexuality in the love of
the young man, but Julie is initially without desire,
this is not the origin of her love.
Desire is born in her heart as the result of the
first physical intimacy between them, which like
every new stage in their affair is ascribed to her
compassion for him. She rewards his restraint71 with
a kiss and: "One moment, one single moment, fired me
with a desire which nothing could extinguish; and if
my will still resisted, my heart was from that time
corrupted."72 From now on Julie has to resist not
only her lover, but also her own desire.
Her lover too has been affected by the kiss. The
impetuosity of his love increases and it seems she
must either yield to him or discard him. Thus: "It
seems that my fatal passion wished to cover itself,
in order to seduce me, with the mask of all the
virtues."73 Her passion disguises itself as virtue,
first by using her pity for her lover's suffering,
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and then presenting her "fall" as a self sacrifice in
which she ruins herself in preference to harming her
lover, or, by running away with him as he wants her
to, causing grief to her parents.
In this she acknowledges that there is an element of
self-deception, or rather that the alien passion,
using the mask of virtue, deceives her. Julie is
divided against herself. In the long letter written
after her marriage she writes that the lovers "forgot
themselves in their transports"74 after the kiss, and
that her marriage tie has "extricated me from a
slavery much more dreadful; and my husband becomes
dearer to me for having restored me to myself."75
This separation from herself is not the result of her
love but of its deformation into passion, into sexual
desire. In Julie's case the senses are awoken, not by
imagination as on civilised man, but by physical
intimacy. Her love does not proceed from the body.
This love can be made compatible with her duties as a
daughter and hence does not involve separation from
herself. This comes with consummation. When Julie
enters into a sexual rel~tionship she loses her
"honour", her sexual integrity is essential to her
moral integrity. The separation from herself that her
marriage heals is quite literal, in that her moral
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being comes to inhere in her lover. She can recover
her moral being only by surrendering herself to him.
Her analysis of this phase of their love comes to be
centred on its necessary impermanence. At the time
she writes that their "enjoyments were formerly both
temperate and lasting"76 in contrast to the brutish
transports of sex. Later she sees this as a time when
"Heaven and nature authorised the ties which united
them; •• they were less corrupted than debased".77
This could only be temporary; love alone could not
guarantee constancy, lovers would have succeeded one
another, "one deviation from virtue would have led to
another; and vice grown habitual, would no longer
have appeared horrible in my sight ••• from a seduced
virgin I would have become an abandoned woman".78
In stepping outside the bounds of duty Julie both
loses her integrity and exposes herself to the danger
of a fall from all virtue, for which her love can
temporarily stand in. She has exposed herself to this
disintegration, and to this danger because it is her
nature first to attempt to mediate the opposing
claims on her rather than to choose ruthlessly
between them, and then to take on herseif the costs
of this mediation.
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This internalisation of the opposition between her
love and her duty is further intensified after her
lover has gone into exile. It is impossible for
Julie's honour to be recovered. Her sexual activity
can only be justified by the love that moralises it.
while her duty to her father means that she cannot
bring that love into conformity with the social ethic
through marriage. As a result her heart, the inner
self, becomes the property of love. while her body is
to be surrendered to the family in marriage.
This surrender is not even motivated by duty. It is
only her father's evocation and manipulation of her
love for him that induces her final agreement to
marry Wolmar. Julie is even ready to contemplate
adultery, which she ,regards as the most fundamental
of all ethical transgressions.
The marriage ceremony itself is a moment of crisis.
As Julie goes to the church she is in despair. She
"could have beheld the preparations for my funeral
with less horror than those for my marriage." The
contradiction between her heart and her conduct
intensifies, and, she writes to her lover: "At the.. . .very time that I was prepared to swear eternal
constancy to another, my heart still vowed eternal
love to thee; and I was carried to the temple as a
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polluted victim, which defiles the altar on which it
is sacrificed."79
This profound conflict reaches a climax during the
ceremony which is the hinge between the novel of love
in the first half, and that of moral instruction in
the second. Julie undergoes a conversion experience
in which she feels that the grace of God acts to
transform her love and to return to her her lost
moral integrity: "I felt a thorough revolution within
me. An invisible power seemed suddenly to rectify the
disorder of my affections, and to settle them
according to the laws of duty and nature."aD
Two things are identified by Julie as contributing to
this: she is strongly impressed with the "purity, the
dignity, the sanctity of marriage; •• which are so
important to the happiness the order, the peace, the
being of human nature"'S1 which she says it'is the
"first and most sacred" duty of mankind to respect.
Second, she feels that God "reads the bottom of my
soul"S2 and compares her deeds and her thoughts.
"Eternal providence ••• You have recalled me to that
goodness that I was m~de to l~ve!a3 The.action of God
erases the effects of the fatal kiss and its
successors and returns Julie to her native state.
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This does not destroy her love but restores its
purity: "I was sensible that I loved you as much, if
not more than ever; but I felt my affection for you
without a blush"S4 Equally, as Wolmar recognises, she
does not and cannot love him: at the time of their
marriage he recognised, he later tells her, that
"Your heart was worn out for love: I therefore
counted for nothing a disproportion of age that took
from me the right to pretend to a sentiment which he
who was its object could not enjoy, and which was
impossible for any other to obtain."85 As Julie makes
clear in the letter on her marriage quoted above,
this is an ethical undertaking, not founded on
passion. She comes to love Wolmar, but this is the
love of habit opposed to passionate love by Rousseau,
which follows from cohabitation.
The nature of Julie's situation in her marriage is
delineated in the letter with which the book resumes,
after a space of some years. She writes to Claire
demanding the presence of her cousin at Clarens. She
has need of Claire because she seems to be losing all
the warmth of love from her life and her "sensitive
heart" responds to the chill by collecting "around it
all its natural warmth. The more it loses the more it
attaches itself to what is left."86 She lists the
connections she has and has lost. Love is "wholly
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extinguished, •• and has left a vacancy in my heart
which will never be filled up again."S7 while her
mother is dead and her children too young to return
the love she gives them. Significantly her husband
appears in this list only as being insufficiently
intoxicated with love for the children to meet
Julie's need for response.
Despite the place she occupies as the centre of the
field of love sustaining Clarens, Julie is
i
unsatisfied because love flows from, but not to her.
While she is loved by all at Clarens this is devoid
of the kind of mutuality that she needs. She writes:
"one perishes by degrees, till at length, loving no-
one but oneself, one ceases to feel and to live
before one ceases to exist."SS Although the reader
will be told repeatedly that Julie loves her husband
and is happy in her life at Clarens this introduction
to that life remains as the foundation of what
follows. She is clearly not fulfilled.
Julie has desexualised herself to the extent that
access to the ecstatic moment that is the temporal
expression ~f the body, as represented by her lover,
is closed to her. However, through her personal
relation to God, centred on private prayer, she
participates in the eternal. The mundane banality of
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C1arens absorbs her time, but her passions belong to
God. She is quite clear that Clarens allows no outlet
for her need for intense loving relation and that she
can find this only in religion.
Into this unstable and dangerous situation comes her
returned lover. His love is the normal imaginative-
passionate formation and is rendered safe as such.
What Wolmar cannot, and knows he cannot, operate on
in this way is Julie's loving nature. Her love is of
a quite different kind as one would expect, given the
masculinity of illusory passionate love. She has
explained this earlier, telling Saint-Preux that
while he has illusions about her she loves him in
knowledge of his truth. Her love is an expression of
the very essence of her being, in fact is the
paradigm of femininity and feminine love.
When Saint-Preux returns the conflict between her
nature and her life is intensified. She continues to
hold to the ethics that make central and are
necessary to the continuity of social life, but their
repression of the very aspects of Julie's nature that
they rely on for their effectiveness becomes less and
". ..
less sustainable.
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This is expressed in the correspondence she conducts
with her former lover after he has spent the winter
at Clarens and set out on a trip to Italy with his
mentor and protector, Edouard. She attempts at this
time to engineer a marriage between him and Claire,
which she describes as offering him another Julie to
take the place of the one he has lost. She argues
that this marriage is desirable because it would
render him harmless, where otherwise he would be a
sexual threat to the women of the community. Her
perseverance in this project, against the objections
of both the proposed spouses, indicates its
importance to her.
This correspondence is notable for the way in which
this theme becomes entangled with a dispute between
the two over the nature of Julie's religion. He
accuses her of becoming a "devotee", implying that
her religion is beginning to take over the centre of
her life. Her response is to deny this, arguing that
religion is compatible with, and subordinated to, her
duties as wife and mother.
Julie first raises the idea of the marriage in a. . . '.
letter to Claire, whom she believes to be in love
with Saint-Preux. In pressing Claire to face up to
this and to marry him, she shows that she remains
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uneasy about the state of her own feelings: "Yes,
Claire, you will serve your friend by indulging your
love, and I shall be more certain of my own
sentiments, when I shall no longer make a distinction
between him and you."89
This repeats a theme that has often appeared in
Julie's letters since her ex-lover's return. As
Wolmar has noted: "A veil of wisdom and honour makes
so many folds about her heart, that it is
impenetrable to human eyes, even her own."90 The
state of her heart is unknown, even to Julie, and it
is "wisdom and honour" that guarantee her against a
new fall. In this she is different from her lover
whose heart has been open to the gaze of Wolmar, and
subject to is manipulation. It is Julie who has been
active in her struggle against love.
This struggle, invisible except in the signs of
Julie's unease, has been discounted by those around
her. Claire, for example admonishes her when she
confides that she is afraid of what may happen during
her husband's absence on the occasion of the trip to
Meillerie: "Your gentleness and d~votion have given
you a taste for humility ••• you are an extravagant
devotee."91 When she puts her suggestion to Saint-
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Preux he repeats these arguments: "This extreme
timidity is as dangerous as excessive confidence."92
Claire and Saint-Preux are united in dismissing the
possibility of Julie being tempted as the product of
an imagination which takes its fears from an overly
severe interpretation of her duties. This is linked
by them both to a religious devotion that exceeds the
limits that should be set for it. They cannot
contemplate the idea of real passion remaining in
Julie's heart, for if they did, as Claire points out,
the substance of their world would be under threat.
They have underestimated the costs to Julie involved
in the life she lives at Clarens. They have not
appreciated the extent to which love is necessary for
her, despite the frequent references to it. This
becomes clear in the second letter she writes to
Saint-Preux in Italy, that known as her "swansong".
Here she describes her situation as one in which all
that she could desire on earth has come about. All
those she loves have been brought together in a
harmonious community with her as its centre. Love
flows freely to and from her within the confines of
"Clarens and no greater earthly happiness is
conceivable: "I am replete with happiness, and
satisfied with life: come death when thou wilt."93
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Yet Julie does not feel herself fulfilled: "A secret
languor steals into the bottom of my heart; •• all my
attachments are not sufficient to fill it."94
The reasons she gives for this state of affairs
reprise the problem of the passions traced in Chapter
One. It is worth quoting her at some length:
We enjoy less that which we obtain, than that
which we hope for, and are seldom happy but in
expectation. In fact, man, made to desire every
thing and obtain little, of boundless avarice, yet
narrow capacity, has received of Heaven a
consolatory aid, which brings ~o him in idea
everything he desires, displays it to his
imagination, and in one sense makes it his own;
but to render it such imaginary property still
more flattering and agreeable, it is even modified
to his passion. But this shadow vanishes the
moment the real object appears; the imagination
can no longer magnify that which we actually
possess; the charms of illusion cease where those
of enjoyment begin. The world of fancy, therefore,
the land of chimeras, is the only world worthy to
be inhabited; and such is the inanity of human
enjoyments that, except that Being which is self-
existent, there is nothing delightful but that
which has no existence at all.95
This is familiar from the material examined above,
with its contrast between infinity of imaginative
desire and the limits of possible pleasure. What is
remarkable is its ascription to Julie. In particular
her disdain for the "inanity of human enjoyments" is
a rejection of all that she has stood for up to this
moment in the novel. Apart from her temporary
"corruption" in the first part, and the "devotion"
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which she has insisted is subordinate to the mundane,
Julie has been a spokeswoman precisely for those
finite human pleasures she now seems to reject. When
in the next paragraph she goes on to say, "I am too
happy; happiness bores me."96 Rousseau adds a
footnote: "What, Julie! more contradictions! Ah! I
fear, charming devotee, that you are no longer in
accord with yourself."97
At Clarens Julie has championed the finite as that
which endures. Suddenly in this "swansong", as
Rousseau's footnote calls it, she reveals that this
no longer convinces her. As the name given this
letter indicates, this is the last letter she will
write before the accident that leads to her death, a
death she has already invited: "come, death, when
thou wilt! I no longer dread thy power:" The analysis
of the significance of this death forms the
concluding part of this chapter, and of the first
part of this thesis.
'.
There are three interpretations of her death that are
offered to the attentive reader. This section will
consider all three, and the relations betwe~n them,
in the light both of the novel and of Rousseau's
thought as set out in the previous chapter. The first
is that it is a sacrifice of Julie in which she is
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absorbed in the spirit of the community she leaves
behind, an apotheosis of Mme. de Wolmar, the moving
spirit of Clarens. The next is that which can be
drawn from the swansongj Julie has come to experience
the "inanity of human pleasures", in contrast to the
plenitude promised by her mystical religion, and
sheds her animal encumbrance in order to pass over to
God's side.
Finally there is the woman fearful for her virtue,
who flies from the temptations of the flesh. this
last has elements in common with the other two, as
will emerge in the course of the exposition. Indeed
in most recent readings of Julie this last absorbs
the others, but this is a serious distortion of
Rousseau's thought, which suppresses themes which, it
is argued here, are at the centre of his work.
Immediately after the swansong comes the announcement
of the accident. Julie's youngest child has plunged
into the water from a dike on the lake, during an
expedition mentioned in her last letter. She has
thrown herself in after him. While both were pulled
out, the mother has fallen into a condition from
. .
which she will not recover.98 Julie's death is the
result of an action determined by her maternity. She
has sacrificed herself for her child. In the letter
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from Wolmar to Saint-Preux describing her last days
this theme is developed and expanded.
The singularity of the story, Wolmar writes, is the
way Julie employed her last days: "she foresaw, she
said, that [her illness] would prevent her from
discharging her part" in the education of her
children, "and charged us with dividing it amongst
us"99 As she lies dying her first thought is to
ensure that her place as mother be filled. Then her
concern is to ease the grief of the others.
In addition to these marks of her sacrificing herself
to children and husband she also writes that after
her death she will continue to live in the community
at C1arens: "my friend, my children, think not that I
shall leave you; I will remain with you, will reside
amongst you;"lOO and in writing to Saint-Preux she
urges him: "Come and join [my] family, in the midst
of whom Julie's heart will still be found. Let every
one that was dear to her unite to give her a new
being·"lOI
One thread is thus.the idea that Julie sacrifices
herself for the good of those that remain and that
she who has been the spirit of the community, now
becomes that alone. This coincides with the idea
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alluded to earlier, that Julie after her marriage
gives up her own desires to an ethic that demands her
love as its substance without returning anything to
her. Here that gift becomes the gift of her life.
This general idea, expressed so far in Julie's
sacrificing herself for the life of her child and the
salvation of her husband can be specified further in
way that introduces a new element. In her final
letter to Saint-Preux, written on her death bed and
sent after her demise by her husband she writes:
Long have I indulged myself in the salutary
delusion, that my passion was extinguished; the
delusion is now vanished, when it can no longer be
useful ••• who could have answered for my future
years? ••• That virtue, which separated us on
earth, will unite us for ever in the mansions of
the blessed. I die in that peaceful hopej102
This letter, and the explanation she gives her
husband in entrusting it to himl03 indicate that
Julie's passion was not only not cured but was still
dangerous in a way that Saint-Preux' was not. Julie's
love was always only incidentally sexual but here is
evidence that the danger of it "awakening the senses"
was always inherent. After repressing it so long
Julie comes to recognise the danger posed, and hence
is "content to die". Moreover her love, being
concerned with the spirit, can regard death as a way
of realising itself.
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This in turn connects with the third line of
interpretation. Earthly love, with the limitations
imposed by finitude and embodiment, is one of the
"inane" human pleasures. In discussing her religious
belief Saint-Preux has written:
no terrestrial object being equal to the need to
love that devours her, that excess of sensibility
is forced to re-ascend to its source. This is not,
like Saint Theresa, an amorous heart, which
changes its object and wishes to deceive itself;
this is a truly inexhaustible heart which neither
love nor friendship can drain, and which carries
its superabundant affections to the sole being
worthy to absorb them.104
In distinguishing Julie's inexaustible heart, with
its need to love, from an "amorous" heart, which
deceives itself as to the nature of its passion,
Rousseau reminds the reader of the character of
Julie's love. This is an expression of the essence of
the feminine, like Sophie's corresponding need, and
not the product of imagination. It is a need, not a
passion. Like the passions, though, it cannot be
satisfied with merely human and finite pleasures. In
this it corresponds to the love Julie felt during the
epoch of her love affair. This was at its best before
the corruption of her heart by physical intimacy.
,
Her "devoeion" can theiefore bci seen as a development
of a characteristic present from the beginning, and
the difficulty she finds in reconciling it with the
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mundane as closely related to the conflict between
her love and her family in the first part of the
novel. This is spelt out in the "swansong". There she
seeks to justify her "devotion" against criticisms
made by Saint-Preux. A passage was quoted above from
this letter that staged her problem as being that of
the contrast of the imaginary and the real. A little
later she restates it in slightly different form:
finding nothing in this world capable of giving it
satisfaction, my desiring soul seeks an object in
another world; in elevating itself to the source
of its sentiment and existence, its languor
vanishes; it is re-animated; ••• obtains a new
existence independent of corporeal passions, or
rather it exists no longer in me, but in the
immensity of the supreme being; and disencumbered
for a while from its terrestrial shackles, returns
to them again with patience, consoled with the
expectation of futuritY.105
Julie returns to a familiar theme. Just as the Vicar
has suggested that the conscience is an instinct of
the soul, with which the body interferes so Julie
claims about her love. She suggests that the love
which she has felt for her lover was a form of this
love, whose real object is God. In writing of the
shackles of the corporeal passions she reminds Saint-
Preux of the way in which se~uality interfered.with
their love. This would suggest that her death might
be interpreted as the final freeing of her soul from
her body, as her reflections on her death bed, her
"profession of faith", might also indicate.
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In her discourse with the pastor as she lies dying
she says: "In a few days my soul, freed from its
mortal form, will begin to pay [God] more worthily
that immortal homage that will be my happiness
through all eternitY."106 her soul can look forward
to death as not only a release but as a movement to a
higher form of satisfaction, in union with God.
It is tempting to regard this as wish fulfilment,
that Julie has retreated from the threat to her order
posed by her passion into a fantasy of purity and
compensation founded on the myth of the soul as an
entity independent of the body. On the other hand
there is the possibility that Julie is right in her
own assessment of what has happened. Her passion has
proved incompatible with the social, but her end is
not an escape from it, but an accession to it. In
this case her end is the telos of her beginning, her
devoted death is the truth of her version of love.
In either case the project of Clarens has failed, but
in one case it has been a detour imposed by a
r.epressiVe ethic and leading nowhere; while in the
other it is a stage of purification that has freed
Julie from sexual passion, given her back her moral
being and prepared her for her death as triumph.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that through a reading of La
Nouvelle Heloise it is possible to bring out a
feminine essence that elsewhere is invoked as the
site of the resolution of the problems of the
masculinity that occupies the centre of attention.
When this is worked through it becomes clear that
those problems are replicated in a new excess, this
time not of self-love, but of the need to love, and
be loved by, others. Freedom, as transgression of any
limit, is again at work, this time on this feminine
need, which thus corresponds to the need for
integrity of men. The soul has again proved resistant
to integration with the limits imposed by human
existence, but this time displacement is impossible.
In addition to the contradiction within the structure
of Rousseauean masculinity, that freedom and self-
determination depend on unfreedom, it now appears
that freedom cannot be denied to women. Julie's death
claims that freedom in the only way available to her.
That many would regard that way as illusory should
not disguise the fact that Rousseau himself did not.
As the Reveries make abundantly clear his own way was
also to lie in a flight from the social towards a
self-sufficient mysticism
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CONCLUSION TO PART I
The chapters on Rousseau have argued that his thought
has at its centre an attempt to reconcile self
determining conscience with an ethic of social
responsibility, and that this attempt is made through
the medium of sexual difference. The duality that is
to be reconciled has been traced to his philosophical
anthropology, and the way in which this recurs as a
theme through a dialectical development of forms of
love set out. Finally it has been argued that the
excessive character of the freedom he makes the
essence of the soul proves incompatible with any kind
of social, and of human, existence.
In the first chapters the nature of masculinity,
which is consistently made into a norm in the works
considered there, was analysed, and shown to depend
on a displacement of unresolved difficulties into the
sexual field, where they were made the responsibility
of women. This was carried out through the ascription
of a natural sociality to women, which was to
complement the primary independence of men. To this
end a dual ethic was developed, with marriage
creating a single moral being, which could synthesise
them. In this synthesis men were given absolute
mastery, as they must if their independence were to
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be preserved, but it was necessary for women to
actually control them through "guile", as they must
if the men were to be socialised.
The third chapter turned to femininity, through a
reading of La Nouvelle Heloise. Here, it was argued,
the nature of feminine sociality could be discovered
in the form of a "need to love". This need
corresponds to the primitive "amour de soi", which
was.the bedrock of masculine psychology. Where self-
identity was the absolute value of masculinity
relatedness was the essence of femininity. It is this
that makes women social and men asocial in Rousseau.
It was shown through a careful consideration of
Julie's story that this need to love, no less than
the male need for self-containment, was subject to
the excessive logic of the free soul. In sociality it
can receive only partial expression and satisfaction,
and ultimately breaks through into a mystical
religion, whose telos is death as release and as
movement to God. Femininity has nowhere else to go,
having already acted as the receptacle of the
problems of the masculine. The full significance of
'this structure will be set out in the final part of
the thesis, where the relations of sex, gender, and
freedom will be reconsidered~
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PART II: INTRODUCTION
The second part of this thesis begins by developing a
critique of Rousseau in the context of an exposition
of the thought of Freud. This has two main elements:
Rousseau's dualism is contrasted to Freudian
ambivalence, and these are held to correspond to,
respectively, an escapist and a responsible or
resigned attitude to the necessity of suffering;
secondly, and correlatively, Freud's thought is shown
to reject the opposition of conscience and social
ethics, and to make these continuous. This approach
to ethics is shown to undermine the Rousseauean
position of natural goodness and natural
independence. The Freudian subject is constituted in
relation, and is never integral.
This argument is developed particularly through a
consideration of the nature of conscience. It is
shown that the development of conscience in Rousseau
depends on the idea of an original independence from
and indifference to others. This is clear from the
education of Emile, and from the structure of the
contrast between the forms of self love in the Second
Discourse. The Freudian positing of infantile
sexuality, and the role of this in the formation of
"conscience", of the super-ego, means that morality
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becomes the resultant of relation to other, which can
only become self-determining in a limited sense, and
as the result of a difficult struggle.
This discussion of the origin and nature of morality
in Freud leads to a consideration of the nature of
freedom or autonomy in the psychoanalytic project. It
has often been noted that there is a tension in Freud
on this question. On the one hand he insists on his
attachment to a doctrine of scientific determinism,
arid the "hermeneutic of suspicion" dethrones the
self-legislating subject through the interpretation
of unconscious and pathological motivation. On the
other the therapeutic practice is dedicated to the
liberation of the I through the dissolution of
repression, and the pushing back of the barriers of
the id.
This liberation can be seen to have two main
elements, that come to the fore in different texts,
but should not be thought of as contradictory. First
there is the liberation of the ego from the excessive
repressions imposed by the super-ego. This involves
Freud in a distinction between a rational and an... .
irrational element in morality, a distinction that
reaches its fullest expression in Moses and
Monotheism. There he makes more explicit the
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difference between the repressive and terroristic law
of the father and a rational "law of the brothers",
implicit at least since Totem and Taboo. This
rational, contractarian social law is to be freed
from its entanglement with the Oedipal violence
toallow the creation of the the utopia of The Future
of an Illusion.
The second element of the liberation offered by
analysis is that from the excessive demands of the
ide The ego, freed from the restraints of the
irrational super-ego, can negotiate the currents of
instinctual desire in such a way that instinct is
integrated into the self and brought under the sway
of the reality principle, "where id was ego shall
be". Where the critique of religion expresses the
struggle of the ego against the super-ego, the work
of science as the completion of the project of the
reality prinCiple is directed to the id, the second
of the "stern masters". (Of course it is not so
straightforward as this, science and the critique of
religion are inextricable, as are rational sociality
and the rationalisation of desire. However it is
convenient to separate them for purpose~ of
exposition.)
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The exposition of analysis as science of liberation,
as the scientific struggle to free the ego from its
two internal masters in order to strengthen it in
face of the external world, the third and most
recalcitrant, concludes by returning to the
comparison with Rousseau. Where Rousseau posited an
infinitely excessive freedom, which he could not then
rconcile with the finite possibilities of actuality,
Freud begins with this finitude and teaches freedom
as resigned acceptance of it. The excessive demands
both of the super-ego and of the id are to be exposed
as pathological and the realisitic ego placed in
charge. The autonomy of the ego is the victory of a
ratioanlity that has recognised its limits. This
concludes the first chapter on Freud.
The second chapter turns to the unresolved tensions
of the Freud's position, and particularly to gender.
As in Rousseau sexual difference is essential to the
formation of the ethical subject, and as in Rousseau
this is obscured texts that take masculinity as the
norm, suppressing its dependence on femininity. In
Freud this becomes clear in those texts from the mid
1920s on that turn their attent10n to the feminine.. .
This is accompanied by a deeper understanding of the
nature and import of the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex, and the role of sexual difference in it
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This theme can be usefully approached through the
1937 article 'Analysis terminable and Interminable'.
Freud dicusses as the most intractable of analytic
problems the "repudiation of femininity". It is
suggested that both men and women are in flight from
the position of woman, and that this flight is the
source of many of the most difficult pathological
formations encountered by analysts. Freud stresses
the necessity of the analyst overcoming this and
enforcing the feminine in the case of women.
With this he makes explicit his complicity with a
rigid system of gender identity the nature of which
may be traced through his writings on femininity in
particular, and which, it becomes clear, is essential
to the system of his thought. This is one limit to
the liberation of the ego, that it cannot be extended
to women. The apparently casual and unsystematic
passages scatterred through Freud's writings on the
irrational, amoral, and antisocial nature of womem
can be seen, through a careful consideration of the
role of sexual difference and of the flight from
femininity in forming the characters of the two sexes
in the Oedipal drama, to be indispensable.
This problem in regard of gender is connected to
another, which is most notably analysed in Ricoeur's
Page 152
Freud and Philosophy. This is his denial of the
possibility of the ego's transcending its position in
relation. No ego morality is possible, and hence the
imposition of compulsive super-ego morality through
the terror of the Oedipus complex has as its main
alternative the return of the terror of the primal
horde. This is the fear that haunts the pages of
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and of
Civilisation and its Discontents. The utopian vision
of The Future of an Illusion, with its replacement of
compulsion with rational assent, is a fleeting one.
More typical is Freud's famous pessimism, which sees
as the only alternative to the unleashing of the
terror of the death instinct its turning against the
self through the action of the super-ego.
This problem in Freud must be seen in the context of
the place of the idea of ambivalence in his thought,
with which the first chapter on Freud began. There
are two fundamental ambivalent relations in Freud.
There is the primal ambivalence between eros and
death, in which the two great instinctual formations
are inseparably bound together; and there is the
ambivalence of desier and authority, in which the
structures of the super-ego are put in place by and
as desire. The second "limit of psychoanalytic
liberation is figured in the way in which this second
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ambivalent relation can never become fully
internalised. There remains an element of pure
externality in the relation of authority and desire,
and .Freud's attempt to deal with this leads to the
absurdities of the "archaic residue" and of the myth
of the primal murder.
Civilisation, culture, is ultimately imposed on the
self, and cannot become unified with it. Despite the
placing of relation at the heart of the formation of
the subject the externality is not overcome, the
cultural cannot be owned and hence terror remains
necessary. Moreover this terror cannot be sublimated
by women as it can by men. In 'The Economic Problem
of Masochism', in many ways the most profound of all
Freud's reflections on the place of the feminine in
his thought, a feminine morality of desire is
posited. Women can never experience the full terror
of castration, and thus can never overcome it. They
can never identify with the father but only desire
him. For them morality must remain external and their
relation to it is the desire to be punished.
'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' must be read
.
with this in mind. Because cultural imperatives can
never fully be rationalised, never be owned, even by
men, the masochistic feminine identity must be
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enforced. Freud not only describes but polices a
misogynistic system of rigid gender identity. The
next chapter introduces the writings of Kierkegaard
to suggest that a relation to freedom that rejects
both the flight from actuality of Rousseau, and the
resigned acceptance of Freud, offers the possibility
of transcending the rigid and hierarchical sexual
systems they have both described and enforced.
In 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' Freud
suggests that the "repudiation of femininity" is a
barrier beyond which analysis cannot pass. It forms a
limit to the liberation offered by analytic therapy.
The pathology of gender is an absolute. This late
insight, flowing from the sustained attention to
questions of gender, is intimately connected with the
other great project of the last period of Freud's
life, the analysis of culture and of religion.
Central to the argument of this thesis is the idea
that the tragic account of culture that received its
summation in Civilisation and its Discontents is
inseparable from the place given to gender. That
engendering is the key moment in acculturation and
that the violence of this act is both too awful to. .
, . .
contemplate (the limit of analysis) and essential to
the very existence of culture (the tragedy of
culture) is the tragic terminus of Freudian thought.
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As in the case of Rousseau it is important to hold
this dialectic of gender in its specificity while
examining the anthropology that is its counterpart.
The account of sexual difference must be framed by
its ontological assumptions without being reduced to
a mere expression of it. The key to this here is the
comparison with the works of Kierkegaard, where
sexuality is recognised and given importance, while
also, and shudderingly, erased in the movement of
faith. Before God, but only before God, sexual
difference recedes. In that difficult moment where
the ethical is suspended, and in the present context
all the connotations of that word are necessary, the
sexual, definitive of the ethical, is also suspended.
Because Freud can only conceive of this suspension as
the analytic situation or as the terror of the primal
horde, reborn perhaps as fascism, the ethical, and
,"
gender, can never achieve suspension. The analytic
encounter enforces rather than transcends gender and
the analysis of culture tends towards a hypostsasis
of the social as a (male) personality. It is this
that leads to the absurdities of the "phylogenetic
residue", of the cultural latency period and of the. .. .
myth of the primal murder. These speculations convey
the magnitude of the Freudian endeavour, and its fate
without the transcendent moment of spirit.
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CHAPTER FOUR: A SCIENCE OF LIBERATION
This chapter argues that in Freud may be found an
ethic of resignation, of acceptance of the necessity
of suffering and the limits of actual existence that
contrasts sharply with the escapism of Rousseau. This
is deeply connected to the thought of ambivalence.
Where Rousseau's dualism allowed the poles to be
separated, and in their simplicity to come to rest,
in Freud no such reduction of the compound nature of
human being is countenanced. This comes to fullest
expression in the synthesis of Civilisation and its
Discontents, where the mutual entanglement of the
instincts of life and death provides the ground for a
profound integration of Freud's accounts of
individual and of cultural development.
This contrast is traced out through the notion of
conscience, and in particular of its relation to
social-ethical life. In Part One it was shown that
Rousseau opposed the self-determining morality of
conscience to a social ethic of continuity and
solidarity. Conscience was the agency of the
assertion of the self against the domination of a
sociality that disrupted its primitive and natural
integrity. This possibility rested on the natural
independence of man. Further it was opposed to the
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passions, to desire. Conscience was the moral sense
of an integral and independent man, free from desire
and immediate in his relation to self.
Freud rejects this view of the origin and nature of
conscience in every particular. Conscience, or the
superego whose voice conscience is, internalises
external authority. The superego is the aspect of the
self which most inexorably subjects it to the the
social, to civilisation. It is the "garrison" within
the self of culture. It divides the self, the ego,
against itself: far from offering the possibility of
a return to a lost integrity, as did conscience in
Rousseau, the superego turns the fantastic desire for
such a return into the occasion for intensifying the
division that the ego has disguised through its
attempts to centre the libidinal instincts on itself.
Finally the origin of the superego lies not-in a lost
self-sufficiency but in far-reaching dependence. In
positing infantile sexuality and the drama of the
Oedipus complex Freud makes the constitution of the
self and its acquisition of a moral sense the result
of the powerful object relations of the pre-oedipal..
child. Desire far from being a late and disruptive
addition to the self, as passion was in Rousseau, is
what makes the it possible.
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From this results a radically different concept of
freedom. Psychoanalysis holds out the possibility, in
alliance with the ego, of freeing it from the
domination of its stern masters, the id and the
superego. In this the location and nature of
liberation is transformed. Where Rousseau situated an
infinite and excessive freedom in the conscience
Freud aims to strengthen the ego, the bearer of the
reality principle. It is the blind desire of the id
and the unyielding dutifulness of the superego that
are to give way to the finite calculation of the ego.
Freud rejects illusion and urges that one face and
accept the division of the self from itself, which as
its most fundamental is the duality of life and death
instincts. In comprehension he suggests lies victory.
Sublimation of instinct provides a way of easing the
pain of the "war of the.giants" that is waged in the
innermost constitution of each of us. From a resigned
embrace of truth comes the only freedom we can know.
This chapter seeks to exposit the various dimensions
of this notion of conscience and to explore
psychoanalysis as a science of liberation as a
preparation for examination of the limits of analysis
in the next chapter. In this it draws chiefly on what
might be called the "classic texts" of philosophical
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interpretation of Freud. By this is intended chiefly
the work of Ricoeur, within the phenomenological
tradition, and Marcuse within the Hegelian (Marxist).
In addition the more sociological writings of Rieff,
and to a lesser extent Brown have been influential.
These texts have formed the basis for a "mainstream"
anglo-american reading of Freud within which the
present study largely falls. In more rececnt years
Lacan has been increasingly important in forming
images of Freud, but is not extensively utilised or
discussed here because the intention is to engage
directly with the Freudian text, and for this purpose
Lacan is not very helpful. His work, fascinating and
suggestive though it often is, provides an extremely
tendentious interpretation of Freud.
It is argued that the strength, and the weakness, of
Freud is his identification with the finite ego. This
lies counter to the main thrust of Lacan's work.
Since limitations of space preclude any substantive
discussion of this difference Lacan has largely been
excluded. It should be clear, however, that the
conclusions drawn have important resemblances to. .
~Lacanian criticisms of the "imaginary ego", which in
other context could usefully be developed.
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Conscience and Superego
This section begins from a critical review of the
Rousseauean doctrine of conscience, which examines
its presuppositions in the light of the Freudian
account of the formation and nature of the agency of
conscience, the superego. This argument contrasts the
original independence and simplicity of the
Rousseauean subject, which is the precondition of
conscience, with the compound and dependent formation
first of the ego and then of its special agency the
superego. It is shown that in both these movements
the self is unified and structured through its
relation to other. In this relation it emerges from
the chaos of the neo-natal auto-erotic instincts
through the imposition of authority.
The Freudian superego as the agency responsible for
the moral sense corresponds to Rousseau's conscience.
These two stand in a very different relation to
social being. The first part of the present section
explores this difference in the context of a
comparison of the formation of Emile's conscience and
of the superego. It is shown that the possibility of
conscience in the former case rests on Emile's
independence as a child, and on the related notion of
"natural goodness". Freud's analysis of infantile
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sexuality, and of the fundamental opposition of Eros
and the death instinct stand in contradiction to
these crucial Rousseauean ideas. The Freudian subject
has no ground outside relation of the kind to which
Rousseau, in his accounts of childhood and of the
state of nature, posits as the foundation of the
morality of the man of conscience.
In the account of the formation, and nature, of the
superego (explanation and description are always
genetic in Freud) it is further shown that moral
authority, the structures that oppose and limit
instinct, are themselves desirous. This is true both
of the ego, and of its "differentiating grade"! the
superego. In Rousseau, as in his great inheritor,,
Kant, conscience is opposed to desire. This
opposition is more complex in Rousseau than in Kant,
given the "sentimental" dimension of his moral
thought, but is real nonetheless. This is clearest in
the account of Law in the Social Contract, but is
also to be found in his other writings. Conscience
returns desire to its origin in self-love, in which
the space of desire cannot be opened up. The divided
self-love of amour-pro pre , in which desire interposes. .
between the self and itself, is what is to be
overcome in conscience. The presence of desire in the
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formation of the self, and of its moral identity, is
one of the most revolutionary of Freud's discoveries.
In Rousseau the conscience, the agency of morality,
has as its essence its independence of the judgement
of others. As was shown in the first chapter of this
thesis this characteristic is closely related to the
problem of desire, or to use Rousseau's own term, of
passion. Conscience, by returning the passion of
amour propre to the closed economy of the self, in
which it originates as amour propre, closes the space
of desire. In this it reproduces the characteristics
of the man of the state of nature who exists in a
closed moment of need and satisfaction. In this sense
conscience is opposed to, and prevents, the emergence
of desire.
This oPPosition is taken further in the doctrine of
law in the Social Contract, where the universality of
law is designed specifically to exclude the intrusion
of individual desire and secure indifference in the
act of legislation. It is this side of Rousseau's
thought that was so to influence Kant. The opposition
of conscience, and of the natural man, to desire can
be found also in the Reveries of a Solitary Stroller.
In the famous fifth walk Rousseau describes the most
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complete and perfect happiness of which he can
conceive. He asks:
What is the source of our happiness in such a
state? Nothing external to us, nothing apart from
ourselves and our own existence; as long as this
state lasts we are self-sufficient like God ••••
But most men being continually stirred by passion
know little of this condition •••• [I]t cannot be
. experienced by every soul or in every situation.
The heart must be at peace and its calm untroubled
by any passion.2
Crucially the heart must not be troubled by a bad
conscience, which disturbs its peace with itself. As
Rousseau writes in Emile; "take away the pains of the
body and the remorse of conscience, all our ills are
imaginary."3 The pains of conscience are real because
they divide the self against itself. In this way the
doctrines of conscience and of the state of nature
unite against desire.
This is reflected in the education of Emile. In
childhood he is absolutely independent. He is "almost
only a physical being"4 "He considers himself without
regard to others and finds it good that others do not
think of him."S Although, as shown above, at the end
of the first and in the second chapters of this
thesis, this state of being "alone in human society",
of having "a heart that is free and without
passions."6 cannot last, it is the necessary
preparation for the education of his conscience.
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Freud's analysis of the role of infantile sexual
desire in the formation of the self flatly
contradicts the Rousseauean idyll of free and
independent childhood. In the Oedipal drama the child
is placed in a relation of desire and not just of
need to the mother from almost the beginning. Desire
is formative. Conscience, the agency that rescues
from desire in Rousseau is in Freud a precipitate and
an agency of desire.
Desire is crucial to the two differentiations that
Freud distinguishes in the formation of the self.
First the ego emerges from the id, and then later the
superego from the ego. In each of these processes
desire, the cathexis of an object plays the leading
role. The self emerges as and is then transformed by
the creation within it of an object of desire, and in
each case this object is defined by desire. In this
way the relation to self is fundamentally different
from the immediate love of self in the primitive man
or child posited by Rousseau, where desire, the space
of non- or suspended satisfaction, is excluded.
The first of these processes, the narcissistic.
positing of the primitive ego~ will be examined
first. In this will become clear the second, and
concomitant, difference between Freud and Rousseau,
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the role of the other in defining the self. In
Rousseau, as has been shown above, it is crucial to
the essence of masculinity, its independence, that
the self should have a ground outside relation. This
cannot be the case for the Freudian self. Even the
narcissistic "pleasure-ego" comes into being in
relation to an object.
One dimension of Freud's theory of the ego makes of
it the representative of the external world, the
bearer of the reality principle and"hence of rational
evaluation of real possibilitY.7 This moment in his
ego-psychology will be considered below, when the
idea of psycho-analysis as science of liberation is
discussed. Another crucial moment, though, is that of
the ego as narcissistic object.a
The two classic statements of this are in 'On
Narcissism: an Introduction' from 1914, and in
'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' from 1915, but the
terms "reality ego" and "pleasure ego" can be found,
for example, in 'Negation' from 1925'9 and in the
discussion of narcissism and the formation of the ego
in the first chapter of Civilisation and its
Discontents from 1930.10 It is thus clear that
although Freud often stressed the role of the ego as
representative of the external world this did not
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preclude his continued recognition of the role of
libidinal forces in its creation. Indeed there is a
close relationship between the two sources of origin
of this agency.
The first stage in the establishment of the ego from
the "undifferentiated ego-id"11 is the distinction
between inside and outside. "The antithesis ego-non-
ego is •• thrust upon the individual organism at an
early stage by the experience that it can silence
external stimuli by means of muscular action, but is
defenceless against instinctual stimuli."12 This
first moment of differentiation leads to the
establishment of an original "reality ego", which
distinguishes "internal and external by means of a
sound objective criterion".13
Even at this early, and apparently realistic, phase
of its development desire plays a role. The
distinction of inside and outside is made on the
basis of the difference between sense stimuli and the
pressure of the instincts for satisfaction. At the
next stage the pleasure principle, the postulated
fund~mental gu~de to mental a~~ivity, intervenes to
redefine the ego on its own terms. The pleasure
principle, in the pure form in which it here appears,
can be identified with the "primary process", in
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which the mental apparatus takes a "short cut" to
satisfaction through wish-fulfilling phantasY.14
This principle transforms the initial "reality ego"
into a "purified 'pleasure-ego', which places the
characteristic of pleasure above all others. For the
pleasure-ego the external world is divided into a
part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated
into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to
it."15 This "primitive pleasure-ego cannot escape
rectification through experience"16 so that a new and
more developed reality-ego is then re-established. On
this account, drawn from 'Instincts and their
Vicissitudes' the operation of the pleasure principle
merely interferes with the establishment of an ego
fundamentally leaning on a realistic separation of
self and other.
There is, however, a different and more complex
account to be discovered in other texts, which while
it does not contradict this reality-pleasure-reality
sequence disturbs it by the introduction of the
concepts of narcissism and of identification. The
classic statement of this is in 'On Narcissism: an
Introduction' where Freud writes that "a unity
comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual
from the start; the ego has to be developed. The
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auto-eroti~ instincts, however, are there from the
very first; so there must be something added to auto-
erotism - a new psychical action - in order to bring
about narcissism."17 This new action is
identification.
At the very beginning, all the libido is
accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in
process of formation or is still feeble. The id
sends part of this libido out into erotic object-
cathexes, whereupon the ego, now grown stronger,
tries to get hold of this object-libido and to
force itself on the id as a love object. The
narcissism of the ego is thus a secondary one,
which has been withdrawn from objects.18
As is made quite clear in the paragraph preceding the
one just quoted the mechanism for this is
identification. The unity of the ego is established
at least partly through its taking on the identity of
the object and thus recreating itself as an erotic
object. Narcissistic cathexis is a moment of the
definition of the self. The ego emerges as desired,
and models itself after the objects it finds
cathected. This allows Freud to speculate that "the
character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned
object-cathexes and that it contains the history of
those object choices."19
Of these identifications one above all stands out.
This is the identification with the father which is
to explain the origin and nature of the agency of
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conscience, the superego. The examination of this
explanation is the main task of the present section.
The preceding discussion of the role of desire in the
formation of the ego is only a preparation, here as
in Freud, for the more profound part it plays in the
creation of the moral sense, of the possibility of
guilt. This in turn can only be fully explained once
the critique of culture is grasped, a task which is
here delayed, for reasons of expository clarity.
To understand the theory of the super-ego it is
necessary first to make clear the structure of the
Oedipus Complex. This has three essential elements,
all of them vital to the formation and dissolution of
the "nuclear complex". These are the narcissistic
relation to self; the "anaclitic" object cathexis of
the mother; and the identification with the father.
(It should be made clear here that, as in Part I,
this exposition follows the example of its object
text in taking the masculine case in isolation first,
the feminine case will be extensively discussed in
the next chapter. In Freud this delay was, of course,
chronological. Femininity only became a major concern
of his in the 1920s.)
The self-cathexis has been outlined, it remains to
consider anaclitic object choice and identification.
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The first of these is most extensively dealt with in
'On Narcissism: an Introduction', where it is
contrasted with the choice of the self as object. "We
say that a human being has originally two sexual
objects - himself and the woman who nurses him".20
The term "anaclitic type" is the English translation
of the German "Anlehnungstypus" or "leaning-on-
type".21 Its significance is explained in the text:
The first auto-erotic sexual satisfactions are
experienced in connection with vital functions
which serve the purpose of self-preservation. The
sexual instincts are at the outset attached to the
satisfaction of the ego-instincts and only later
do they become independent of these, and even then
we have an indication of that original attachment
in the fact that the persons who are concerned
with a child's feeding, care and protection become
his earliest sexual objects: that is to say, in
the first instance his mother or a substitute for
her·22
This first sexual object is introduced through the
medium of the "ego-instincts". This is the attachment
that is referred to, of the libidinal to the self-
preservative instincts. This is, in the context of
the discovery of narcissism, not altogether
surprising, since the differentiation of these groups
of instincts was, as shown above, undermined by this.
This type of attachment is modelled after the ego-
instinct that gave it its object so that its aim is
to "have" the object, to own it and to use it to
complete a self essentially independent of it.23
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In a footnote added to the Three Essays on Sexuality
in 1915, after the introduction of the theory of
narcissism, Freud posits a sharp distinction between
anaclitic and narcissistic object choices as seeking
to return to the two elements of the pre-Oedipal
situation that have so far been considered'24 What
disrupts the dyadic structure and makes necessary
this attempt to return is the drama of the
dissolution of the Oedipus complex, a drama whose
third element must now be put in place.
This is identification with the father, who will act
in phantasy to force the infant out of the position
he has been in. The mechanism of identification
remained obscure to Freud but its importance was not
in doubt.25 The most extensive discussion of it is in
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, where
it is described as the "earliest expression of an
emotional tie with another person'"26 It is.given
priority over the "object-cathexis towards [the]
mother according to the attachment [anaclitic]
type'"27 Identification is held to be;
ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into
an expression of tenderness as easily as ·into a
wish for someone's removal. It behaves like a
derivative of the first, oral phase of the
organisation of the libido;-In which the object
that we long for and prize is assimilated by
eating and is in that way annihilated as such'28
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It is clear that this type of object relation stands
in a close relation to the anaclitic object choice in
this oral origin, and indeed Freud notes elsewhere
that: "At the very beginning, in the individual's
primitive oral phase, object cathexis and
identification are no doubt indistinguishable from
each other."29 The difference that later asserts
itself is that identification acts on the ego to
transform it, placing the object inside it, while
object-cathexis seeks to enjoy the object while
leaving the self unchanged. The formula in Group
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego states this as
the difference between wanting to be and wanting to
have·30
The case of identification that Freud most often
invokes is that between the boy and his father, but
in his discussions of the "complete Oedipus
complex"31 identification with the mother is also
discussed along with object cathexis of the father.
The three elements of the Oedipal scene are now in
place. In particular the characteristic relations to
the two parents are established •
.
In consequence of the irresistible advance towards
a unification of mental life, they come together
at last; and the normal Oedipus complex originates
from their confluence. The little boy notices that
his father stands in his way with his mother. His
identification with his father then takes on a
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hostile colouring and become identical with the
wish to replace his father in regard to his mother
as well.32
The drama of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex
and the establishment of the superego will involve
this interplay between these two forms of desire, and
what will be decisive is the intervention of the
third, narcissism. Out of this conflict of desires
will emerge the special agency of the ego that will
return this section to its starting point in
conscience. In the moment of unification the
primitive oral stage in which the two object
relations are indistinguishable leads to a doubling
in which desire and authority fall apart. Desire is
localised in the mother and authority in the father.
She promises pleasure and he figures power, a power
that becomes increasingly threatening.
In considering the relation between the narcissistic
ego and the father one comes up against a puzzling
phenomenon that is of the greatest significance in
assessing the nature of identification and of its
subsequent transformation. The pre-Oedipal
narcissistic ego "is [its] own ideal".33 The ego at
this stage exists in a state of the profoundest self-
satisfaction, resulting from the exclusion from the
self of all that is unpleasant and the corresponding
inclusion of all that is pleasant. Yet the
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identification with, the desire to be, the father is
present from the very beginning. The conclusion can
only be that the father who is to be "introjected" in
the course of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex
can only be a projection of the self. This is not
quite so simple, since the pleasure ego is, as
outlined above, altered by the pressure of reality,
but it is important nonetheless.
The child's desire to possess the mother is from the
beginning doomed to failure. The inevitability of
this does not, as the observer can see, actually
result from the prior claims and superior strength of
the father. "[T]he Oedipus complex would go to its
destruction from its lack of success, from the
effects of its internal impossibility."34 The father
not only is not responsible for the infant's
disappointments but he is also figured by the infant
in a form determined by the megalomania of the
narcissistic ego. The implications of this for the
Freudian doctrine of authority and hence of morality
will figure largely in the next chapter.
However this may be the formation of th~ Oedipus
complex complicates and intensifies the
identification with the father. "[T]he ambivalence
inherent in the identification from the beginning
CHAPTER FOUR Page 175
[has] now become manifest."35 At this point the
narcissistic attachment to the ego becomes of central
importance. The hostile wishes directed at the father
activate the fear of castration, of a severe
narcissistic loss. The castration complex leads to
the smashing of the Oedipus complex and its
replacement by the superego formation.
The mechanism by which this becomes powerful enough
to have such a powerful impact on the structure of
the ego becomes intimately bound up with the question
of sexual difference in Freud's later work, and this
will be discussed below in that connection. For the
present it is sufficient to stress that this fear
does not necessarily originate in a threat uttered by
the father, indeed typically the threat will come
from the mother or nurse.36 Despite this he comes to
fear that the continuance of his dual Oedipal wishes,
to possess the mother and to do away with the father,
will result in his being punished in this way.
If the satisfaction of love in the field of the
Oedipus complex is to cost the child his penis, a
conflict is bound to arise between his
narcissistic interest in that part of his body and
the libidinal cathexis of the parental objects. In
~his conflict the first of these forces normally
triumphs: the child's ego turns away from the
Oedipus complex.37
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The way in which the narcissistic ego-cathexis
resolves this conflict is by an intensification and
transformation of the identification with the father
and the changing of the object-cathexis of the mother
into "aim-inhibited affection", with the sexual aim
abandoned: "By means of identification [the boy]
takes the unattackable authority into himself. The
authority now turns into his superego and enters into
possession of all the aggressiveness which a child
would have liked to exercise against it."38
The previously external authority is now set up
within the self, or more accurately, the ego alters
its perceived relation to authority. This latter
formulation returns to the suggestion above that the
father of the Oedipus complex is a projection of the
self. This cannot be said to be the dominant line in
Freud, and its relation to a more "realistic" account
will be examined below.
In either case the identification with the father
takes its place as a modification of the ego, but one
with a peculiar character. It is split off from the
main body of the ego and passes into the unconscious,
where it becomes an independent agency over against
the main body of the ego. The ego is now divided into
an actual and an ideal ego, a position implicit in
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the earlier, pre-Oedipal, distinction between
narcissistic ego-cathexis and the identification with
the father. Although new influences can alter the
superego the source of its power remains this origin
in the most important formative moment.
It will be seen in the next chapter, in the context
of the critique of religion, that Freud believes that
overcoming this infantile relation to authority is
one of the most important of human tasks. This cannot
be understood until the relation of the superego to
the process of civilisation is grasped, which is the
task of the next section.
This section has shown that other relation has been
definitive of the self, both in the formation of the
ego and of the agency within it responsible for the
moral sense. The centrality of infantile sexuality is
opposed to the asexual independence of the infant
Emile and means that the relation of individual
morality to social regulation is fundamentally
altered. This placing of desire at the ground of
conscience also undermines the Rousseauean opposition
of self-determining morality and passion. The next
"section will develop these arguments 'further through
the consideration of Freud's culture-critical texts.
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The Critique of Culture
This section passes from the formation of the
individual ego and superego to the closely related
critique of culture. From Totem and Taboo to Moses
and Monotheism Freud worked out a critique of culture
centred on an account of the origin and history, and
a critique of religion. This and the late topography
and instinct theory became inextricably intertwined
so that no one of these three great elements of late
Freudianism is fully explicable in isolation. It is
in Civilisation and its Discontents that the late
system is laid out most clearly, and in Moses and
Monotheism that it reaches its climax, in a
speculative history of civilisation as the
remembering of a forgotten origin
The purpose of this section is to summarise this
movement. In particular the mutual dependence of
Freud's accounts of individual and cultural formation
is shown to stand in relation to the theme of the
ambivalence of authority and desire. This will be
more fully explored in the next chapter.
From the beginning Freud makes instinctual
renunciation a task to be carried out in the service
of "civilisation". (eg '''Civilised''Sexual Morality'
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1908) In this respect it is outside the economy of
the instincts and indeed can be seen as explaining
the futility of Freud's recurrent attempts to reduce
his hermeneutic procedure to a science of energy
flows. The existence of culture depends upon and
demands a system of authority that cannot be
accounted for economically, and indeed the central
concept of cultural transmission, identification,
proved absolutely impervious to any economic
reduction.
Given this it would seem natural to seek the origin
of this self-perpetuating cultural authority,
especially given the genetic character of explanation
within psychoanalysis. This is the context within
which Totem and Taboo should be read, the need to
explain the deus ex machina of civilisation. This
becomes clearer as Freud's thought develops,
especially with the late turn to the theory of
culture, and reaches its climax in Civilisation and
its Discontents and Moses and Monotheism, where the
theory of culture is returned to the instinct theory,
with what effect will be shown below •
.
In effect the theory of the primal horde allows the
re-unification of instinct and authority in the
person of the primal father. This is clearest in the
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Group Psychology, a crucial text for Freudian
politics. For present purposes the vital moment is
that in which Freud recalls the theory of the primal
horde, distinguishing between group and individual
psychology.
The father is unconstrained by any impediment to the
realisation of his desires, other than those of
reality. Of the "three stern masters" one can say his
ego knows nothing of the super-ego and hence is
spared serious conflicts with the ide Only the
pleasure principle, modified as the reality principle
controls his actions. "[T]he father of the primal
horde was free. His intellectual acts were strong and
independent even in isolation, and his will needed no
reinforcement from others. Consistency leads us to
assume that his ego had few libidinal ties; he loved
no one but himself, or other people only in so far as
they served his needs. To objects his ego gave away
no more than was barely necessary."39
This image of the strong ego is one to which the
succeeding chapter will return. For the present its
resemblance to, and differences from, Rousseau's
natural man should be noted. Like him the primal
father is strong and independent, but unlike him this
strength is exercised to dominate others. He
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"prevented his sons from satisfying their directly
sexual impulsions; •• He forced them •• into group
psychology. "40
If the ego is always a differentiated part of the id
we can say that in this case it is able to remain in
close and harmonious contact with it. Freud describes
this figure as the Nietzschean overman, but it would
be more accurate to see him as the "blond beast"
operating before rather than beyond good and evil.
The father is thus the archetype of the "strong ego".
In the Group Psychology his is described as
"individual psychology" as opposed to the group
mentality of the brothers/sons.
If the father represents the union of authority and
desire his sons represent their total separation.
They are completely under the sway of the strong
indiviqual. In this state of enforced instinctual
frustration they are driven to an identification with
one another that leaves their egos impoverished.41
This whole scene is most instructive if it is read
back into the Oedipal scene. Given that it cannot
claim any validity as the anthropology it appears to.. .
be'it is here read in a twofold way. On the one hand
the externality that is achieved between repressive
authority and repressed desire is to be seen as a key
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to understanding a difficulty in Freudian theory, on
the other it can be seen to throw new light on the
Oedipal drama that it projects.
The primal father is the father as he appears within
the Oedipus complex, that is he is the object of the
child's ambivalent identification. He is what the
child fears, but also what he dreams of being, and it
is difficult to say which of these aspects of his
being is primary. The father after all is the
powerful narcissistic ego, the narcissist
unrestrained by his weakness. In this respect he is
the creature of the primitive ego, and may be seen as
a reaction to the recognition of dependence that must
dawn in the course of the Oedipal struggle.
In the story of the transition from the horde the
replacement actually takes place, the father is
murdered. At this point there is no internal
compulsion that prevents it and if the sons feel
strong enough they simply butcher and devour their
father, returning their identification to the orality
that is suggested as its model •
.
The two out at'and Lng accounts of the murder and its
aftermath appear in Totem and Taboo and Civilisation
and its Discontents. In both ambivalence is made
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central to the instantiation of the taboo structure
that is the ancestor of the modern superego. In this
story the role of this ambivalence is much clearer
than in that of the individual Oedipus complex, where
as outlined above, narcissistic attachment to the
penis is more prominent, and ambivalence about the
father subordinate to it.
Totem and Taboo introduced Freud's hypothesis of the
origin of society in the acting out of the Oedipus
complex. In this text the term "ambivalence" has a
very prominent place, but is given a sense somewhat
at variance from that which it has in the account of
the Oedipus complex given above. In Totem and Taboo
ambivalence is defined in terms of the
conscious/unconscious distinction, and as concerning
an act rather than a person.42 In this way this
original ambivalent conflict, which is held to be
common to obsessional neurotics and to the
originators of taboo, is between authority and
desire, rather than between desires.
This reflects the state of Freudian theory at the
moment of this text (1913). The theory of narcissism
was just emerging. The ego-instincts, with their
intimate connection with the unifying and
authoritative agency, as yet undifferentiated, stand
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over against the libidinal instincts, the
representatives of unruly desire. Ambivalence in this
context is concerned above all with temptation and
transgression, as concerning "E.2!h a wish and a
counter-wish"43 This leads Freud to his definition of
taboo as "a primaeval prohibition forcibly imposed
(by some authority) from outside, and directed
against the most powerful longings to which human
beings are subject. The desire to violate it persists
in their unconscious; those who obey the taboo have
an ambivalent attitude to what the taboo
prohibits."44 These most powerful longings are those
found in the Oedipus complex, to kill the father and
to possess the mother.45
This first definition of ambivalence as standing
close to the pressure of a repressed impulse is soon
supplemented with another, although the difference
between them is not registered in the text.· This
second ambivalence concerns the dead, and is held to
be "the classical example, the prototype, of the
ambivalence of human emotions." In this "prototype"
"behind the tender love" that is felt towards a
deceased person "there is a concealed hostility in
the unconscious" that wished for and welcomed their
death.46 From the conflict that arises after a death,
between the conscious affection and unconscious
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exulting, calls forth a defence, first of projection
of the hostility onto the dead person, so that the
dead become hostile spirits, and then into a taboo on
the dead. "The taboo upon the dead arises •• from the
contrast between conscious pain and unconscious
satisfaction over the death that has occurred."47
From these considerations Freud goes on to speculate
that conscience has the same origin as that he has
ascribed to taboo. That it "arose, on a basis of
emotional ambivalence, from quite specific human
relations to which this ambivalence was attached; ••
one of the opposing feelings involved [is made]
unconscious and kept under by the compulsive
domination of the other one"48 This is the key to the
critique of civilisation that was to culminate in
Civilisation and its Discontents and Moses and
Monotheism. Freud postulates that morality is a
social phenomenon that is instantiated in each
individual through the fantastic repetition of its
founding moment, the primal murder.
This story of this act is outlined in Totem and Taboo
as follows. Freud accepts a hypothesis of Darwin's
that the earliest humans lived in a "primal horde".
This horde is said to have consisted of a single
dominant male with "as many wives as he could support
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and obtain, whom he would have jealously guarded
against all other men." The younger males that are
borne to the wives are expelled from the horde when
they reach an age when they could be a threat to
their father.49
One day the brothers who had been driven out came
together, killed and devoured their father and
made an end to the patriarchal horde. United, they
had the courage to do and succeeded in doing what
would have been impossible for them individually •
••• Cannibal savages as they were, it goes without
saying that they devoured their victim as well as
killing him. The violent father had doubtless been
the feared and envied model of each one of the
company of brothers: and in the act of devouring
him they accomplished their identification with
him, and each one of them acquired a portion of
his strength. The totem meal, which is perhaps
mankind's earliest festival, would thus be a
repetition and a commemoration of of this
memorable and criminal deed, which was the
beginning of so many things - of social
organisation, of moral restrictions and of
religion. SO
These far reaching consequences result from the
mechanism of resolution of an ambivalent conflict
already observed in connection with the dead.
They hated their father, who presented such a
formidable obstacle to their craving for power and
their sexual desires; but they loved and admired
him too. After they had got rid of him, had
satisfied their hatred and had put into effect
their desire to identify with him, the affection
which had all this time been pushed under was
bound to make itself felt. It·did so in the form
of remorse.51
This story, wherein the primal father is murdered and
devoured and the remorse felt by the sons leads to
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his internalisation in taboo, the forerunner of the
modern superego, and his veneration as the totem, the
prototype of religion, forms the basis of all Freud's
subsequent cultural writings. What is stressed here
is that it also provides the foundation for the
theory of the Oedipal drama each of us passes
through. The primal murder is the condition of
possibility for every individual's superego. This
will be more extensively discussed in the next
chapter, where the "phylogenetic residue" will be
shown to be indispensable to the structure of
Freudian theory.
In Civilisation and its Discontents this theory of
the origin of culture was combined with the late
theory of the instincts in a powerful synthesis that
brings together the various strands of Freudian
theory. Before examining this it will be necessary to
set out that instinct theory.
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Instincts and Ambivalence
In the Three Essays on Sexuality (1905) and in the
essay 'The Psychoanalytic View of Psychogenic
Disturbance of Vision' (1910), in which the term ego-
instincts is introduced'52 may be found the outline
of the first "pre-narcissism" theory of the
instincts. The best summary of the middle period is
in 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915), which
shows Freud grappling with the implications for his
instinct theory of the idea that the ego itself can
be a libidinal object. Finally the late theory is set
out in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in The Ego and
the Id, and in Civilisation and its Discontents. 53
In the Three Essays on Sexuality Freud's attention is
directed to the force of sexuality and to the
deformations due to its repression. This is ascribed
primarily to "shame, disgust, pity, and the
structures of morality and authority erected by
societY."54 Much emphasis is laid on the fragmented
character of the sexual instincts, with component
instincts arising from discrete "erotogenic zones"
and only subsequently being unified under the
. '.. .
dominance of the genitals. 55
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In the 1910 essay he introduced the term "ego-
instincts", and this marked a clarification of the
duality between instincts of "hunger and love"·
posited in the Three Essays.56 He now sees
"undeniable opposition between the instincts which
subserve sexuality, •• and those other instincts
which have as their aim the self-preservation of the
individual - the ego instincts." The process of
repression is still held to be in the service of
"civilisation" but now the mechanism is focused on
the conflict between instincts. "The sexual and ego-
instincts alike have in general the same organs and
systems of organs at their disposal." This "is bound
to lead to pathological conflict if the two
fundamental instincts are disunited and if the ego
maintains a repression of the sexual component
instinct concerned."57
Symptoms are now traced to the problems of "an organ
with a double claim on it - 'its relation to the
conscious ego and to repressed sexualitY".58 Freud
remarks in the 1923 article on 'The Libido Theory'
that: "The nature of the ego-instincts remained for
the time b~ing undefined and, like all the other
characteristics of the ego, inaccessible to
analysis."59 The pathological conflict of instincts
seemed accidental, and it stood in an uncertain
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relation to the conflict of the sexual instincts with
"civilisation" which the 1908 '''Civilized''Sexual
Morality and Modern Nervous Illness' makes clear is
at the centre of Freud's thought.60
The next development of the instinct theory took
place as part of the shift towards interest in the
ego in the papers on narcissism and on narcissistic
disorders. The consequences of these developments are
summarised in 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes'
(1915).
In 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', (1914) Freud put
forward the idea that libido can take the I as its
object, can be independent of external objects. This
"antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido",
reinforcement of one implying diminution of the
other'61 means that that between sexual and ego-
instincts needs to be rethought. In that same essay
Freud stresses the connection between the duality of
the instincts and a distinction between a "two-fold
existence of the individual", who is at once a self-
centred entity and an "appendage of his germ plasm"
the "mortal vehicle of an •• immortal substance".6Z.
This situation in which instinctual dualism was
stressed, but at the same time undermined by
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developments in the theory of the ego was recalled in
Civilisation and its Discontents:
Since the ego-instincts, too, were libidinal, it
seemed for a time inevitable that we should make
libido coincide with instinctual energy in
I general, as C.G.Jung had already advocated
earlier. Nevertheless, there still remained in me
a kind of conviction, for which I was not as yet
able to find reasons, that the instincts could not
all be of the same kind.63
His response to this is to appeal to the origin of
the dual instinct theory in the observation of the
transference neuroses, and to say that: "Since then
we cannot give it up." The new extension of the
libido theory, by which this instinct can be
transformed from ego- to object-libido and vice
(
versa, is limited by the idea that "libido remains
libido •• and never turns into egoistic interest, and
the converse is also true. This thesis •• is
equivalent to the separation between the sexual and
ego-instincts •• which we shall continue to hold for
heuristic reasons until its possible collapse."64
Instinctual monism was the heresy that was at the
centre with Freud's painful break with Jung. The
denial of the specifically sexual nature of libido
wa~ the core of Jung'~ departure from orthodoxy. The
collapse of dualism in his own theory was troubling,
and a new form of dualism, safe from the difficulties
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posed by narcissism was soon developed. This was the
"mytho~ogical" system of Beyond the Pleasure
Principle.
This has one of its roots in Freud's long-standing
interest in the place of aggression in the economy of
the instincts. In the Three Essays on Sexuality
sadism had already been the subject of a discussion
in which the place of aggressiveness as a component
of sexuality was mentioned. This was described as "a
desire to subjugate; the biological significance of
[which] seems to lie in the need for overcoming the
resistance of the sexual object by means other than
wooing."65 In this stage aggressiveness was
considered principally as a component of the sexual
instinct. However in the second essay of the group an
independent origin of aggression is also suggested.66
In the course of Freud's development this situation,
where aggressiveness was seen either as a libidinal
component instinct or as derived from the group of
ego-instincts was further complicated by the
hypothesis of narcissism. The resolution to the
problem was found in the positing of the death
instinct, from which the aggressive instincts were
held to derive. Before moving on to a brief
consideration of the concept "instinct" it will be
CHAPTER FOUR Page 193
useful to summarise this brief of the history of the
instinctual classification in relation to
ambivalence.
The first distinction between ego- and libidinal
instincts was an essentially external one. Their
conflict was accidental, due to their struggle to
control the "organs" of the body. The necessity of
repression was traced to the action of "civilisation"
of which the organised ego acted as the
representative. In this struggle the self-'
preservative instincts were to provide the force for
the ego.
Once the distinction between these two groups was
thrown into question a new possibility of an immanent
struggle between them was opened up. This is
reflected in the increasing importance of the concept
of ambivalence in Freud's thought, borrowed from
Bleuler in 191267 Ambivalence is central in the
argument of 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', in
which the possibility of transformations of love into
hate is traced to the libidinal process of ego-
formation, the central insight of the theory of
.'
narcissism·68
The hate which is admixed with the love is in part
derived from the preliminary stages of loving
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which have not been wholly surmounted; it is also
in part based on reactions of repudiation by the
ego-instincts, which, in view of the frequent
conflicts between the interests of the ego and
those of love, can find grounds in real and
contemporary motives.69
Since the ego and libido are now inextricably
intertwined their conflict becomes an ambivalent and
internal one. This process is further developed in
the late synthesis in which ambivalence is
internalised as an intrapsychic relation.
The model is of a mental field into which the
pressure of the instincts introduces a disturbance
that the action of the pleasure principle seeks to
remove. The instincts are a source of mental energy,
or stimulation. The statement in the Three Essays on
Sexuality is typical: "By an 'instinct' is
provisionally to be understood the psychical
representative of of an endosomatic, continuously
flowing source of stimulation, as contrasted with a
'stimulus', which is set up by single excitations
coming from without" 70
'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' spells this out in
relation to the processes of the mind. Having
.considered the contrast between the InatInct s and
external sources of stimulus Freud concludes that
their "essential nature" can be derived from "their
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main characteristics - their origin in sources of
stimulation within the organism and their appearance
as a constant force - and from this we deduce one of
their further feature, namely that no actions of
flight avail ~gainst them."71
In relation to this the nervous system is defined as:
"an apparatus which has the function of getting rid
of the stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to
the lowest possible level".72 Freud does not
differentiate between the pleasure and constancy
principles, as he would later. The pleasure principle
is rather contrasted to its modification, the reality
principle, which takes note of obstacles and
difficulties to take round about routes to
satisfaction·73
In this general account of the nature of the
instincts and of their relation to the mental
apparatus the different instincts are traced back to
a common ground: "the instincts are all qualitatively
alike and owe the effect they make only to the amount
of excitation they carrY."74 The instincts are seen
as essentially active; "[The ego] is forced by its
instincts onto a quite special degree of activity
towards the external world •• [it] is passive in
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respect of external stimuli but active through its
own instincts."75
Having established the essentials of the pre Beyond
the Pleasure Principle theory of the instincts it is
now possible to read that text. In terms of the
development of the classification of the instincts
Freud indicates that the theory of Eros may be
regarded as the intensification of the tendency to
identify libidinal and self-preservatory instincts:
"it is all the more necessary to lay stress on the
libidinal character of the 'self-preservative
instincts now that we are venturing upon the further
step of recognising the sexual instinct as Eros, the
preserver of all things".76 The argument that follows
returns to the problems of sadism and of
aggressiveness.
He suggests that in sadism may be discovered "an
example of a death instinct", which has been directed
outwards as aggressiveness.77 In this way he makes
possible the appearance of a smoother transition to
the death instinct theory than would otherwise
present itself. This has been t~ken up in the. .'
expository literature originating within Freudian
psychoanalysis itself, where a transitional concern
with the problem of the independent origin of
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aggression is inserted as a "third stage" in the
development of Freud's theory between the adoption of
the theory of narcissism and the appearance of Beyond
the PleasurePrinciple.78
By contrast a much greater emphasis on a second
problem is common to the interpretations offered from
outside psychoanalysis 79 and to those writing within
the Lacanian tradition, where the death instinct has
a great prominence, and where philosophical concerns
are often important.80 This cites the idea of the
compulsion to repeat and the new attention to the
fundamental nature of instinctuality as such marked
by Freud's discussion of it.
A third strand in the argument of is the biological
speculation that re-appears in it concerning the
"germ-plasm" and the dual biological existence of any
living thing.S1 The idea is that the individual is
both itself, and concerned with its own survival, and
the bearer or vehicle of a potentially immortal
species identity. This idea had long been associated
in Freud's mind with instinct theory, and is now
invoked in connection with this new version of it.82
"
The first three sections of Beyond the Pleasure
Principle are devoted to bringing forward a number of
CHAPTER FOUR Page 198
phenomena, from the war neuroses, children's play,
and the typical events of analysis, which indicate
the operation of a primitive compulsion to repeat
events from the past even, or particularly, those
that have no possibility of giving pleasure_B3 The
first explanation of this compulsion that Freud
offers is that it acts to "bind" or to master
experiences. This is a "function of the mental
apparatus which, though it does no contradict the
pleasure principle, is nevertheless independent of it
and seems to be more primitive than the purpose of
gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure."84
From this Freud passes to the idea that the
compulsion to repeat has an "instinctual character"
and that this has put him "on the track of a
universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of
organic life in general ••• (A]n instinct is an urge
inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state
of things which the living entity has been obliged to
abandon under the pressure of external disturbing
forces".B5 As the next paragraph notes: "This view of
instincts strikes us as strange because we have
become used to see in them a factor impelling towards
change and development, whereas we are now asked to
recognise in them the precise contrary - an
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expression of the conservative nature of living
substance. "86
From this comes the idea of the place of death in
instinctual life.
The attributes of life were at some time evoked in
inanimate matter by the action of a force of whose
nature we can form no conception •••• The tension
that then arose in what had hitherto been an
inanimate substance endeavoured to cancel itself
out. In this way the first instinct came into
being: the instinct to return to the inanimate
state·"a7
The compulsion to repeat, to return to an earlier
state, can find its terminus only in this return to
the inanimate. While the first dramatic introduction
of this hypothesis seems to bring even the sexual
instincts under it these soon assert their
difference. They too are conservative, but they are
"conservative to a higher degree in that they are
peculiarly resistant to external influences; and they
are conservative too in another sense in that they
preserve life itself for a comparatively long period.
They are the true life instincts."a8
From this Freud goes on to posit a "sharp distinction
between the 'ego instincts' and' the sexual instincts,
•• the former exercise pressure towards death and the
latter towards a prolongation of life."89 Libido is
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transformed by this theory from a somatic sexual
desire, originating in the "erotogenic zones" into
"the Eros of the poets and philosophers which holds
all living things together."gO
From an initial position where ego and sexual
instincts were opposed to one another, but apparently
only accidentally, there developed the opposition of
ego and object libido, where opposition existed in
that these were involved in what games theorists
would call a "zero sum" relationship, to this final
theory where the instincts are opposed in their very
essence. In this last case ambivalence becomes a
primary fact of instinctual life.
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Culture Critique and Instinctual Ambivalence
In Civilisation and its Discontents Freud brings the
various elements discussed in this chapter together.
The theory of the instincts, of the origin of the
superego, and of civilisation are synthesised. To
begin with the implicit relation between the sense of
guilt, the Oedipus complex and the primal murder is
much more clearly set out: "man's sense of guilt
springs from the Oedipus complex and was acquired at
the killing of the father by the brothers banded
together."91 Secondly this sense of guilt is analysed
in terms of the economy of the instincts in a new
way. "[T]he sense of guilt is an expression of the
conflict due to ambivalence, of the eternal struggle
between Eros and the instinct of destruction or
death·"92
."
The relation of the individual Oedipus complex and
the primal murder will be considered at more length
in the next chapter, in the context of Freud's
critique of religion. Here the synthesis of the
theories of the superego and of the instincts will be
analysed. Again this will recur in,the next chapter,
where its importance for the accounts of religion and
of femininity will be explored.
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The problem from which Freud begins his discussion of
this relation is that of a peculiarity of the
superego: "the more virtuous a man is the more severe
and distrustful is its behaviour, so that ultimately
it is precisely those people who have carried
saintliness [Heiligkeit] furthest who reproach
themselves with the worst sinfulness."93 This is
because of the particular relation that subsists
between the superego and aggressiveness.
The internalisation of the feared father is now
understood in terms of the redirection of the
aggressive impulses felt towards him. This was
briefly mentioned above in the section on the Oedipus
complex. It is now possible to go more fully into it,
and in particular to see the connection between it
and the theory of civilisation that makes Freud state
that "the price we pay for our advance in
civilisation is a loss of happiness through the
heightening of the sense of guilt."94
In the formation of the superego the aggressive
feelings, the representatives of the death instinct,
are localised.in the superego: "every piece of
aggression whose satisfaction the subject gives up is
taken over by the super-ego and increases the
latter's aggressiveness (against the ego)."95 In this
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way aggressiveness is neutralised by being directed
inwards, and what is more every such redirection
provides the possibility of further renunciation of
aggression.
The importance of this in the context of the argument
of Civilisation and its Discontents is that Freud has
previously cited instinctual aggressiveness as the
most fundamental obstacle to the process of
civilisation.96 He can therefore see the process of
civilisation as a process in the service of Eros and
as a continuation on a grand scale of the dialectic
established between life and death by the disturbance
of the calm of the inanimate by the coming into being
of living substance.
As he summarises his thesis in Civilisation and its
Discontents:
the inclination to aggression is an original,
self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man,
and •• it constitutes the greatest impediment to
civilisation ••• [C]ivilisation [is] a special
process that mankind undergoes ••• in the service
of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human
individuals, and after that families, then races,
peoples, and nations, into one great unity, the
.unity of mankind. Why this has to happen, we do
not know; the work of ·Eros is precisely;this.97
The price to be paid is the increasing sense of
guilt, brought about by the direction against the ego
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of the aggression that is denied expression against
others. The external authority of the father, first
the primal father and then each individual's father,
is internalised as the punishing agency of the
superego. Superego, civilisation and the instincts
are brought together in a theory of guilt, or rather
of the sense of guilt, as the essence of morality.
,
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Psychoanalysis as a Science of Liberation
The sense in which psychoanalysis is a science of
liberation can be seen both in the theory of therapy
and in the culture critique. One of the clearest and
most succinct statements of the goals of analysis is
in the late 'Outline of Psychoanalysis'. It is worth
quoting at some length.
The ego is weakened by •• internal conflict and we
must go to its help. The position is like that of
a civil war which has to be determined by the
assistance of an ally from outside. The analytic
physician and the patient's weakened ego, basing
themselves on the real external world, have to
band themselves together into a party against the
enemies, the instinctual demands of the id and the
conscientious demands of the superego •••• Our
knowledge is to make up for [the patient's]
ignorance and to give his ego back its mastery
over lost provinces of his mental life'98
The aim of analysis is to strengthen the ego. and
this in two directions, against both the id and the
superego. Repression, the exclusion of instinctual
forces from the integrated structures of the self. is
the response of an ego too weak to deal with them. It
is for this reason characteristic of the earliest
period of life, when the ego has not had time to
develop sufficient strength to cope with the
instincts in less drastic and more integrative ways,
such as sublimation.
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The dissolution of the Oedipus complex and the
formation of the superego form a limit case of
repression. Freud hesitates indeed as to whether it
should be called repression at all, since it is so
far reaching as to transform the ego and the material
repressed is so powerfully driven from the ego-
structures as to exclude any possibility of its
return. In this case the strengthening of the ego
takes place through the "depersonalisation" of the
superego, the erosion of the link between this
agency, which is permanent, and the subject's father.
This allows the separation of one, rational, element
of morality, from another, derived from its origin.
The two movements, of the integration of repressed
instinctual forces into the self and the
transformation of the superego are to strengthen and
liberate the ego. The nature of the second of these,
the transformation of the superego, will be the
central theme of the next chapter, which will argue
that it is here that the limits of Freud's idea of
freedom become clear
In Rousseau the phenomenon of conscience was to be. .
understood in terms of an originary goodness and
integrity. In Freud, by contrast, the essence of
conscience is a guilt that reflects the essential
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dividedness of humankind. Like Rousseau Freud sees
civilisation as the root of guilt, but he does not
posit a time of peace before it. Guilt emerges as the
alternative to the unrestrained rule of the strongest
in the primal horde. In this sense Freud makes guilt
original, where Rousseau sees it as secondary,
positing an original innocence.
The fundamental discovery of infantile sexuality, and
the displacement of integral subjectivity also have
profound implications for the conception of freedom.
This is not, as in Rousseau, infinitely
transgressive, but rather concerned with the freeing
of the self from infinite demands. Freud makes the
ego the self-limiting central institution of the
self, and morality one of the demands against which
it must rebel.
In this the vision of fundamental and inescapable
ambivalence is of the greatest significance. The very
existence of life calls forth the instincts of death
so that these must be contained. In Civilisation and
its Discontents he argues that the destructive urges
can only be tamed by turning them inwards. It does
not seem that sublimation can be effective on these
instincts; ambivalence means that guilt and
civilisation are inseparable. There are texts, and
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again this will be dealt with in the next chapter,
where alternatives are raised, but in general this
"pessimistic" view dominates.
This rejection of illusion and of excessive hope must
be seen as ~ and not less life affirming than
Rousseau's embrace of imagination. In Rousseau the
excessive freedom came to its terminus in Julie's
death and the collapse of Clarens. Even where its
fragile existence could be sustained it was only at
the expense of the repression and exploitation of a
femininity rigorously subordinated to masculine
freedom.
In Freud the resignation and realism are the core of
maturity as it is achieved through the strengthening
of the ego. These allow the self to free itself
through the overcoming of the deformations imposed by
instinctual ambivalence. The Freudian response to the
tensions of human existence is not flight but the
negotiation of what autonomy can be won through the
application of reason, of the reality principle of
which the ego is the bearer. The next chapter will
examine the mechanisms of this more closely and....
discover that here too woman must be sacrificed, and
that the limits of liberation are drawn in such a way
that a reappraisal of freedom is demanded.
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CHAPTER FIVE: LIMITS OF ANALYSIS
The previous chapter set out a reading of Freudian
psychoanalysis as a science of liberation. It
stressed the importance of the idea of ambivalence
and the consequent limited character of the freedom
offered by analysis. The strengthening of the ego is
the victory of a realism that accepts the boundaries
of finitude. There is no escape from the suffering
imposed by the conflict between the instincts and
between the instincts and the actually possible. The
task of the ego is to "tame", to constrain and to
redirect the instincts in order to make this conflict
bearable. In the struggle to achieve this a crucial
moment is the overcoming of compulsive super-ego
morality, with its origin in a pre-rational relation
to the authority of the father, and its prototype in
the obedience to the will of the primal father.
The reinforcement of the ego is the victory of reason
over both desire and authority. It is this victory
that makes analysis a science. For Freud his life
<work was a moment in the scientific extension of the
reality principle, of the growth of ego-syntonic
methods of control of nature and above all of
internal nature. The recognition of the limits of
this, as of all human endeavour was an important
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aspect of his message. It is this that makes the
contrast between Freud and Rousseau instructive.
This second chapter turns to the unresolved tensions
of the Freudian position, and particularly to the
problem of gender. It is argued that while the stress
on limit and realism is an integral and self-
conscious moment of Freud's thought a careful
analysis of the limit as drawn in this dimension
.'
exposes a weakness in Freudian thought. In particular
it is argued that the ambivalence that is the
distinctive and crucial centre of this thought fails
here. The relation between desire and authority is
never made an internal one and this leaves Freud in
the position of having to find authority outside the
economy of desire. It is this that accounts for the
eccentricity of his anthropology and of the closely
related absurdity of the "archaic heritage", on the
genetic transmission of memory. The same difficulty
is shown to be bound inextricably to the misogyny of
his thought, its placing of a rejection of femininity
at the heart of the formation of the subject, and its
affirmation of this rejection.
Both in Freud and in Rousseau sexual difference is
essential to the formation of the ethical subject,
and in both this is obscured in many texts that take
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masculinity as the norm, suppressing its dependence
on the feminine other. In Freud this dependence
becomes clear in those texts from the mid 1920s on
that turn their attention to the feminine. This turn
is accompanied by a deepening of the understanding of
the nature and import of the dissolution of the
Oedipus complex, and of the role of sexual difference
in it.
This theme can be usefully approached through the
1937 article on 'Analysis Terminable and
Interminable'. There Freud discusses as one of the
most intractable of analytic problems the
"repudiation of femininity". It is suggested that
both men and women are in flight from the position of
woman, and that this flight is the source of many of
the most difficult pathological formations
encountered by analysts. What is more, Freud stresses
the necessity of the analyst overcoming this and
enforcing the feminine in the case of women.
In this article he makes explicit his complicity with
a rigid system of gender identity the nature of which
may be traced th~pugh his writi~gs on femininity in
particular, and which, it becomes clear, is essential
to the system of his thought. This attitude to gender
is one limit to the liberation of the ego, that it
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cannot be extended to women. The apparently casual
and unsystematic passages scattered through Freud's
writings which refer to the irrational, amoral, and
antisocial nature of women can be seen, through a
careful consideration of the role of sexual
difference and of the flight from femininity in
forming the characters of the two sexes in the
Oedipal drama, to be indispensable.
This problem in regard of gender is connected to
another, which is most notably analysed in Ricoeur's
Freud and PhilosophY. This is his denial of the
possibility of the ego's transcending its position in
relation. No ego morality is possible, and hence the
imposition of compulsive super-ego morality through
the terror of the Oedipus complex has as its main
alternative the return of the terror of the primal
horde. This is the fear that haunts the pages of
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and of
Civilisation and its Discontents. The utopian vision
of The Future of an Illusion, with its replacement of
compulsion with rational assent, is a fleeting one.
More typical is Freud's famous pessimism, which sees
as the only alternative to the unleas?ing of the
terror of the death instinct turning this terror
against the self through the action of the super-ego.
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This problem in Freud must be seen in the context of
the place of the idea of ambivalence in his thought,
with which the first chapter on Freud began. There
are two fundamental ambivalent relations in Freud.
There is the primal ambivalence between eros and
death, in which the two great instinctual formations
are inseparably bound together; and there is the
ambivalence of desire and authority, in which the
structures of the super-ego are put in place by and
as desire. The limit of psychoanalytic liberation is
figured in the way in which this second ambivalent
relation can never become fully internalised. There
remains an element of pure externality in the
relation of authority and desire, and Freud's attempt
to deal with this leads to the absurdities of the
"archaic residue" and of the myth of the primal
murder.
Civilisation, culture, is ultimately imposed on the
self, and cannot become unified with it. Despite the
placing of relation at the heart of the formation of
the subject the externality is not overcome, the
cultural cannot be owned and hence terror remains
necessary. What is more this terror cannot be
sublimated by women as it can by men. In 'The
Economic Problem of Masochism', in many ways the most
profound of all Freud's reflections on the place of
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the feminine in his thought, a feminine morality of
desire is posited. Women can never experience the
full terror of castration, and thus can never
overcome it. They can never identify with the father
but only desire him. For them morality must remain
external and their relation to it is the desire to be
punished.
'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' must be read
with this in mind. Because cultural imperatives can
never fully be rationalised, never be owned, even by
men, the masochistic feminine identity must be
enforced. Freud not only describes but polices a
misogynistic system of rigid gender identity. The
next, and last, chapter introduces the writings of
Kierkegaard to suggest that a relation to freedom
that rejects both the flight from actuality of
Rousseau, and the resigned acceptance of Freud,
offers the possibility of transcending the rigid and
hierarchical sexual systems they have both described
and enforced.
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Gender and Ethics.
In this section it is argued that the "repudiation of
femininity" discussed in 'Analysis Terminable and
Interminable' is an essential element of the
formation of the superego, and of masculine ethics.
The corollary of this is that there must be a
different ethics for women, a feminine ethics for
those who can and must not repudiate femininity, or
rather who must learn to live with that repudiation
as a rejection of themselves. Such a form of ethical
existence is described in 'The Economic Problem of
Masochism', where moral masochism is described. This
is not explicitly made the form of relation to
morality proper to the feminine but this connection
can be traced through Freud's account of the
femininity and is implicit in 'The Economic Problem
of Masochism' where masochism is a feminine trait.
The masculine relation to ethics may usefully be
contrasted to this masochism. The superego was above
discussed as a limit on the freedom of action of the
ego. In the present context it becomes clear that it
itself is also a liberator. Through the dual
processes of sublimation and of depersonalisation of
the superego the internalisation of the father's
authority opens the possibility of freeing the
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constraint essential to social life from its
compulsive and blindly authoritarian character. The
social imperative of controlling the instincts in
order to avoid conflict with others and allow the
smooth functioning of a cultural order can be
rationalised only through its "owning" by the medium
of the formation and subsequent transformation of the
superego, and through the sublimation of instinct of
which this identificatory process is the prototype.
When the role of gender is examined it emerges that
this liberation is available only to men and that the
motive force behind it is misogyny, or more correctly
misophobia. The fear which drives the masculine
subject out of the Oedipal position and brings into
being the superego is specifically fear of becoming
(like) a woman. It is necessary that the boy has seen
the female (lack of) genitals in order for the threat
of castration to be sufficiently dreadful. For this
reason girls never emerge from the Oedipus complex
and never form strong superegos. It is arguable, and
will be briefly argued at the end of the present
chapter, that this does not necessarily exclude the
.possibi1i~y of a feminine ethic other than a
masochistic desire for punishment but it is important
that in the Freudian schema it does have this effect.
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The full reasons for this are to be discussed in the
next section of this chapter and are crucial to the
argument of the next and last chapter wherein a
critique of Freud drawing on the work of Kierkegaard
is developed. Here it suffices to say that the
central point is the impossibility of an "ego
ethics". Rational calculation of interest is the
closest the Freudian ego can come to an ethical
principle and Freud is rightly sceptical of the power
of this to contain the "destructive instincts". For
this reason the terror of the dissolution of the
Oedipus complex remains necessary as do its
misogynistic consequences. Only a rethinking of the
relation of ego to ethics and hence of the nature of
freedom can offer an escape from this melancholy
conclusion, the core of Freud's famous pessimism.
The Repudiation of Femininity as the Possibility of
Culture.
In beginning the assessment of the relation of gender
to ethics in Freud it is necessary to return to the
dissolution of the Oedipus complex and the putting in
place of the superego. In the previous chapter this
.process was discussed in terms of the joining
together of the three pre-Oedipal currents: of
narcissism; of "anaclitic" object choice directed to
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the mother; and of identification with the father. It
was shown that a narcissistic fear of castration
resolved the ambivalence of the identification with
the father, which was intensified by rivalry over the
mother, by means of internalisation. The ambivalent
relation to the external object is replaced by a
dynamically unconscious alteration of the ego.
In this the instinctual forces can be expressed and
"released" through an intrapsychic relation between
agencies. The superego punishes, or conversely offers
love to, the ego. The relation with its mixture of
hostility and narcissistic affection replicates the
ambivalent identification. In addition it enforces a
transformation of the object choice of the mother
into an "aim inhibited affection", thus allowing the
defusing of the real situation of conflict with the
father, which has now been internalised as the
relation between ego and superego. What was not
spelled out there was the nature of the narcissistic
terror that played the crucial role in taking the
identification to the point of decisive alteration of
the ego. This is known as the castration complex and
is the point at whicn sexual difference becomes part
of the structure of Freudian thought.
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The key texts here are 'The Dissolution of the
Oedipus Complex' (1924) and 'Some Psychical
Consequences of the Anatomical Disti~ction Between
the Sexes' (1925). These marked a new concern with
femininity, and with the different paths taken by the
sexes through the Oedipus complex, something
previously neglected. Their implications were further
developed in 'Female Sexuality' (1931) and in the
essay in the New Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis (1933) on 'The Psychology of Women'.
In these essays and in others like 'Medusa's Head'
(1932) sexual difference, and specifically the
"repudiation of femininity" came to play an
increasing role in Freud's explanation of
masculinity. Where the early texts had made
femininity merely a mirror image of masculinity it
became clear that masculinity itself was founded on
flight from the feminine.
The decisive development was the new attention to the
mechanisms of the end of the Oedipus complex that
followed from the new topography and the super ego in
particular. As early as 'On Narcissism: an
Introduction' in 1914 the connection between the
moral agency that was just coming into view and the
castration complex had begun to emerge. In this essay
Freud indicates that the castration complex is an
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important determinant of the suppression of infantile
sexuality and that it works through the medium of a
narcissistic attachment to the penis.1
This in turn leads to the setting up of an ego ideal
which can be the haven of the disrupted narcissism.2
This early stage in the development of the new
topography is summed up thus: "The development of the
ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism
and gives rise to a~vigorous attempt to recover that
state. This departure is brought about by means of
the displacement of libido onto an ego ideal imposed
from without; and satisfaction is brought about from
fulfilling that ideal."3
At this stage the details of the castration complex
are neglected and the role of identification much
less prominent. This was to be the route through
which, in 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1915) the final
theory was approached, with the new understanding of
the importance of mechanisms of identification and
introjection, but the detail of the castration
complex was neglected until after the elaboration of
the topography. in The Ego and the Id (1923).
As late as this last text Freud continued to suggest
that the dissolution of the Oedipus complex in girls
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was a kind of mirror image of that in boys. Having
stressed that in boys an identification with the
father is the "normal outcome" of the end of the
Oedipus complex (as outlined in the previous chapter)
Freud goes on to write: "In a precisely analogous way
the outcome of the Oedipus attitude in a little girl
may be an intensification of her identification with
her mother (or the setting up of such an
identification for the first time) - a result which
will fix the child's feminine character."4
This indicates that he had not thought through the
implications of the importance of the castration
complex in this connection. It is clear that a girl
cannot be driven by the possibility of the loss of
the penis, unless one were to ascribe to her belief
that she possesses one, an extension of the theory of
the "phallic period" Freud never made. This
"disavowal" of the absence of the female penis is a
feature of the boy's perception of the worldS but is
explicitly not also held to be the same in girls.6
The essays in which finally the importance of sexual
difference in the ending of the of the Oedipus was. ' ... .
recognised were 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus
Complex', and 'Some Psychical Consequences of the
Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes' (henceforth
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'Anatomical Sex Distinction'), of, respectively, 1924
and 1925. The importance of this development is
usually, and rightly, held to be the new insight it
allowed into femininity, but what this sometimes
obscures is what is here stressed, that this implies
a new understanding of masculinity. Where this had
previously been self-definitive, with femininity as
an obscure deviation, now the two sexual identities
are explicitly created by reference to one another.
Indeed if anything femininity is the positive of
which masculinity is the negative, or more properly
the negativity of femininity acquires priority.
Masculinity is now a flight from femininity, its
positivity the negation of a negation.
This can be seen in 'Analysis Terminable and
Interminable', where the last section deals with the
repudiation of femininitY.7 The basis of this
"remarkable feature in the psychical life of human
beings"a may be traced in the essays referred to in
the previous section. Its essence is the way in which
it is the absence of the penis in the female that
forces the boy out of the Oedipal phallic sexual
organisation and into the latency period, via the. . ..
"smashing" of the Oedipus complex.
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In 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' Freud
makes clear that "what brings about the destruction
of the child's phallic genital organisation is [the]
threat of castration."9 This threat, Freud believes
usually to be made in connection with masturbation,
but he also states that even if not actually made it
will be imagined.10 The significance of this point
will be returned to when the "archaic heritage" is
discussed. In the present context what is important
is the role played by the observation of the female
genitals in the effectiveness of this threat.
This had long been recognised, along with the
universal attribution of a penis in the phallic phase
of development. The first mention of it appears in
1908 in 'On the Sexual Theories of Children', and it
also occupies a prominent place in the "Little Hans"
case history of 1909.11 But it is only after The Ego
and the Id that the full story is spelt out, in
connection with the new interest in the mechanisms
that bring to an end the Oedipal-phallic period.
Sooner or later the child, who is so proud of his
possession of a penis, has a view of the genital
region of a little girl, and cannot help being
convinced of the absence of a penis in a creature
who is so like himself. With this, the loss of his
own penis becomes imaginable, and the threat of
castration takes its deferred effect.12
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It now becomes clear that it is precisely the
existence of women, and the fear of becoming like
them that drive the "more than a repression"13 that
destroys the Oedipus complex. The various effects of
this, the turning away from the mother, the
identification with the father and the establishment
of the superego are attempts to become masculine, and
even more to avoid becoming feminine. As Freud writes
in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926):
"preCisely in the interests of masculinity (that is
to say, from fear of castration), every activity
belonging to masculinity is stopped."14
The formation of the masculine character, and of the
superego are the result of the terror of becoming a
woman. It is this that expresses itself in the
masculine repudiation of femininity as set out in
'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', and in the
attitude to women that is left as a precipitate of
this period. This mixes fear, derived from the
reminder of castration, with contempt for this
incomplete and mutilated creature.1S
As Freud put it in his essay 'Female Sexuality': "it
is the discovery of the possibility of castration, as
proved by the sight of the female genitals, which
forces on [the boy] the transformation of his Oedipus
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complex, and which leads to the creation of his
super-ego and thus initiates all the processes that
are designed to make the individual find a place in
the cultural community."16
Masculinity is defined by flight from the feminine.
It is this that opens up the possibility of the
cultural process, the nature of which will be more
extensively considered below. What is now clear is
that this process can only be understood in its
relation to the other on which it depends, on
femininity. The girl child must react to the
castration complex in a different way. For her the
penis cannot be protected, but must rather be
desired. The meaning of this difference in relation
to the interaction of gender and moral identity is
explored in the next section.
Femininity and (lack of) Ethics.
The following very striking passage occurs in the
'Anatomical Sex Distinction' essay.
In girls the motive for the demolition of the
Oedipus complex is lacking.' ••• Thus the Oedipus
complex escapes the fate in meets with in boys: it
may be slowly abandoned or dealt with by
repression, or its effects may persist far into the
woman's normal mental life. I cannot evade the
notion (though I hesitate to give it expression)
that for women the level of what is ethically
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normal is different from what it is in men.
Character-traits which critics of every epoch have
brought up against women - that they show less
sense of justice than men, that they are less ready
to submit to the great exigencies of life, that
they are more often influenced in their judgements
by feelings of affection or hostility - all these
would be amply accounted for by the modification in
the formation of their super-ego which we have
inferred above.17
This discovery must have been comfortable for Freud,
since even before he had a theoretical basis for it
this judgement of women came naturally to him.18 Now
the reason for the non- or anti-cultural essence of
the feminine could be explained it was possible for
him to examine it more closely. In this context this
is interesting primarily for the light it throws on
masculinity, since the Freudian account of femininity
itself is now well worked. It will, however reappear
at the end of the present chapter where its contrast
to the Rousseauean will be examined.
For the purposes of the present argument the key
text, often neglected in the account of Freud and
femininity is 'The Economic Problem of Masochism'
.(1924). The significance of this text is usually
sought in its development of the implications of the
theory of the death instinct through the positing of
a "pri~ary masochism". It-has not often been seen
that it is of great importance in understanding the
way in which the feminine character, with its weak
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superego and inadequately dealt with Oedipus complex,
relates to the moral law. This provides new insight
into the importance of the super-ego, which allows a
grasp of its role as liberator of the ego, usually
overshadowed by its persona as "harsh master". This
in turn will lead to the limit of freedom in
psychoanalysis, and thence both back to femininity
and misogyny, and forward to Kierkegaard, faith, and
the "suspension" of the ethical and of gender.
In 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' three forms of
masochism are discussed: erotogenic, feminine, and
moral masochism.l9 These three correspond to the
realms of instinct theory; history of the formation
of the subject as genderedj and topographical account
of ethical identity, respectively. Here it will be
necessary briefly to survey the first two before
turning to a more extensive discussion of the third.
Freud takes feminine masochism first. Characteristic
of his refusal to naturalise sexual identi~y is it
that this is found by Freud in men.20 It is equally
typical that he none the less adheres to a view of
the feminine as masochistic. Freud indicates that to..
be victimised and to be feminine may almost be
equated. Where masochistic fantasies are "richly
elaborated •• they place the subject in a
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characteristically female situation; they signify,
that is, being castrated, or copulated with, or
giving birth to a babY."21 This accords to a view
that defines femininity through castration.
This brief account leads to the longer discussion of
"erotogenic" masochism. This holds that unlike in
Freud's earlier discussions of the topic, where
masochism was held to be the turning round on the
self of a primary sadism'22 it represents a portion
of the death instinct never externalised.23 This
point, the connection of masochism and the death
instinct is an important one that is elaborated
through the concept of "moral masochism".
In this an "unconscious sense of guilt" that derives
not from the active, sadistic super-ego, but from the
desire for punishment of a passive, masochistic ego
is posited. "Conscience and morality have arisen
through the overcoming, the desexualisation, of the
Oedipus complex; but through moral masochism morality
becomes sexualised once more, the Oedipus complex is
revived and the way is opened for a regression from
morality to the Oedipus complex"24 Before lo~king. '. .
more closely at the consequences of this "regression"
and the light they throw on the role of the super-ego
in freeing the ego it is necessary to recognise the
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links between this masochism and the feminine
experience of the Oedipus complex.
At the beginning of this section a long passage from
'The Anatomical Sex Distinction' was quoted that
indicated that due to the absence of the fear of
castration the female Oedipus complex was never dealt
with as adequately as the male and consequently women
had weaker super-egos and a number of consequences
followed. Already this seems to indicate that moral
masochism might be the typical ethical formation in
women. When one follows the course of the effects of
the castration complex in women this feeling is
greatly strengthened. Women come not to identify with
their father but to desire him in a passive manner.
A late, and representative, discussion of this may be
found in 'An Outline of Psychoanalysis' one of the
last things Freud wrote and published posthumously.
"In males •• the threat of castration brings the
Oedipus complex to an end; in females •• on the
contrary, it is their lack of a penis that forces
them into their Oedipus complex."25 This goes on to
renew the discussion of the repudiation of femininity.. ,
met with in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', a
topic to which this thesis will return below.
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The great problem of female development for Freud was
the passage from an early, pre-Oedipal stage in which
her attachment to the mother is identical to that of
a boy, "the little girl is a little man"'26 to the
female Oedipus complex proper in which her affection
is transferred to her father. "[H]ow does she pass
from her masculine phase into the feminine phase that
has been biologically marked out for her?"27 It is
here that the castration complex intervenes.
The details ~f this process are complex, and need not
be fully set out here. In brief there is a twofold
development. On the one hand the ambivalence that is
assumed to be present in all "primitive" attachments
means that there is a current of hostility toward the
mother in the pre-Oedipal stage.28 This is massively
reinforced by the reproach directed toward the mother
that she did not give the girl "a proper penis", and
this is "the girl's strongest motive for turning away
from her".29 On the other hand the lack of the penis
becomes a reason for desiring the father.
One line of development for the girl is to cling to
the wish for a penis. This line holds to the
repudiation of femininity, and in 'Analysis
Terminable and Interminable' and in the 'Outline'
Freud makes quite clear that a practical task of
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analysis is to break this "masculinity complex" in
women patients. This will be returned to in due
course. The main line of "normal" female development
renounces this wish, and adopt a feminine character.
"She gives up her wish for a penis and puts in place
of it a wish for a child: and with that purpose in
view she takes her father as a love object."30
This wish for a child has a number of implications.
First it accepts the "fact" of castration and gives
up the wish for the completion of a penis. Instead
there is a displacement to the wish for a child. That
the substitute is inferior is shown by the difficulty
of replacing the masculinity complex by the proper
feminine attitude and by the importance ascribed to
penis envy in the normal feminine character.3l
Secondly, and here the theme of moral masochism
returns, it involves turning round the active sexual
desire of the pre-Oedipal desire for the mother into
a passive desire to be "copulated with", to recall a
phrase from the discussion of "feminine masochism".
It is central to Freud's account of the development
of infantile sexu~lity that the sexual act is seen as
an aggressive act, that the male attacks and the
female is victimised in the child's vision of
intercourse.32 This means that in order to complete
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the turn from the mother to the father that sets up
the Oedipus complex a turn round from activity to
passivity is necessary. Further, as was noted above
this Oedipal attitude to the father is not done away
with as is its masculine equivalent. It lives on to
form the nucleus of the feminine character.33
Thus in women instead of an internalised agency,
introjected through identification, taking the place
of Oedipal desire this desire itself remains in
plac~. This situation corresponds precisely to the
state of affairs in moral masochism, as described in
'The Economic Problem of Masochism'. Women do not
"regress" to this state of affairs, since they can
never, not being exposed to the educative terror of
the fear of becoming women, escape from it. Freud
makes some interesting remarks about the consequences
of the two relations to morality, with which the next
section will be concerned.
The Superego as Liberator: the Depersonalisation of
Authority.
In 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' Freud writes
that the "regression from morality to th~ Oedipus
complex" that is represented by moral masochism "is
to the advantage neither of morality nor of the
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person concerned."34 This section examines the nature
of the disadvantage referred to for the light it
throws both on sexual difference in the ethical
sphere and on the liberation offered by the superego.
In a passage preceding and serving as a preliminary
to that just quoted Freud considers the way the
superego develops from its origin in the Oedipus
complex.
The course of childhood development leads to an
ever-increasing detachment from parents, and their
personal significance for the super-ego recedes
into the background. To the imagos they leave
behind there are then linked the influences of
teachers and authorities, self chosen models and
publicly recognised heroes, whose figures need no
longer be introjected into an ego which has become
more resistant. The last figure in the series that
began with the parents is the dark figure of
Destiny, which only the fewest of us are able to
look on as impersonal ••• [A]ll who transfer the
guidance of the world to Providence, to God, or to
God and Nature, arouse a suspicion that they still
look on these ultimate and remotest powers as a
parental couple, in a mythological sense, and
believe themselves bound to them by libidinal
ties·35
It is clear from this, and from the negative
comparison with moral masochism, that the
introjection of the authority of the parents,
principally the father, as the superego allows a
,process of development that is impossible otherwise.
This process, of the depersonalisation of morality,
is indispensable to the creation of an autonomous
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moral identity. The alternative is an "unconscious
sense of guilt" that seeks punishment. The phenomenon
that Freud brings forward to exemplify this need to
be punished is the "negative therapeutic reaction",
wherein the desire to suffer blocks the possibility
of recovery in ana1ysis.36
This makes only a brief appearance in 'The Economic
Problem of Masochism' but is more extensively
discussed in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'.
There it is more explicitly linked to the problem of
the death instinct and of the primary masochism
derived from it.37 This raises again the question of
the role of the superego in constraining and "taming"
the death instinct, considered above. It now emerges
that the problem of aggressiveness, that was most
prominent in this connection in Civilisation and its
Discontents, is joined by that of primary masochism,
the death instinct directed against the self. The
superego acts in the economy of the instincts to
divert and to render safe this instinct
Why it is the superego that plays this role will be
considered in the second half of the present chapter •
..
At present the focus is on the way in which it
achieves this and the implications of the exclusion
of women from possession of a strong superego.
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There are two mechanisms that allow the superego to
free the ego from instinctual binds and to engage in
a progressive acculturation. One is the freeing of
authority from its dependence on the influence of the
parents allowing its rationalisation; the other is
its importance in the sublimation of libido, which
allows displacement from the directly sexual to
"higher" forms of expression. For the argument of
this thesis the first of these is the more important,
but the second should not be lost sight of.
The process of depersonalisation has already been
touched on. 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' is
one of the texts where it is most explicit, and it is
telling that this occurs in the context of comparison
with moral masochism, which is typically feminine.
The key point is that: "[The superego] came into
being through the introjection into the ego of the
first objects of the id's libidinal impulses -
namely, the two parents. In this process the relation
to those objects was desexualisedj it was diverted
from its direct sexual aims."38
The superego draws upon the enormous and undiluted. .
strength of these in~tinctual impulses, but diverts
them into a new avenue. The external authority
becomes part of the self, and a part deep within the
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id and able to draw upon its power. "[T]his super-ego
is as much a representative of the id as of the
external world."39 What is more this taking inside of
the parents (the father, Freud sometimes equivocates
on this but the logic of the theory demands that the
father is the central figure) is extremely radical.
There is a striking and perplexing passage in
Civilisation and its Discontents that illustrates
this point. Having restated the derivation of the
superego from the Oedipus complex and identification
with the father Freud goes on to write: "By means of
identification [the son] takes the unattackable
authority into himself. The authority now turns into
his super-ego and enters into possession of all the
aggressiveness which a child would have liked to
exercise against it. The child's ego has to content
itself with the unhappy role of the authority - the
father - who has been thus degraded."40
The play of identification has become extraordinarily
complex in this account, which is directed towards
the instinctual economics of the process of superego
formation. The ego s~parates a part of itself to play..
the role of the authority figure and then shifts its
primary locus of selfhood to this special agency in
order to leave the remainder available to play the
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role of whipping boy. This is made more puzzling by
the way in which this remainder then becomes the
external authority that was the model for the over-I
which now seems to be the self's primary location.
Unravelling the details of this dizzying play of
identification and displacement is unnecessary to the
grasping of the essential point. The extremely
powerful agency of control formed by the dissolution
of the Oedipus complex is part of the self as well as
a division of it. The passage just considered
demonstrates that the superego is just as much "I" as
the ego. This means both that the subject has had its
unity fractured, a point stressed in the previous
chapter in the comparison with Rousseau; and that the
internalised authority has had its links to the
father figure who was its basis weakened to the point
where the possibility of breaking them emerges.
This is the process traced out in the passage with
which the present section began. The development of
the moral personality, by adding new influences to
the parental core of the superego depersonal1ses it.
This is the indispensable precondition of the
. .
rationalisation of morality that is the central
meaning of the Freudian critique of religion. This is
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quite impossible if the relation to the ethical
remains at the masochistic, feminine level.
Because this masochism has as its core a passive
relation to the father-authority figure the emphasis
falls on punishment'41 The superego retains from its
original form, the ego ideal of 'On Narcissism: an
Introduction' the characteristic of a positive
striving, an attempt to match a model'42 (This
aspect, for example is prominent in so late a work as
Moses and Monotheism. There, in the context of a
discussion of the ethical rigour of Judaism Freud
contends that this may in part be due to satisfaction
to be gained from pleasing the superego'43) As a
result of this difference the superego has the
potential to free authority from dependence, to make
it the possession of the self and to rationalise it.
Masochistic feminine morality has no such potential.
It is fixated on the figure of the father, to whom it
is turned by the desire for the child as substitute
penis. This late, and passive, masochistic Oedipal
formation has as its ethical component a desire to be
punished and equally to be be directed which
corresponds to that dimension of religiosity that the
critique of religion most decisively rejects.
Femininity has been correlated by Freud with that
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regressive, father fixated psychic formation that
psychoanalysis aims to free the ego from. the next
section will examine why the superego, with its roots
in terror, of the father and of (becoming a) woman,
is so necessary.
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Ethics and Ambivalence.
The second part of this chapter examines why it is
that the superego is so indispensable to the
liberation of the ego. This returns to the theme of
ambivalence, so prominent in the first chapter on
Freud. There it was argued that the theme of
ambivalence, of the inseparability of apparently
opposed emotional or instinctual forces, was the core
of Freudianism. It was this Hisight that allowed him
to break from the escapist idealism of which Rousseau
is here the representative. Freud is resigned in face
of the suffering ambivalence makes inevitable.
The present argument is that the misogyny discovered
and analysed above is a symptom, in a sense close to
that of the psychoanalytic usage, of the failure of
the thought of ambivalence. It was argued that in
Freud not only are the instincts ambivalent but that
there is also a structure of ambivalence between the
instincts and the authority that stands over against
them, unifying the self and enforcing ethical,
civi1isationa1, renunciations. Here it is shown that
Freud never came fully to grips with this. Authority
..
remained external to the self, and especially to the
economy of the instincts, despite some indications of
a possibility of overcoming this.
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In the next chapter it will be argued that this
externality is inevitable if Freud's materialist
assumptions about the possibilities of freedom are
accepted. For the present the point is the
impossibility of an "ego morality", the consequences
that would flow from the failure of the formation of
the superego in males, and the meaning of this for
the relation of desire and authority.
That the unfettered ego is an object of lurking,
usually unexpressed fear in Freud, leads to the
necessity of enforcing bounds on its behaviour
through the terror of the castration complex. The
last section of the present section will consider the
alternative that is not raised in Freud's work, but
which emerges from the comparison with Rousseau, that
of the affirmation of femininity, of an ego neither
modelled on the primal father nor burdened with the
terror of him. Freud, through the analysis of moral
masochism has excluded thisj Rousseau found in
maternity the ground of a different morality from
that of the conscience.
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The Primal Horde and the Archaic Inheritance.
In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego there
occurs a passage, briefly discussed in the previous
chapter, that describes the primal father, and his
relations to his sons. Freud has been discussing the
psychology of groups, which he finds to be marked by
dependence on others, inhibition of the intellectual
functions, and the dominance of primitive emotion. He
turns in Chapter X of the work to his hypothesis of
the primal horde and finds that the group revives
this horde.
[T]he psychology of groups is the oldest human
psychology; what we have isolated as individual
psychology, by neglecting all traces of the group,
has only since come into prominence out of the old
group psychology, by a gradual process which may
still, perhaps, be described as incomplete ••••
Further reflection will show us in what respect
this statement requires correction. Individual
psychology must, on the contrary, be just as old as
group psychology, for from the first there were two
kinds of psychologies, that of the individual
members of the group and that of the father, chief,
or leader ••• [T]he father of the primal horde was
free. His intellectual acts were strong and
independent even in isolation and his will needed
no reinforcement from others. Consistency leads us
to assume that his ego had few libidinal ties; he
loved no one but himself, or other people only in
so far as they served his needs. To objects his ego
gave away no more than was barely necessarY.44
This 'pi~ture of the primal father as the possessor of
a strong and unrestrained ego was analysed in the
previous chapter in terms of the projection of the
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pre-Oedipal narcissistic ego. Here it must be
stressed that this is only one aspect of its
importance. It is essential to the structure of
Freudian theory that the primal father really existed
in the pre-history of the race, and what once existed
might, perhaps, do so again. In considering this the
limit of the project of liberation is reached, the
castrating primal father cannot and must not be
brought back into existence. In the 1930s the
implications of his return would be all too clear.
In the terms established here the possibility of the
ambivalence of authority and ambivalence is, in this
original moment, excluded. On the one hand there is
in the father the immediate unity of desire with
authority; on the other, in the case of the sons
there is an external opposition of the two poles. It
is only the primal murder and the setting up of
taboo, the primitive form of the superego that the
two terms come into an internal relation. This latter
moment will be re-examined below. First it is
necessary to look at the two positions in the primal
horde.
The father, as described in the passage quoted at the
beginning of the present section, knows no restraint
on his behaviour other than those of the ego's
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assessment of reality. He is a pre-moral being, a
character described erroneously by Freud as
coinciding with the post-moral Nietzschean
superman.45 His social relations are confined to a
total domination of those who surround him. He has
disposal of the females of the horde and ruthlessly
and brutally represses the males.46 He is totally
free, except in so far as his finite strength limits
him. There cannot arise a conflict between authority,
domination, and desire for him since his desire is
the nearest thing to law the horde knows.
The sons' situation is the polar opposite. The
reality of the primal horde is essentially structured
by an absolute opposition between their desire and
the domination of the father. He prevents their
"satisfying their directly sexual impulsions"'47 he
drives them away as soon as they grow uP'48 he
castrates them.49 For them desire impels them into a
fatal conflict with unrestrained authority, that will
punish them to the limit if it is suspected. There
can here be no more question of an ambivalent
relation than in the opposite case of the father,
although here the ambivalence is resolved in the
opposite direction.
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It is out of the sons' position that development
issues, although only in relation to that of the
father. The primal murder and its aftermath bring
together the group psychology of the sons with the
individual psychology of the father to begin the
process whose endpoint is the rational Utopia of The
Future of an Illusion and the cultural recollection
of Moses and Monotheism. Taboo is the incorporation
into the id of what will be made ego by the
fulfilment of the analytic project. What is in
question here is why it is necessary to exclude women
from this project, which as argued above, is in turn
the question of the necessity of the superego, of the
indispensability of the educative terror of the
castration complex.
This necessity can be approached through a
consideration of the role played in Freudian theory
of the myth of the primal murder as origin of the
cultural process. It is tempting to see the outmoded
and highly speculative anthropology as an
illegitimate projection of an otherwise empirically
grounded and independent theory, that of the Oedipal
origin of the moral sense. In Freud, however, the.
relationship between the two is not as tidy as that.
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It is clear that in Totem and Taboo Freud was
bringing to his study of anthropology insights into
the Oedipal drama derived from his previous work on
modern individual psychology. He is quite
unembarrassed by this, and has arguments to validate
this procedure.SO Having established the theory of
the primal murder, however he shows an increasing
tendency to use it to explain features of modern
psychic formation, most particularly through the
ideas of the primal fantasies, the archaic heritage,
and the inheritance of acquired characteristics.
These, and particularly this last, it is again
tempting simply to ignore or to dismiss. The argument
of this thesis is that to do so is to ignore vital
symptoms of what is repressed within Freudianism, the
bringing of which into the light will be the
particular task of the next chapter.'
The archaic heritage is an idea that appears in a
number of texts, but which receives its fullest
treatment in Moses and Monotheism. In it Freud
develops the idea that the events of the primal
murder are transmitted not only by their restaging
within the personal history of every son, but
..
genetically. This is suggested as the reason that the
threat of castration need not be uttered to be heard.
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I have behaved for a long time as though the
inheritance of memory-traces of the experience of
our ancestors, independently of direct
communication and of the influence of education by
the setting of an example, were established beyond
question. When I spoke of the survival of a
tradition among a people or of the formation of a
people's character, I had mostly in mind an
inherited tradition of this kind ••• My position,
no doubt, is made more difficult by the present
attitude of biological science, which refuses to
hear of the inheritance of acquired characters by
succeeding generations. I must, however, in all
modesty confess that nevertheless I cannot do
without this factor in biological evolution'51
In the context in which this confession occurs Freud
needs the assumption to buttress the far reaching
claims he is making about the history of religion,
but the same idea recurs in texts dealing with
individual development, where it appears in the guise
of the "primal fantasies". These are treated at
length in the Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis, of 1915-17, thus much predating the
last passage, although not the first elaboration of
the theory of the primal horde in Totem and Taboo.
In Lecture 23 'The Paths to Symptom-Formation' Freud
raises the difficulty of the uniform appearance of
certain fantasies in every case. He lists as
universal a series of these fantasies and claims that
they are:
a phylogenetic endowment. In them the individual
reaches beyond his own experience into primaeval
experience at points where his own experience has
been too rudimentary. It seems to men quite
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possible that all the things that are told to us
today in analysis as phantasy - the seduction of
children, the inflaming of sexual excitement by
observing parental intercourse, the threat of
castration (or rather castration itself) - were
once real occurrences in the primaeval times of the
human family, and that children in their fantasies
are simply filling in the gaps in individual truth
with prehistoric truth.52
With this theoretical leap of faith, "his own absurd
belief Freud has cancelled the very insight with
which analysis began. The power of fantasy was the
decisive idea that allowed him to break with the
seduction theory and begin the exploration of the
unconscious. His new science was founded on the
insistence that events did not have to be real to be
really effective, to decisively shape the lives in
which they may not have happened. With this doctrine
of the archaic heritage and the primal fantasies,
which tellingly recurs in 'The Anatomical Sex
Distinction"53 the fantasy events are turned back
into reminiscences of real events, as more generally
the theory of the primal horde makes the Oedipus
complex that of a real murder.
The Failure of Ambivalence and the Necessity of the
Superego •
.'
In Totem and Taboo the primary usage of the term
"ambivalence" refers to a contradiction between the
coherent ego structures and repressed instinctual
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desire. The ambivalent attitude is described as one
in which a desire encounters a prohibition, where:
the conflict between these two currents cannot be
promptly settled because - there is no other way of
putting it - they are localised in the subject's
mind in such a manner that they cannot come up
against one another. The prohibition is noisily
conscious while the desire •• is unconscious and
the subject knows nothing of it. If it were not for
this psychological factor, an ambivalence like this
could [not] last so long.54
In the previous chapter the case of instinctual
ambivalence was examined, and was shown to rest on
the fundamental strain of life, on the necessary
presence in life of death and the desire for death.
This second dimension of ambivalence is different.
The previous section examined the primal horde, and
showed both that its real existence is an inseparable
part of Freudian theory, and that in it desire and
authority are not involved in an ambivalent relation.
Rather they are immediately identified in the case of
the father and absolutely opposed and separated in
the case of the sons. It is only with the primal
murder and the putting in place of taboo, the ur-
phenomenon of the superego, that their relation
begins to become an internal, an ambivalent one.
This is important because every (male) individual is
doomed to repeat the struggle of the sons. The
passage into culture repeats the drama of the primal
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murder, and this drama, through the phylogenetic
residue, is inescapable. Why this is so is explained
by the nature of the primal father. His freedom was
the freedom to appropriate, to dominate, to castrate.
In the economics of Freudian theory there is no other
way than the creation of the superego, the turning of
terror against the self, for to restrain the ego. The
free ego recognises no authority other than
necessity, the limits imposed by natural finitude •
..~
There are passages in Freud's work where it is
intimated that this might be an inadequate
conceptualisation of the relation of desire, freedom,
and the moral law, but these are subordinated to the
main line of the theory, which through the notion of
the primal horde, the primal murder, and the archaic
inheritance, insists on the original externality of
restraining authority and desire.
These hints of another view concentrate on the
internality of limit and desire, and the implications
of this for the development of the self. In
particular it sometimes appears that the
impossibility of satisfaction opens up the self to a
.process that might have as terminus a self-reflective
relation both to desire and to the object of desire.
This alternative exit from the Oedipal narcissistic
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union with the mother is most clearly outlined in
'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex'.
At the beginning of the essay Freud discusses the
Oedipal position, he speculates that typically it is
the arrival of a new baby that disabuses the boy of
his illusion that his mother belongs to him alone.
Reflection must deepen our sense of the importance
of these influences, for it will emphasize the fact
that distressing experiences of this sort, which
act in opposition to the content of the complex,
are inevitable. Even when no special events occur
•• the absence of the satisfaction hoped for, the
continued denial of the desires baby, must in the
end lead the small lover to turn away from his
hopeless longing. In this way the Oedipus complex
would go to its destruction from its lack of
success, from the effects of its internal
impossibility. 55
The pathos of this passage is reinforced by two
features of the development of the desire for the
mother. These are its origin in "anaclisis" and its
fate, its continual repetition. The first of these
was dealt with in the previous chapter. The cathexis
of the mother as a libidinal object begins by
following the path of oral/nutritive satisfaction.
The mother is desired in a fashion modelled on
ingestion of milk. This is central to the contrast
between anaclitic and identificatory cathexis on
which the theory of the Oedipal drama depends.
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The desire for the mother is the desire to "have"
her, to incorporate her to complete the self, as the
"pleasure ego" incorporates whatever gives it
pleasure. Since the real achievement of this would be
catastrophic, both in the sense that the infant would
die, and in the more important psychic sense that it
would prevent any further experience of satisfaction,
anaclitic attachment is predicated on frustration.
Freud indeed explicitly recognises this:
Childhood love is boundless; it demands exclusive
possession, it is not content with less than all.
But it has a second characteristic: it has •• no
aim and is incapable of obtaining complete
satisfaction; and principally for that reason it is
doomed to end in disappointment and to give place
to a hostile attitude.56
Further material for reflection on the tragic
character of the relation to the mother is provided
by the thought of its repetition in the adult search
for an object. In the three 'Contributions to the
Psychology of Love' (1910 - 1918) this theme is
teased out. The first two, in particular, explore the
implications of the idea that: "The finding of an
object is in fact a refinding of it."S7
In the first 'A Special Kind of Object Choice Made by
Men' Freud investigates a type of pathological love,
whose essential characteristics are centred on a need
for the object simultaneously to be sexually involved
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with someone else, but which has a long list of
regular features.58 The full range of these are held
to have a single source and moreover: "The object
choice that is so strangely conditioned, and this
very singular way of behaving in love, have the same
psychical origin as we find in the loves of normal
people. They are derived from the infantile fixation
of tender feelings on the mother, and represent one
of the consequences of this fixation."S9
Of course, in the type discussed here by Freud the
Oedipal drama is being replayed, which displaces it
from the main path of the present argument, but in
working out its implications he makes the following
remarks: "We have learnt from psychoanalysis in other
examples that the notion of something irreplaceable,
when it is active in the unconscious, frequently
appears as broken up into an endless series: endless
for the reason that the surrogate nevertheless fails
to provide the desires satisfaction."60
It is thus clear that the sexual instinct is
incapable of satisfaction for two reasons: first that
it in its original and prototypical form has no aim,.. .
or perhaps no aim that could in any circumstance be
reachedj second because all subsequent forms compound
this insatiability with the additional factor of the
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impossible attempt to resurrect a specific love with
a different object. The way out of this impasse
suggested by Freud is sublimation, which itself
depends on the superego for its mechanism, but it
might be possible to construct an argument that a
non-repressive alternative to the morality of the
superego would have its beginning here.
An insight, at whatever level, into the impossibility
of the incorporative infantile desire, might lead to
a new relation to desire, and to its object. It
depends on the ability to transcend the self, to go
beyond the ego without establishing another super-ego
as a stable entity. This ability is what is variously
described as freedom, or in its primitive form,
irony, by Kierkegaard. This chapter will end by
returning to the comparison of Freud with Rousseau
with which it began, this time with the focus on
ethical femininity.
Rousseau, Freud, and Ethical Bisexuality.
Rousseau, it has often been noticed, claimed to
transgress the rigidly de~ined sexual identities he
was usually so keen to enforce.61 In writing of his
childhood he suggests that the early influence of
romantic literature gave him a strong imaginative
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"insight •• into the passions."62 The action of his
strong imaginative facility, when combined with early
influences both of this sort and of a more masculine
political kind'63 led him to develop: "a heart at
once proud and affectionate, and a character at once
effeminate and inflexible".64
The free imagination, in Rousseau's case as in any
individual in whom it is allowed, or is strong
enough, to do so, exceeds the bounds of gender
identity. Often Rousseau notes this possibility as
the great danger of modernity, as in the Letter to
d'Alembert, one of the great themes of which is the
danger to the demarcation of sexual roles in Geneva
posed, narrowly, by the possibility of Voltaire's
projected theatre, and more generally by the
importation of metropolitan mores.
This critique of life in the city, and especially in
Paris, and contrast to the more traditional SWiss,
reappears in La Nouvelle Heloise in the series of
letters Julie exchanges with Saint-Preux during his
stay in Paris. The feminisation of men, it must be
noted is the focus of Rou~seau's anxiety, while the
masculinisation of women is decried chiefly as
leading to this emasculation.
CHAPTER FIVE Page 256
However, the position adopted by Rousseau as author
itself transcends masculinity and incorporates
elements of the feminine. Some preliminary reference
has been made to this above, in its confessional
appearance. It is also thematised, as integral to
Rousseau's activity as an author in the Preface to La
Nouvelle Heloise.
"Great cities require public theatres, and romances
are necessary to a corrupt people. I saw the manner
of the times, and have published these letters. Would
to heaven I had lived in an age when I ought rather
to have thrown them in the fire."65 The poison of
sensibility, taken in by Rousseau as a child from
romances, results in a romance offered by him as
remedial. It has required his bisexual nature to
create a book which from its position beyond the
polarisation of the sexes strives to put that
polarity back in place.
Rousseau's going beyond does not rest there, however.
In the late Reveries of a Solitary Walker he puts
forward, more explicitly than elsewhere, the
possib~lity of a position outside society and hence
beyond gender. This' position is possible only for the
exceptional, like himself, but for them should be
regarded as higher than the limited and compromised
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position necessary to sustain social life. This has
already been briefly analysed in the first chapters
on Rousseau. Here it necessary only to remark that
Rousseau's sexual dialectic has implicit in it the
possibility and even necessity of its excess, of the
going beyond sex into bisexuality, which makes
Rousseau's authorship possible.
In Freud the situation is entirely different.
'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' specifically
commands the analyst to enforce the proper sexual
identity in the case of women, and as has been argued
in previous sections of this chapter the contrast
between masculine morality, with its roots in the
superego, and moral masochism, implies that
masculinity is preferable in every dimension to
femininity.
Science, the completion of the project of the reality
principle; moral autonomy gained through the
depersonalisation of the superego; and sublimation,
the continuation of the desexualisation of libido
begun with the smashing of the Oedipus complex; are
all masculine. Femininity is marked by the dominance
.. .
of wish-fulfilment; continuation of dependence on the
father; and the lack of capacity for sublimation
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resultant from the failure decisively to dissolve the
Oedipus complex.
Thus Freud, while acknowledging, and indeed
stressing, constitutional bisexuality can find no
positive moment in adult, ethical bisexuality. In
Chapter Two above it was shown that in Rousseau an
ethico-sexual complementarity was central to the
possibility of ethical life, while in the present
section it was argued that Rousseau's own position
within his work is a bisexual one and that the
infinite freedom he posits necessarily transgresses
sex-roles. This chapter has argued that in Freud by
contrast there is a privilege accorded to masculinity
that means that the achievement of this position is
the essential preliminary to any ethical or cultural
advance.
Further, this development of masculinity out of an
initial bisexuality depends on a negative impulsion
from femininity. Freudian thought is structurally
misogynistic in that the "repudiation of femininity"
is definitive of all that it values most. There is in
Freud, as in Rousseau, a sexual dialectic at the..
heart of moral identity, but in Freud this is marked
by a placing in masculinity of all moral worth. This
is a necessary consequence of his conflation of the
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values of moral autonomy and cultural solidarity that
in Rousseau were so sharply distinguished.
The only possibility of autonomy in Freud lies
through the identifiction with the social constraint
transmitted through the Oedipal drama. Authority is
to be first internalised and then depersonalised and
made rational. In men one of the sources of pathology
is a refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the
authority of the father.
This forms the sharpest of contrasts to Rousseau, for
whom autonomous conscience is defined by its
rejection of social determination. It is for this
reason that he is able to, or must, find an ethical
role for women as the guardians and representatives
of collective ethical life.
Freud having reduced the two dimensions, (which one
might, following Hegel call the ethical and the
moral) to one, cannot find such a role. It has been
argued (for example by Judith van Herik in her Freud,
Femininity and Faith) that an "extra moral" value is
still placed on women as the representatives of a
satisfaction excluded by the austerity of Freud
cenuncIa tory ethico-moral vi-ew, but if ,this is
present it is very much as a subordinate theme.
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Conclusion.
This chapter has examined the limits of analysis, in
the profoundly connected dimensions of moral autonomy
and sexual identity. It has shown that the terror of
the institution of the superego is a necessary moment
of the development of the subject, and that this
entails a structural misogyny at the core of Freudian
thought.
The place of the superego in Freud has been traced to
the nature of the "strong ego" without internalised
moral authority. This was shown to be represented by
the primal father, the narcissistic ego writ large,
whose relations to others can only be structures of
dominance and whose complementary other is found in
the group psychology of his sons. This pairing, with
its echoes of fascist politics, can only be overcome
in the bringing together of the two psychological
types via the putting in place of the superego.
The mechanism for this, the castration complex,
depends on the masculine terror of being feminised.
This means both that masculinity becomes the bearer
of a civilisation predicated on flight from
femihinity, and that women, since the .cas t rat t on. .
complex acts so differently on them, are excluded
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from the process of civilisation. This is so
especially since the superego is the locus not only
of a moral autonomy dependant on its
depersonalisation, but also of the parallel process
of sublimation.
This constellation of ideas has been held to centre
on the impossibility of an "ego-morality" a moral
identity founded within the self rather than on
internalisation of constraint. It has been suggested
that the Freudian rejection of transcendent freedom
in favour of a materialism expressed in the ambition
to reduce psychology to an economics of instinctual
forces and thence to physiology, is the source of the
impossibility of such a morality. In this sense it
forms a polar opposite to the unbounded freedom
posited by Rousseau, the consequences of which were
examined in the first three chapters.
In the next chapter it will be argued that in the
difficult relations of self, freedom, faith, and the
finite, that may be discerned in the writings of
Kierkegaard lies the possibility of overcoming these
.problems, or at le.ast of opening ~them up. In
Kierkegaard can be traced the outline of an
alternative treatment of moral, and of sexual
identity.
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CHAPTER SIX: BEYOND FREUD AND ROUSSEAU
This chapter reads some writings of Kierkegaard with
and against those of Freud and of Rousseau to begin
the work of comprehending the limitations in their
ethical and moral thought. These limits have been
found particularly in the way in which they have
placed gender and love in their work, and so the
chapter ends with a brief consideration of the
appearance of these themes in the writing of
Kierkegaard.
Freud, it was argued in the previous cha~ter, relies
on the engendering of the self in the Oedipal drama
to overcome the externality of desire and authority.
The "flight from femininity" is the mechanism for the
creation of the superego. This in turn is the agency
which allows the internalisation of the social law,
and its integration with the self and rationalisation
through "depersonalisation" of the superego. The
necessity for this terror, and the consequent
exclusion of women from moral identity, was traced to
the absolute opposition of desire and authority
.figured most strikingly in the myth' of the primal
horde and the primal murder.
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Finally it was argued that the idea of the "archaic
heritage", of the inheritance of the guilt of this
original event was the cancellation of psychoanalysis
and exposed the weakness occasioned by the limit of
ambivalence. The failure to integrate desire with any
structure of authority was the key moment in this
reading of Freud. The present chapter begins here, by
arguing that this failure can be understood within
the Kierkegaardian psychology as anxious.
In The Concept of Anxiety the fall into guilt follows
from the anxiety of the infinite freedom that
dissolves the boundaries of the constituted self. Sin
emerges from an anxiety that is made dizzy be the
abyss of freedom. The attempt to deny this abyss, to
cling to finitude can only make the anxiety worse. In
developing this idea through the various, and
increasingly developed forms of anxiety Kierkegaard
analyses the ideas of fate and guilt which have
particular relevance to the reading of Freud offered
here. It will be shown that the idea of freedom' and
its relation to guilt that is found in The Concept
of Anxiety allows a way out of the impasse of the
control of desire encountered in·psychoanalysis.
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The second section reads The Sickness Unto Death in
relation to Rousseau. In doing so it demonstrates
that the infinite freedom that Kierkegaard explores
differs essentially from the imaginative flight from
the finite that was shown in Rousseau. Kierkegaard
places the spirit, the locus of freedom, in necessary
relation to finitude. The self is a particular,
embodied and determined self, and cannot escape from
this. The attempt to do so is a form of despair, of
loss of self and of freedom.
Finally the third section briefly indicates lines of
thought found in Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and
Works of Love that rethink some of the themes of this
thesis in ways that allow for a recognition both of
the dissolution of differences and of identities in
the movement of infinite freedom, and of their
necessity for the ethical subject. Such a
recognition, it is being suggested, is of particular
importance in reflecting on issues of gender. Gender
identity is an essential moment in the constitution
of any ethical subject, but must and can be
renegotiated to escape the restrictive and exclusive
determinations it has hitherto had.
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Freudian Anxiety: Clinging to the Finite
The first section of this chapter considers Freudian
psychoanalysis in the context of the psychology of
Kierkegaard and specifically of The Concept of
Anxiety. There many of the themes of the chapters
concerned with Freud reappear. The limitations found
in Freud are overcome through Kierkegaard's
psychology of freedom and faith. Drawing on The
Concept of Anxiety it is argued that in
Kierkegaard's, or Vigilius Haufniensis', concept of
anxiety is to be found the internal, ambivalent,
relation of desire and authority that was lacking in
Freud. In the notion of anxiety as presentiment of
freedom may be seen the possibility of overcoming the
limits to liberation encountered in Freud.
Further this tracing of the origin of sin and of
guilt allows a reappraisal of the place of guilt in
Freud. In Freud guilt is decisively separated from
responsibility. Guilt is the primary phenomenon from
which all other aspects of moral life are derived. In
the idea of the archaic heritage guilt even becomes.. .an inherited residue from the past. In ~he Concept of
Anxiety this idea of being "guilty by fate" is
considered and rejected in favour of the idea of the
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fall from innocence as taking place through freedom.
This contrast will be developed below.
The place of sexual difference is correspondingly
changed. In Freud the imposition of the sense of
guilt depended on that of the sexual difference,
which accordingly became rigid and inescapable. In
The Concept of Anxiety the fall and the sexual
difference are closely associated, but the sequence
is reversed. In the fall are opened up the spaces of
the ethical and of history, and these are the place
of the sexual. What is more the place accorded to
these does not have the absolute character ascribed
to them by Freud. The famous "suspension of the
ethical", the nature of which will be briefly
explicated in this context, also suspends the sexual.
This requires also that attention be given to the
difference, so important to Kierkegaard, between
repetition and recollection. This problem will be
approached through a comparison between Moses and
Monotheism and Chapter III of The Concept of Anxiety
which like Freud's great work on the origin and
significance' of Judaism is centred on'the relation to
the lost origin of guilt. Where Freud sees the
development as a "repetition backwards" a regression
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to the primal crime, which can be broken only through
a comprehension that recalls it, Kierkegaard sees the
possibility of breaking out of the grip of the past
through the leap of faith, a repetition forwards.
This last point opens the way to the conclusion of
this first section of the present chapter which
argues that Freud's work can be understood as anxious
in the terms established in The Concept of Anxiety.
The Freudian ego, without the transcendent moment of
freedom, is a finite ego. In Kierkegaard's terms this
is of necessity an anxious position, which "clings to
the finite" when confronted with the abyss of its own
freedom. The gives a perspective on the nature of the
moral imperative in Freud and on the imposition of
sexual roles traced in the previous chapters. The
finite ego both needs these limits to avoid
collapsing into the pit of possibility, and is in
terror of what may emerge out of that collapse,
either in itself or in others. All of these points
will be reprised and their Significance reconsidered
in the third and last section of this chapter •
.In Freud the~e was an irreducible externality of
authority and desire, which could be overcome through
their identification in the strong ego, of which the
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primal father was the model. Despite the intimations
of an alternative conception that were referred to in
the later part of the previous chapter authority, the
imposition of structures of limitation on desire was
never made an internal feature of its development. In
origin desire is blind and indifferent to all except
its own urgent demand for expenditure.
In The Concept of Anxiety is found an account of the
origin of desire and its relation to authority, that
is very different, with similarities to Rousseau's
notion of a time before desire, but acknowledging the
difficulty of pre-lapsarian innocence. Where Rousseau
has imagination, as the primary organ of freedom,
create desire, passion, through the creation of its
object, in Kierkegaard freedom itself, 8S
possibility, or the possibility of possibility,
posits desire as the outcome of the fall.
Desire emerges out of anxiety, and: "Anxiety is ~
sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathY."l
Anxiety is defined by its ambivalence, by this doubly
doubled relation to its object. Anxiety in turn is."concentr~ted" b~ the word of p~ohibition, by the
primitive encounter with authoritY.2 The explanation
of this emergence of desire out of the ambivalent
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relation of anxiety to its as yet undefined object
through the encounter with the word of prohibition is
essential to the understanding both of The Concept of
Anxiety and the interpretation of Freud on the basis
of that work which is to be offered here. It is
essential, therefore, to read closely the relevant
pages of this extremely difficult and profound
analysis of the psychological ground of sin.
Kierkegaard's starting point is with the problem of
original sin. This has a twofold character in the
work under consideration: the way in which Adam's
relation to the "subsequent individual" is to be
thought;3 and that in which the transition from
innocence to the state of sinfulness is to be
conceived. It is with this latter, the dominant theme
of The Concept of Anxiety, with which this chapter is
principally concerned.
Central to the approach of this "psychologically
oriented deliberation"4 is the insistence that sin
must be the result of an act of freedom, although not
properly a free act. There is a "leap",S a break in
the chain of causality where sin comes into the
world. Furthermore sin is a matter with which each
has to face his, or her, own responsibility. For this
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reason: "The concept of sin does not properly belong
in any sciencej"6 Psychology cannot deal with sin, to
do so would falsify it by fixing it as "a state.
However, sin is not a state •••• As a state (de
potentia [according to possibility]), it is not, but
de actu or in actu [according to actuality or in
actuality] it is, again and again."7
The object of psychology is the "abiding something
out of which sin constantly arises, not by necessity
(for a becoming by necessity is a state •• ) but by
freedom - this abiding something, this predisposing
presupposition, sin's real possibility ••• "a This
state is the ambivalent state of anxiety, and is the
presupposition, the "real possibility", of sin, from
which actual sin is posited by freedom.
The first sin, which brings sinfulness into the
world, both for Adam and for the "subsequent man"9
comes about "through anxietY".IO Innocence is a state
in which "there is peace and repose, but there is
simultaneously something else that is not contention
and strife, for there is indeed nothing against which
to stfive."ll This "something else" is a~xiety the
object of which is nothing. It is essential to the
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definition of anxiety that it is differentiated from
fear by this having of "nothing" as its object.12
Anxiety is a "sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic
sympathy" towards an undefined possibility, or is
"freedom's actuality as the possibility of
possibility".13 The understanding of this demands
consideration of Kierkegaard's notoriously difficult
idea of the self, or the spirit'14 as the "synthesis
of the psychical and the physical"15 where the
synthesis is itself a third term, spirit.
The development of this cannot be pre-empted by a
definition, since the impossibility of conceptual
thought's grasping the self is central to
Kierkegaard's writing. The self is each person's
existence and task. The authorship strives towards
the confrontation of each individual with this
responsibility and the psychological works are circle
around the evasion of it. Anxiety is the presentiment
of the freedom that 'has yet to emerge, and hence of
the selfhood that this freedom posits through faith.
"In'!nnocence, man is not qualified as spirit but is
psychically qualified in immediate unity with his
natural condition. The spirit in man is dreaming."16
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This recalls Rousseau's man in the state of nature,
but where Rousseau evaded the difficulty of the
transition out of this state through the idea of
"latency" and of external catastrophe as driving it
Kierkegaard makes innocence anxious. "Anxiety is a
qualification of dreaming spirit •• Awake, the
difference between myself and my other is posited;
sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming it is an
intimated nothing'"17
In innocence freedom and the spirit, the third that
is the "relation to the relation" of psyche and
soma:18
is present, but as immediate, as dreaming.
Inasmuch as it is now present, it is in a sense a
hostile power, for it constantly disturbs the
relation between soul and body, a relation that
indeed has persistence and yet does not have
endurance, inasmuch as it first receives the
latter by the spirit. On the other hand, spirit is
a friendly power, since it is precisely that which
constitutes the relation. What, then, is man's
relation to this ambiguous power? How does spirit
relate itself to itself and to its condItionality?
It relates Itself as anxietY'19
In innocence thus conceived, as distinct from
Rousseau's state of nature, there is an immanent
restlessness. There is an ~ndefined something, or
properly "nothing", about which innocence is anxious.
This nothing is the "possibility of possibility" and
is the form in which spirit, which is to constitute
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the synthesis, to give it "endurance", first disturbs
the immediate unity of the two poles that are to be
related. This anxiety is not yet able to bring forth
a "something" to fill the place it creates. For this
to occur the encounter with authority, with the "word
of prohibition" is required. "Innocence still is, but
only a word is required and then ignorance is
concentrated. Innocence naturally cannot understand
this word, but at that moment anxiety has, as it
were, caught its first prey. Instead of nothing, it
now has an enigmatic word."20
This is the crucial moment for the present argument.
The innocent man, "Adam", finds that anxiety, the
ambivalent mixture of sympathy and antipathy is
activated through the relation to the prohibition.
Although the "word" cannot be understood, it provides
a point of crystallisation for anxiety. This allows a
sharper definition of anxiety, the outcome of which
will be the fall, and thence desire as such. There
is, though, a most important warning attached to this
passage: "When it is assumed that the prohibition
awakens the desire, one acquires knowledge instead of.
ignorance, and in that case Ad~m m~st have h~d a .
knowledge of freedom, for the desire was to use it.
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•••·The prohibition induces in him anxiety, for the
prohibition awakens in him freedom's possibility."2l
By the prohibition and its counterpart, the equally
ambiguous threat of punishment, "innocence is brought
to its uttermost."22 The final refinement of
Kierkegaard's interpretation of the Genesis narrative
is his suggestion that "Adam talked to himself"'23 or
that "the speaker is language".24 This indicates that
the relation to prohibition and punishment, to
authority, in the terms employed here, is an immanent
one, that it does not need to be brought to innocence
from without. The disturbing influence of spirit, of
freedom, of the "possibility of possibility" is
present as anxiety in the state of innocence itself.
What remains after this stage has been reached is the
fall, the moment at which sin is actualised. The
nature of sin is developed more in The Sickness Unto
Death, with which the next section will be concerned.
In The Concept of Anxiety the focus is on the
precondition of sin, anxiety, both in the state of
innocence and "as a consequence of sin". Kierkegaard
insist~ that in psychology it 1s illegitimate to ask
how sin comes into the world. It is necessary though
to exclude two ways of thinking it. First it does not
CHAPTER SIX page 275
come into the world through necessity. This would be
"a contradiction", nor by the act of "an abstract
liberum arbitrium (which no more existed in the world
in the beginning than in a later period •• )"'25
When spirit posits itself, through the exercise of
freedom, and sins, there is a double consequence:
"that sin came into the world and that sexuality was
posited; the one is inseparable from the other ••••
If [man] were not a synthesis that reposed in a
third, one thing could not have two consequences'"26
The actuality of spirit, even the "unwarranted
actuality"27 of sin, posits not only itself but the
synthesis, and to do this it must "pervade it
differentia tingly, and the ultimate point of the
sensuous is precisely the sexual."28 As in Freud, and
in Rousseau, the entry to ethical life and to history
depends on the positing of the sexual difference.
"[W]ithout sin there is no sexuality, and without
sexuality, no history. .,, First in sexuality is the
synthesis posited as a contradiction, but like every
contradiction it is also a task, the history of which
begins at 'the same moment, "29 The positin'g of sin is
the moment at which responsibility, and a self-
reflective relation to freedom come into the world
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through the decision to grasp the undefined
possibility of possibility felt as anxiety. At this
same moment the immediate, animal, unity of soul and
body is disrupted. It is this that makes the physical
into the sinful, a fall that can only be annulled
through repentance.
This summary of the account of the Fall in The
Concept of Anxiety provides the necessary background
for the first stage in the comprehension of Freud,
drawing on the next development of Kierkegaard's
argument. In Chapter II: 'Anxiety as Explaining
Hereditary Sin Progressively', he turns his attention
from the Fall, from Adam, to the "subsequent
individual", for whom the history of the race, and
the sexuality that is its precondition, are already
posited.30 The effect of this is that: "Anxiety in a
later individual is more reflective".3l The
individual whose first sin is committed in the
context of the history of the race has a "more" in
his or her anxiety. "Nevertheless, his anxiety is not·
anxiety about sin, for as yet the distinction between
good and evil is not, because this distinction first
comes about with the actuality of freedom."32
In discussing this the following passage occurs:
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Anxiety may be compared to dizzyness. He whose eye
happens to look down into the yawning abyss
becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It
is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss,
for suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety
is the dizzyness of freedom, which emerges when
the spirit looks down into its own possibility,
laying hold of finiteness to support itself.
Freedom succumbs in this dizzyness.33
The argument presented here is that this anxiety is
present in the writing of Freud, and is the secret of
the difficulties, limitations, and absurdities
discussed in the previous chapter. When considering
the relations of freedom, authority, and desire,
freedom succumbs. The abyss of possibility presents
itself in Freud in the awful figure of the primal
father, and the finitude that is grasped expresses
itself most clearly in the rigidities of the sex
roles he describes, and most especially the passive,
masochistic femininity which he prescribes in a text
such as 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'.
The "something that the nothing of anXiety may
signify in the subsequent individual"34 is above all
sexualitY.35 "[S]pirit is found at the extreme point
of the difference of the synthesis in such a way that
that spirit is not merely qualified as body but 8S
body with a gener tc ' di fference. "36 Anxiety' is present
in the erotic not because it is sinful but because
"spirit cannot participate in the culmination of the
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erotic."37 Sexuality is the moment when the synthesis
comes closest to its extreme, and when spirit, as the
relation to the relation is displaced. Hence it is
anxious. 38
In Freud the key locus of anxiety, as argued in the
previous chapter, is the castration complex. This was
shown to be the terror of feminisation. In the terms
established in the present chapter this is the moment
when identity, established through the accident of
the generic difference, is put into question.
Possibility and contingency are concentrated by the
encounter with the father's word of prohibition, and
by the pOSiting as real and as threatening of the
generic difference, of the extreme of the synthesis
as The Concept of Anxiety expresses it. In this
moment spirit is confronted with the abyss, grasps at
the finite, its sex, and succumbs in anxiety.
This is the first expression for the diagnosis of
Freudian anxiety offered here within the frame of
Kierkegaardian psychology. Below it will be more
fully developed through a closer consideration of the
problem of guilt, so'central in Freud, and so closely
tied to the problem of sin. This will be approached
through a reading of Chapter III of The Concept of
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Anxiety 'Anxiety as the Consequence of that Sin which
is Absence of the Consciousness of Sin'.
In the third chapter of The Concept of Anxiety an
account is given of the types and objects of anxiety
proper to different shapes of spirit: of modern
"spiritlessness"; of Greek paganism; and of biblical
Judaism. In each of these a form of anxiety is
present, although none is innocent. In modern
spiritlessness, which is not of great concern here,
spirit has been excluded, and anxiety is "waiting".39
It is with the second and third that the further
comprehension of Freudian anxiety begins. These deal
with paganism and Judaism under the headings:
'Anxiety Defined Dialectically as Fate' and; 'Anxiety
Defined Dialectically as Guilt'. These sections form
an equivalent to the history of religion presented in
Moses and Monotheism, where the event that posits
guilt is recalled, brought into the present, so that
its power may be cancelled. The differences in them
allow insight into the way Kierkegaard's insistence
on freedom and responsibility in relation to sin and
guilt, ,and the different notion of freedom involved
in this, allow an overcoming of Freud's limits.
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As the chapter title 'Anxiety as the Consequence of
that Sin which is Absence of the Consciousness of
Sin' indicates, it turns its attention away from the
first sin to the state from which new sin emerges. It
examines the state of anxiety to be found after
spirit is posited as "an unwarranted actuality".40 In
this situation the relation of anxiety is still to
nothing, but to a nothing that is still "more" than
it was for the subsequent individual in the previous
chapter. "[W]hat does the nothing of anxiety signify
more particularly in paganism? This is fate."41
"Fate is a relation to spirit as external. It is a
relation between spirit and something else that is
not spirit and to which fate nevertheless stands in a
spiritual relation."42 Fate is at once the necessary
and the accidental, and thus the pagan "cannot come
into a relation with fate, because in the one moment
it is the necessary and in the next it is the
accidental."43 The profound moment of expression for
this is the oracle. In the ambiguous word of the
oracle fate is brought into relation with the
individual, but in the impossibility of comprehension
remains out of reach. The pagan does not dare to
forbear consulting the oracle, but: "Even in the
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moment of consultation, he stands in an ambiguous
relation to it (sympathetic and antipathetic)."44
Having introduced the idea of fate those of guilt and
sin emerge. "The concepts of guilt and sin in their
deepest sense do not emerge in paganism. If they had
emerged, paganism would have perished upon the
contradiction that one became guilty by fate."45 The
relevance of this to Freud is immediately apparent.
In the story of the Oedipus complex, especially when
the "archaic heritage" is recalled in the central
importance he accorded to it, this "contradiction"
emerges. Through the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex the individual takes on the guilt inherited
from the history of the race and re-enacts it.
At the end of this section this point will be
reiterated in the context of the anthropology
developed in The Concept of Anxiety, where each
individual is "simultaneously both himself and the
whole race".46 this idea, intimately bound up with
the concept of repetition, will be contrasted with
the Freudian anthropology, and their different
concepts of the relation to history examined.
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The importance of guilt ia clearer in the concluding
section of Chapter III of The Concept of Anxiety,
'Anxiety Dialectically Defined as Guilt. '47 This
takes as its object biblical Judaism, and the claim
is made that 'The anxiety found in Judaism is about
guilt."48 While it may be that Kierkegaard has
misunderstood Judaism, or has anachronistically
brought biblical Judaism into the present'49 it
should not be forgotten that this section of ~
Concept of Anxiety is not concerned exclusively with
Judaism. The lengthy discussion of the "genius who is
religious"50 makes clear that the anxious relation to
guilt has a much more general scope.
.'
As Kierkegaard notes, it may seem "paradoxical" to
make guilt the object of anxiety. It would appear to
be a "something" in too strong a sense. His answer to
this is that precisely the relation of anxiety to it
makes it a nothing. If guilt is actually entered into
a relation with then the relation is repentance, and
not anxiety. Anxiety maintains its characteristic
ambiguity: "while anxiety fears, it maintains a
subtle communication with its object, cannot look
away from it, indeed will not, for if the individual
wills it, repentance is there."51
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The genius who is religious has turned inward and
found freedom. "To the degree he discovers freedom,
to that same degree the anxiety of sin is upon him in
the state of possibility. He fears only guilt because
guilt alone can deprive him of freedom."52 This is so
because of the way freedom is conceived. As before it
is distinguished from the negation of necessity,
which is said to be a "category of reflection", and
from "force", "something entirely different".53
Freedom, in this form, is still related anxiously to
guilt: "The relation of freedom to guilt is anxiety,
because freedom and guilt are only possibilities."54
This anxiety is also "ambiguous" or ambivalent in its
relation to its object. Its anxious preoccupation is
also a fascination. Comparing this to the anxiety
experienced by Adam Kierkegaard writes:
Guilt is a more concrete conception, which becomes
more and more possible in the relation of
possibility to freedom. At last it is as if the
guilt of the whole world united to make him [the
genius who is religious] guilty, and, what is the
same, as if in becoming guilty he became guilty of
the guilt of the whole world.55
In this way the relation to guilt as external becomes
an intolerable burden. T~e very possibi~ity of being
guilty, in this objective sense, leads to the
crushing of the individuality by the total possible
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guilt. In this form of anxiety: "when freedom fears
guilt, what it fears is not to recognise itself as
guilty, if it is, but rather it fears to become
guilty"'S6 guilt is conceived as belonging to an
objectified reality. Becoming guilty in this sense
destroys the freedom which regards it as a
possibility and thus the relation of anxiety is
established. The secret of the nemesis of this
religiosity is the nothingness of the objective
guilt. The real relation of repentance, through which
the freedom sacrificed in sin can be reclaimed,
cannot be achieved. Repentance is possible only if
the guilt is made actual through the recognition of
the immediate responsibility of the individual.
The further explication of the nature of the freedom
that is at question here will be delayed until later
in this chapter, when The Sickness Unto Death, the
indispensable companion to The Concept of Anxiety,
has been addressed. Before moving on to that, which
will involve a comparison with Rousseau, the present
section concludes with a reconsideration of Freud.
In Moses. and Monotheism Freud presents a history of.
religion, which begins with the primal murder, and is
dominated by it. This event is repeated, in the
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murders of Moses and Jesus, and repressed through
their denial and the distortion of their meaning. A
progressive dimension of this history is found in the
increasingly transparent centrality of these events
in Judaism, which reinstates the primal father as the
one god, and Christianity, which acknowledges the
murder, albeit in distorted form. The end point of
the process is the Freudian recognition of this
meaning of religion, and consequent demystification.
If the overthrow of the Oedipus complex and the
freeing of the individual from the domination of the
father, ultimately of the primal father is not
possible, then some progress is. The recognition of
the paternal origin of the superego is a moment in
the "depersonalisation" that allows the mature man to
rationalise his moral identity, and to separate the
necessary from the regressive in it. While the
educative terror of the Oedipal drama is inescapable,
it can be worked through and made manageable.
The structure of the determinations of anxiety, from
Adamic innocence through to the 'Anxiety of Sin', in
the fourth chapter of The I Concept of Anxiety, offers
instructive parallels to this story. At each stage
freedom, spirit, is anxious about a possibility, the
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core of which involves a relation to an authority.
This authority stands in a deeply difficult relation
to the self, apparently external, but "actually"
internal to the very structure of spirit.
It is through the anxious relation to this object,
first the "word", secondly fate, thirdly "guilt"'S7
that the possibilities of freedom are "concentrated"
and its actualisation made possible. From this
anxious relation emerge, on the one hand desire, and
on the other prohibition. These are refined until in
the exquisite self-lacerations of the "genius who is
religious" they are recombined in the "ambiguous"
relation to guilt, conceived as an abstract state.
The release from this regressive repetition is
repentance, or faith, as in the final chapter of The.........
Concept of Anxiety 'Anxiety as Saving Through Faith'.
Here the central theme is that: "Anxiety is freedom's
possibility, and only such anxiety is through faith
absolutely educative, because it consumes all finite
ends and discovers their deceptiveness'"S8 In
plunging into this anxiety, the anxiety that takes
the possibility of freedom 'as its object and exh~usts
its infinity, the original positing of an external
object can be overcome. This anxiety will always
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over-reach the finite: "possibility is absolutely
educative. In actuality, no man ever became so
unhappy that he did not retain a little remnant •• •
But whoever took possibility's course in misfortune
lost all, all, as no one in actuality lost it."S9
This anxiety plumbs the depths of the soul plunging
the individual into the abyss in face of which
anxiety clung to the finite.60 "[W]hen the individual
through anxiety is educated unto faith, anxiety will
eradicate precisely what it brings forth itself.
Anxiety discovers fate, but just when the individual
wants to put his trust in fate, anxiety turns around
and takes fate awaY".61 The anxiety that runs through
the finite destroys the trust in fate by confronting
the individual with "the trump card of infinitY".62
"So it is also in relation to guilt, which is the
second thing anxiety discovers."63 The infinite
anxiety that lets go of the finite and faces the
possibility of freedom reorients itself in respect of
guilt. Anxiety with its insistence on the infinite
discovers the truth in the word, already given in
Chap~er III, th,t the opposite of guilt is freedom;
"guilt alone can deprive of •• freedom."64 For the
anxiety that took guilt as an external object this
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led to the hopeless flight from guilt. For the
infinitely educative anxiety it leads to repentance.
In recognising that the infinite demand of duty is
impossible, but that through a repentant faith a new
ethics can be posited, the individual is enabled to
rise again from the abyss of anxiety. This repeats
the act of freedom through which sin came into the
world, but in such a way that sin is annulled. The
education to the infinite accomplished by infinite
anxiety allows a renewed recognition of and
repentance over the fall. In this way the development
of anxiety has led back to its beginning in that that
beginning, in which freedom posited its other as
standing over it, can be reclaimed for freedom.
This is possible only because freedom is conceived of
as infinite, and that its freeing of itself from
entanglement with the finite involves its recognition
of its responsibility for itself. The fall into sin
has to be free in order that repentance can gain
purchase on sin. This responsibility derives from the
action of spirit in creating the relation, that is
the separation of'body and ·soul. This section closes
with an outline of the relevance of this conception
of freedom to the reading of Freud presented above.
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In Moses and Monotheism Freud too has set up a Fall,
which posits as external an object of anxious
subjection. This object is reincorporated into the
self through its repetition and recollection. The
self is thus freed from the posited object, religion
and the image in it of the primal father. In this can
be seen a parallel to the relation of anxiety,
freedom, the fall, and repentance outlined here. The
difference is in the impossibility of repentance in
Freud, and the impossibility on which this depends,
the impossibility of taking responsibility.
In the previous chapter of this thesis it was
demonstrated that there is a limit to the liberation
that analysis offers. The superego may be
depersonalised but it cannot be transcended. This
limit is encountered most centrally in the
enforcement of gender identity. The key to this was
found in the externality of desire, the drives, and
authority, which is archetypically another person. In
the idea of the archaic heritage this limit of
Freudianism, it was argued, turns into a collapse.
In the notion of the archaic heritage ~reud makes of .
the most formative experience a re-enactment of a
complex of events whose relation to the individual is
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a non-personal one. The Oedipal drama is simply
repeated, "repeated backwards". Kierkegaard's
excessive notion of freedom allows him to conceive of
the fall as "repeated forwards", as being radically
new for each individual, and hence as made proper to
each. It is this that allows the resurrection of
freedom in repentance. The anthropological expression
for this repetition that is equally origination is
that each is "both himself and the race".65
Every individual finds herself in a historical
situation, the fall for every subsequent individual
occurs within the context of sinfulness. The nothing
of their anxiety is a "more". It remains the case
however that only freedom can posit sin. Sin remains
the responsibility of the individual despite the
historical context and the common structures (of
which anxiety is the expression) that condition it.66
In this sense each is both himself and the race. This
relation of freedom to the finite and determined will
be further explored in the final section of this
chapter. The next examines The Sickness Unto Death
and the light it throws On the reading of Rousseau in
the first part of this thesis.
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Rousseau in Despair: The Flight From the Finite
The first section of the present chapter argued that
the notion of freedom as bursting the bounds of the
finite ego illuminates the limits of Freudian
analysis. It was suggested also that this freedom
allows the founding of a moral identity that does not
depend on the terroristic imposition of social
imperatives. This second argument will be made more
clearly in the next and last section of this chapter.
Before this it is necessary to return to the relation
of freedom and the finite. This section approaches
this by reading The Sickness Unto Death in order to
develop an understanding of the difficulties outlined
in Rousseau in the first chapters of this thesis.
..
It was argued that in Rousseau freedom is excessive
and intimately bound up with the imagination. The
te10s of freedom was a flight from the finite,
expressed in Julie's death. It was this excessive
notion of freedom that required the balance of a
bound social femininity. Moral identity became
utterly self-defining and ultimately incompatible
with sO'cia1,'indeed any merely human, "existe,:\ce.This
notion of freedom is rejected in The Sickness Unto
Death as decisively as the "clinging to the finite"
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is in The Concept of Anxiety. By following the
contours of this argument a closer approach can be
made to the idea of freedom, which will be pointed
towards in the last section of this chapter.
The sections of The Sickness Unto Death in which this
movement occurs are Part One, Section C, a, a and b,
a.67 These are entitled 'Infinitude's Despair Is to
Lack Finitude', and 'Possibility's Despair Is to Lack
Necessity'. In these it is argued that the self loses
itself in an infinitude or possibility that is not
concretised through an affirmation of the given
finitude from which it cannot leap free. this
argument then can be followed through into those
about choice and repentance that mark the decisive
developments into the two ethical or moral identities
recognised in Kierkegaard's writings, "first" and
"second" ethics. In The Sickness Unto Death a
definition of the self is offered:
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit?
Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self
is a relation that relates itself to itself or is
the relation's relating itself to itself in the
relation; the self is not the relation but is the
relation's relating itself to itself •.A human
being is a synth~sis 6f the infinite and the
finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of
freedom and necessity, in short a synthesis. A
synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in
this way, a human being is still not a self ••••
If •• the relation relates itself to itself, this
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relation is the positive third, and this is the
self·68
The various polarities in this passage are to be held
through the act of overcoming designated as "relating
the relation to itself". This establishment of
selfhood is to bring into being a synthesis that goes
beyond the coexistence or conflict of the poles. The
self is related to "another" which establishes the
relation.69 "Despair", the central focus of the text
is the failure properly to establish the relation.
"The misrelation of despair is not a simple
misrelation, but a misrelation in a relation that
relates itself to itself and has been established by
another, so that the misrelation in that relation
that is for itself also reflects itself infinitely in
the relation to the power that established it."70
Here two forms of misrelation are to be considered.
These are the denial of the finite in favour of the
infinite, and of necessity in favour of possibility.
These represent the characteristic positions adopted
by Rousseau in his conception of the infinitely
excessive soul, with its imaginative freedom and
transcendence of the limits of human existence •. ..
"The self is composed of infinitude and finitude.
However, this synthesis is a relation, and a relation
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that, even though it is derived, relates itself to
itself, which is freedom. The self is freedom. But
freedom is the dialectical aspect of the categories
of possibility and necessitY."71 This statement at
the beginning of 'The Forms of This Sickness
(Despair)', Section C of The Sickness Unto Death,
encapsulates the notion of freedom that, this thesis
argues, offers the possibility of transcending the
thought of both Freud and of Rousseau. The way in
which the relation of the self to itself goes beyond
the finite self of Freudianism has already been set
out. In reading two of the sub-sections of Section C
the escapism of Rousseau will be considered.
To become oneself is to become concrete. But to
become concrete is neither to become finite nor to
become infinite, for that which is to become
concrete is a synthesis. Consequently, the
progress of the becoming must be an infinite
moving away from the self in the infinitizing of
the self, and an infinite coming back to itself in
the finitizing process.72
It is with the second of these that the present
section is concerned, the importance of the
infinitizing of the self having been argued in the
previous section on Freud. The "infinite coming back
to itself in the finitizing process" is the subject
of the sub-section 'Infinitude's Despair Is to Lack
Fin~tude'.73 This form of despair is closely linked
i~ the text to'imagi~ation: . .
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As a rule, imagination is the medium for the
process of infinitizing ••• Imagination is
infinitizing reflection ••• The self is
reflection, and the imagination is reflection, is
the rendition of the self as the self's
possibility •••• The fantastic is generally that
which leads a person out into the infinite in such
a way that that it only leads him away from
himself and thereby prevents him from coming back
to himself.74
This admirably captures a process traced in Chapter
One of this thesis in the work of Rousseau. Rousseau
conceived of freedom and imagination as almost
identical. For Rousseau imagination was the primary
faculty of freedom. The finite became a mere limit to
the free soul, for which the unlimited possibility of
imagination was the real stuff of existence beside
which the limits of the actual became a pale and
insubstantial realm. The two texts in which this
process reached a climax were on the one hand the
relatively early La Nouvelle Heloise and on the other
the very late Reveries of a Solitary Stroller.
In the Reveries Rousseau returns repeatedly to the
impossibility reconciling his imaginative nature and
his independence with the constraints of social and
of merely human life. He aspires to the condition of
Godlike independence which he ascribes to the
disembodied soul and sees this prefigured in the
perfected state of reverie. The clearest statement of
this is to be found in the celebrated Fifth Walk.
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It was argued above in Chapter Three that in La
Nouvelle Heloise this tendency in the thought of
Rousseau reaches a climax in the flight of Julie from
the everyday, of which she has the status of supreme
spokeswoman and exemplar, into the life of the soul.
Her death is figured as the liberation of her
exceptional soul from the limits imposed by the
finite. In Julie the soul, with its imaginative
freedom bursts the bonds of the earthly, having first
explored their outer limits in Julie's experience of
sexual love and of family and community.
It is this logic of excess that Kierkegaard, through
Anti-Climacus, attacks and undermines in the sections
of The Sickness Unto Death under consideration.
Having argued that to reject finitude is a form of
despair the text returns to a similar theme in the
polarity necessity/possibility:
Just as finitude is is the limiting aspect in
relation to finitude, so also necessity is the
constraint in relation to possibility. Inasmuch as
the self as a synthesis of finitude and infinitude
is established, is kata dynamin [potential], in
order to become itself it reflects itself in the
medium of imagination, and thereby the infinite
potential becomes manifest. The self is kata
dynamin [potentially] just 'as possible as it is
necessary, for it is indeed itself, but it has the
task of becoming itself. Insofar as it is itself,
it is the necessary, and insofar as it has the
task of becoming itself, it is the possible.75
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This becoming itself is the task of every self. The
accident of being precisely the individuality that it
is is essential to the essence of that individuality,
despite the infinitising action of reflection. True
freedom can only be won through the recognition of
this necessity, of the impossibility of beginning
elsewhere than where one is, of jumping out of this
position. To refuse this movement, which in other of
Kierkegaard's texts is the movement of faith'76 or in
a limited form is the act of "choosing oneself"'77 is
to despair, to refuse to be oneself.
[I]f possibility outruns necessity so that the
self runs away from itself in possibility, it has
no necessity to which it is to return; this is
possibility's despair. This self becomes an
abstract possibility, it flounders around in
possibility until it is exhausted, but it neither
moves from the place where it is nor arrives
anywhere, for necessity is literally the place
where it is. To become is a movement away from
that place but to become oneself is a movement in
that place.78
If Julie was the exemplar of the despair of the
infinite, a despair none the less despairing for not
recognising itself as such'79 her lover is the
epitome of the despair of abstract possibility. As
noted in the discussion of their affair above, he is
without .ccrme ctLon , ·witholiltnecessity. It is for this
reason that Julie assumes such overwhelming
importance for him. He is the paradigm of the
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isolated and rootless masculinity that is normative
in Rousseau, as in the Second Discourse and the
autobiographical and introspective writings. He is
defined by the abstract possibility of his
imaginative freedom, but has nothing on which to act.
This despair surfaces repeatedly in the course of the
novel. The most striking occasions are the scene at
Meillerie, when his threat of suicide finally breaks
Julie's resistance, his discussion of killing himself
after his exile from Switzerland and Julie's marriage
to Wolmar, and finally his collapse after Julie's
death. On each of these occasions the dependence on
Julie for attachment to the world is acutely and
explicitly set out. Kierkegaard's notion of the self,
and of freedom as synthesis allows the diagnosis of
this as despair, as the misrelation that stresses one
pole to the exclusion of the other.
The final section of this chapter will examine
certain other of Kierkegaard's writings in order to
begin to fill in the concept of faith without which
those of anxiety, despair and freedom cannot be
undeistood, .and tc examine briefly the implications
of this for the understanding of the ethical and
especially of the significance of sexual difference.
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Freedom, Faith and the Ethical
In the Judge's writings on marriage, especially that
in Stages on Life's Way, is demonstrated an account
of the relation of love, freedom, and ethical life
which offers a starting point for going beyond the
opposition of Rousseau and Freud, escapist
imaginative freedom and resigned acceptance of
limits. In arguing for the action of will in the
either/or which transforms romantic love into
conjugal love the Judge breaks with the sterile
counterposition of freedom and the given and allows
an understanding of the ethical as the beginning from
the given in freedom. Since he puts such stress on
marriage and thus on the sexual relation this is
particularly valuable in the context of this thesis.
However it is important to recall that the Judge is
not his own author and to place his writing in the
context of the authorship. This is to be achieved by
setting out some of the criticisms of his position
that are possible from the points of view of other of
the pseudonyms. These will centre particularly on the
.relation o~ the ethical and the ·r~ligious,.but there"
are implications of this for his account of the
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relation of the sexes in marriage that are crucial
for the argument of this thesis.
The Judge identifies himself firmly as a spokesman
for the "ethical" as opposed to the "aesthetic". For
him the transition from the latter into the former is
essentially the either/or in which the individual
asserts his freedom in the act of choice, the
absolute choice that brings into existence good and
evil. In discussing this the Judge invokes the
category of despair, which has already appeared above
in the discussion of The Sickness Unto Death, and
which the Judge too argues can only be overcome
through faith.
The Judge's faith though is essentially an ethical
faith, and for this reason falls under the category
of despair in the text of Anti-Climacus. His primary
category is not faith but choice, the will and not
grace is to extricate the individual from despair. To
quote him: "in choosing absolutely I choose despair,
and in choosing despair I choose the absolute, for I
myself am the absolute, I posit the absolute and I
myself am th~'absoluie;:but in complete identity with
this I can say that I choose the absolute which
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chooses me, that I posit the absolute which posits
"me .80.
This absolute self is freedom, as in The Concept of
Anxiety. The absolute in the self cannot be anything
finite, it must be the absolute (not, be it noted the
infinite, as in The Concept of Anxiety) of freedom.
Thus far the Judge is at one with the pseudonyms
already considered, except for the use of the terms
"choice" and "the absolute". This conformity
continues when he notes that this absolute choice is
nonetheless necessarily choice precisely of oneself:
that which is chosen does not exist, and comes
into existence with the choice; that which is
chosen exists, otherwise there would not be a
choice. For in that case what I chose did not
exist but absolutely came into existence with the
choice. I would not be choosing but creating; but
I do not create myself, I choose myself.a1
In the awkwardness of this passage is expressed the
difficulty of the Judge's position, a difficulty
posed in the 'Ultimatum' of Either/Or 'The
Edification Implied in the Thought That As Against
God We Are Always in the Wrong', and which works
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itself through in Stages on Life's Way as the
slackening of the tension of his thought in the
direction of an accommodation with the aesthetic.
This difficulty is in the conception of the relation
of man and God, the ethical and the religious. The
"choice" in which the individual is to posit himself
is an act of the individual himself. In essence it is
the act of creation that the Judge disclaims. His
position in Either/Or is one where the individual
posits himself out of nothing. It is a divinisation
of the self.
This is in contradiction with the emphasis on the
ethical that is equally prominent in that text. The
resolution of this difficulty, so similar to that
encountered in Rousseau, is parallel to that of the
earlier writer. The Judge's wife is the guarantor of
the grounding of his "absolute" self. It is for this
reason that the first of his two contributions to
Either/Or is concerned with the 'Aesthetic validity
of Marriage'. The choice especially of love, of the
object of love, and of a woman as that object are to
give his absolute choice finite "validity".
This is expressed particularly in his wife's Silence,
her invocation only as object, as "supplement" to the
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judge. In both the 'Aesthetic Validity' and the
'Reflections on Marriage' in Stages on Life's Way the
crucial importance of his wife to the Judge's image
of himself as living an ethical life is clear:
"Through her I am Man, for only a married man is an
authentic man; compared with this any other title is
nothing and actually presupposes this."S2
In his stress on the "act of choice" as positing the
self, and the distinction between good and evil, the
Judge comes close to an appreciation of the real
significance of the religious, but stops short of it.
A first glimpse of this shortfall can be gained from
a comparison of his writing with that of Johannes de
Silentio in Fear and Trembling. Here the ethical and
the religious are put into an opposition so complete
that an exorbitant "teleological suspension of the
ethical" is declared. This throws into stark relief
the complacency and limitation of the ethics of the
Judge, with his confidence in the realisability of
the contradictory self-positing of his act of choice.
The silent one observes faith and suffers its
difference from any act of will. It is this that
makes him establish such a gulf between the ethical
univer.sal, which is comp~~hensible and the religious
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universal, which is comprehensible and the religious
relation to the absolute, which is not. He sees
Abraham's faith in terms of a supreme act of
strength, of a willing beyond the limits of will. It
is this which inspires such awe in him. The
possibility of such a singular and immediate relation
to the divine seems to him so overpowering that it
cancels the merely human obligations of community,
the foundation for ethical life.
Here he stands at once close to and infinitely far
from the Judge. Like him Johannes has seen faith, his
equivalent of the act of choice as a (the) human
achievement. He has gone beyond him in recognising
the explosive force of the absolute. For the Judge
the absolute stands guarantor for the universal
(echoes of Julie), for Johannes it cannot be
contained by, and destroys it (echoes of her lover).
Fear and Trembling is predicated on this inability of
Johannes to grasp the nature, the possibility, of
faith, and hence of real freedom.SO As shown above
this freedom cancels, annuls, sin through the
movement of repentance •.The condition of re~entanca
is faith and Johannes' wrestling with this allows an
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exploration of its paradoxes, and especially of its
relation to the ethical.
For Johannes faith is an exceptional achievement
which makes Abraham great.al He is right that
Abraham's case is exceptional, but by taking it as at
once this and as the archetype of faith he exposes
himself to a temptation which may be compared to that
of Abraham, the nature of which he sets out so
clearlY.82 In making faith so difficult Johannes
makes possible his own remaining at the point of
resignation·a3
Johannes is right to see faith as exceeding the
ethical, understood in the Judge's way, in terms of
duty and of the merely human, but in making faith an
exceptional act of a "hero" he makes it seem as if
amny, or most are condemned to either the merely
ethical, or to the standpoint of resignation. What is
more the nature of "second ethics" of religious
ethics" is obscure. Johannes makes clear that Abraham
receives Isaac again, but the return to the ethical
from its suspension in the movement of faith is
unclear, despite the idsistence on the difference
between faith and resignation. It appears that this
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The text in which these difficulties are, if not
resolved, at least comprehended, is the great Works
of Love, arguably the summation of the religious,
acknowledged, works. Here the excessive action of
divine grace appears as the necessary corollary and
support of faith, a movement that can be divined in
the profound irony of the Concluding Unscientific
postscript. In Works of Love the element of surrender
in faith is clear, as opposed to the view of faith as
achievement that dominates Fear and Trembling.
Works of Love is concerned with the "second ethics":
the ethics of the commandment to love. Section II
reflects on the commandment "Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thyself", and in the course of this
reflection throws light on faith and on love that
illuminates many of the problems of this thesis. The
great paradox of this commandment is the bringing
together of love and conmand. Love in its "immediate"
or erotic manifestation can recognise no authority
above it.S7 However "only when love is a duty, only
then is love eternally secure"88
This fusion of duty and inclination is the secret of
the second ethics, and can be brought about only
throug~ the double movement of faith, observe~ but
CHAPTER SIX page 307
This fusion of duty and inclination is the secret of
the second ethics, and can be brought about only
through the double movement of faith, observed but
not comprehended in Fear and Trembling. In Works of
Love the weakness in the idea of faith as
achievement, prominent in Johannes' account is spelt
out in its connection with love: "if someone wished
to test whether he has faith, or tried to get faith,
then this will really mean that he will hinder
himself in acquiring faith; he will become a victim
of the restless craving where faith is never won, for
'thou shalt believe'"S6 This position is that of
Johannes, who sees faith as there to be won.
Faith is, as is here indicated, submission to the
coinmanment, "thou shalt believe", or "thou shalt
love", it is not victory but surrender. This echoes
the Judge, with his insight that one must choose
onself but displaces the act of choice. The positing
of onself through the act of choice is, rather, a
free acceptance of the self. Freedom, human freedom,
is infinite only in relation to the absolute, an idea
that echoes Fear and Trembling, with the difference
th&i·this relation is,there and need only be
acquiesced in.
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Kierkegaard is quite clear that Christianity has
displaced earthly love, that the selfless commanded
love of the neighbour is to be given prioritY.92 The
truly ethical love cannot be the partiality of any
earthly love, even the Judge's apparently dutiful and
"infinitely reflected" marital love. It must be love
of the neighbour, the love that gives up the self.93
It might be thought that this love, in refusing all
partiality destroys the specificity of the loved one,
reduces him or her to anonymity. This is the reverse
of the case found if its relation to erotic love is
examined closely. In both Freud, the scientific
analyst of Eros, and Rousseau, his effusive
spokesman, love is essentially dependent on illusion
and projection. In Kierkegaard 'Love Believeth all
Things - and Yet is never Deceived'.9l The love that
is prepared to love despite all need not distort and
misperceive the loved object. That object can. in
this love, be as he or she is. This love can love its
object without illusion.
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Conclusion
In Freud the finite ego was subjected to the Law
through the terror of the Oedipal drama. The denial
of the excessive moment of freedom, of the necessary
excess of any such self, led to the impossibility of
conceiving of the immanent relation to morality which
has been designated here by the notion of an
ambivalence of authority and desire. Such an
ambivalence has been shown to exist in Kierkegaard's
psychology of anxiety. Here desire and authority both
emerge out of an original relation to a self which is
definable only in terms of freedom.
This notion of the self further allows a rethinking
of the nature and significance of guilt. Guilt, as
primary phenomenon of morality and of civilisation
has a prominent place in Freud's thought, but is
decisively separated from responsibility. The self
becomes guilty as part of its education, but cannot
be held accountable for. that guilt. This thought
underlies the resigned acceptance of renunciation as
the dynamic of civilisation.
In Kierkegaard the idea of the infinite movement of
freedom, and of spirit as synthesis, leads to an idea
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of history as task. In its profound connection to
sexuality and the generic difference this also
implies the notion of gender as a task. this thought
is suggested also through the going beyond the Judge
that is necessitated when the "suspension of the
ethical" is considered seriously.
The "ethical stage" of which the Judge is the
representative, is not erased by the religious, but
rather is taken into it and transformed. All the
stages are coexistent. This means that marriage and
family as the transformation of the erotic into the
ethical remain important, but that they are
transformed in turn by faith and by the commanded
neighbour love.
Sexual and moral identity are both thrown into
question by this movement and become a task for which
each individual is (absolutely) responsible. As
history provided the context for anxiety so it does
here, but as there each must take up what they are
and own it. This perspective, it is argued here,
provides a framework within which the necessary
renegotiation of gender, ethics and moral identity
may take place.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that if the
conception of the self falls into either of the poles
of the "misrelation in the synthesis" that run
systematically through The Sickness Unto Death then
this will express itself in the thought of the sexual
difference. If the self falls into despair in its
relation to itself then this fundamental dimension of
ethical identity will show it. The false conception
of the self will call up its dialectical partner in
its sexual other. Rousseau's masculinity, flying into
the ether of infinite possibility posits bound and
heteronomous femininity; Freud's masculine ego,
finding a finite identity in the internalisation of
social law reflects itself in amoral and anti-social
Medusa.
In the difficult and risky notion of faith, of a self
grounding itself unthinkably on a paradox, is an
alternative to these thoughts. It has been argued
here that through a reading of Kierkegaard an
approximation may be found to this notion, but, with
Kierkegaard, this thesis finds that this movement
cannot be stated. Whether it can be made is a
question beyond its bounds.
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Some indications have been given of the direction in
which a thought that turned from Kierkegaard to
gender could proceed. The reality and importance of
the sexual difference, its absolute necessity in
constituting an ethical subject, would be recognised,
but "suspended". Spirit takes a relation to its
gender, is not defined by it. Sex becomes a task, not
a fate. The concrete expression of this change from
fate to task is an existential and historic question,
in which reflection has its part but cannot legislate
for or preempt experience.
Central to this must be a reflection on and a
transformation of desire, love, and their relation.
In the reading of Freud it was suggested that an ego
which went beyond itself would of necessity desire in
ways that could not be thought within Freudianism. In
the final chapter some approach was made to the idea
of the commandment to love and its implications.
These would be the starting points for any thought of
how to assume the task of gender. 'This thought,
however, would be nothing without the faith to embark
upon it.
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8 It is this that is given greatest prominence in
Lacanian theory, where the idea of the "imaginary
ego" is so important.
9 PFL11 439
10 PFL12 254-5
11 An Outline of Psychoanalysis PFL15 381 cf
Civilisation and its Discontents PFL12 25412 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' PFL11 131.
Ricoeur gives a good account of this Freud and
Philosophy (trans. D. Savage) New Haven and London:
Yale University Press 1970, 274f.
13 ibid 133-4 cf 'Formulations on the Two Principles
of Mental Functioning' (1911) ibid. 40
14 cf eg 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the
Theory of Dreams' PFL11 239. Again Ricoeur is good on
this, pp261-81.
15 'Instincts and Their Vicissitudes' PFL11 134
16 Civilisation and its Discontents PFL12 254
17 PFLll 69
18 The Ego and the Id PFL11 387
19 The Ego and the Id PFL11 368
20 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' PFL11 81
21 ibid. editor's note.
22 ibid 80-1
23 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12135
24 PFL7 145n.1
25 see eg New Introductory Lectures 86
26 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12
Group PSfCho!ogy
treats 0 it.
89
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134
27 ibid.
28 ibid 134-529 The Ego and the Id PFL11 368. Brown N.O. Life
A ainst Death: The Ps choana1 tical Meanin ~
History Lon on: Routle ge & Kegan Pau ,6f is
perceptive on the tensions in this distiction. cf,
however, fn 57 below.30 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12
13531 eg The Ego and the Id PFL12 373
32 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego
PFL12 13433 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' PFL12 88
34 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' PFL7 315
35 The Ego and the Id PFL11 371, cf Group Psychology
and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12 134
36 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' PFL7 316
37 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' PFL7 318
38 Civilisation and its Discontents PFL12 322
39 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12
156
40 ibid.
41 ibid. 154-6
42 Totem and Taboo PFL12 83
43 ibid. 90
44 ibid 89
45 ibid. 192
46 ibid. 116
47 ibid. 117
48 ibid. 125
49 ibid. 185-6
50 ibid. 203
51 ibid. 204
52 PFL10 11053 Accounts of the development of Freud's theory of
the instincts can be found in Bibring E. 'The
Development and Problems of the Theory of the
Instincts' International Journal of Psycho-analysis
22 (1941) and in the'Nagera volume.
54 PFL7 155
55 PFL7 82-4
56 PFL7 45
57 PFL10 110-12. This thesis argues that ambivalence
Ls. ,the key to Freud's. thought, and thus rejects
arguments such as Brown's (eg 56-7, 76f) that argue
for an instinctual monism in the interest of a
Utopian politics.
58 PFL7 112
59 PFL15 153
60 see particularly PFL12 38-9
61 PFL11 68
62 PFL11 70-1
63 PFL12 309
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64 PFL1 469-70
65 cf eg PFL15 123
66 PFL7 7167 PFL7 11n.1 The editor's introduction to
Civilisation and its Discontents in the Penguin
edition (PFL12 247-9) gives a useful summary of this
issue, which is more extensively covered by Bibring
68 PFL11 n2
69 PFL11 130-38
70 PFL11 137
71 PFL7 82-3
72 PFL11 116
73 ibid.74 As in 'Formulations on the Two Principles of
Mental Functioning' (1911)
75 PFL11 120
76 PFL11 132
77 PFL11 32578 Bibring would seem to be the first to have put
forward this schema, which is, eg, followed by those
contributing to Nagera's volume on the instincts.
79 such as those of Marcuse, Brown, Ricoeur and Rieff
80 Boothby's recent book on the death instinct is a
good example of this.
81 PFL12 318-2082 cf. 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' PFL11 122
and Introductor! Lectures on psychoanalysis PFLI 463.
83 PFLII 275-29
84 ibid. 304
85 PFL11 308 Freud's emphasis
86 ibid. 309 Freud's emphasis
87 ibid. 311. Marcuse Eros and Civilisation London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul 1987 stresses the internal
relation of the instincts. eg p29.
88 PFL11 313
89 PFLII 316
90 ibid. 323
91 Civilisation and its Discontents PFL12 324
92 ibid. 325
93 ibid 318
94 ibid 327. cf Marcuse Ch 4 on civilisation and the
superego.
95 ibid. 321
96 ibid.302
97 ibid. 313
98 PFL15 406 Abramson, in his The Limits of
Liberation, takes up this theme, but develops in the
direction of politics rather than, as here, towards
an ontology of freedom. These approaches should be
seen as complementary rather than opposed
alternatives.
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Chapter Five
1 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' PFL11 86
2 ibid. 88
3 ibid. 95
3 The Ego and the Id PFL11 371-2
5 'The Infantile Genital Organisation' (1923) PFL7
310 .
6 ibid 309
7 SE23 250-3. Since the 1970s there has been a
growing body of work, most of it feminist, that has
explored and criticised the Freudian theory of
femininity. The classic work remain Juliet Mitchell's
Psychoanalysis and Feminism, although it has been
criticised, notably, from a more rigorously Lacanian
position, by Jane Gallop in her Feminism and
Psychoanalysis. This thesis does not depart radically
from the consensus interpretation that has grown up,
but it makes connections to the ethical that have not
previously been developed.
8 ibid. 250
9 PFL7 317
10 Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis PFL1 416
11 PFL7 193-5 and PFL8 268 and 288
12 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' PFL7 318
13 ibid 319
14 PFL10 269
15 'Female Sexuality' PFL7 376
16 PFL7 375
17 PFL7 342
18 cf eg '"Civilised" Sexual Morality' (1908) where
the lack of capacity for sublimation of women is
mentioned (PFL12 47)
19 PFL11 415
20 ibid. 416
21 ibid.
22 references to these are given in the Editor's
introduction in the PFL edition. The most important
previous treatment was in '"A Child is Being Beaten"'
(1919) PFL10 163ff
23 ibid 418
24 ibid. 424
2S PFL1S 429
26 New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 15127 ibid 152
28'ibid 382
29 ibid 381
30 ibid 382
31 eg New Introductory Lectures on pSfchoanal*sis 161
32 eg Three Essays on SexualIty PFL7 14-5 if e
Sexual Theories of Children PFL7 198-200
33 eg 'Female Sexuality PFL7 376-734 PFL11 424
35 ibid. 423
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36 ibid. 420-1
37 SE23 242-4
38 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' PFL11 422
39 ibid.
40 PFL12 322
41 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' PFL11 424
42 PF111 88
43 PFL13 364
44 PFL12 155-6
45 ibid. 156
46 Totem and Taboo PFL13 202
47 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12
156
48 Totem and Taboo PFL13 202
49 Moses and Monotheism PFL13 325
50 Totem and Taboo PFL13 187-193
51 Moses and Monotheism PFL13 345
52 PFL1 41853 PFL7 334, cf also 'A Case of Paranoia Running
Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease'
(1915) PFL10 154, 'The Question of Lay Analysis'
(1926) PFL15 312, and'An Outline of Psychoanalysis'
PFL15 399 amongst others.
54 PFL13 83
55 PFL7 315
56 'Female Sexuality' PFL7 378
57 Three Essays on Sexua1itr PFL7 145
58 The full descrIption wII be found on PFL7 235
59 ibid.
60 ibid 236
61 Schwartz gives a good account of this 107-108 In
Spurs, Derrida makes a similar claim for Nietzsche,
In a profoundly interesting study of femininity and
the question of style.
62 Confessions 20
63 ibId.
64 ibid 23
65 La Nouvelle Heloise I i
Chapter Six
1 The Concept of Anxiety 42 Kierkegaard's emphasis
2 ibid 44
3 ibid 25-35
4 from the sUbtitle to The Concept of Anxiety,
" '5 The Concept of'Anxiety 32
6 ibid 21
7 ibid. 15
8 ibid. 21
9 ibid. 33
10 ibid. 43
11 ibid. 41
12 ibid. 42
13 ibid.
FOOTNOTES Page 323
14 cfThe Sickness Unto Death 13
15 The Concept of Anxiety 43
16 ibid 41
17 ibid 41-2
18 ibid 41
19 The Concept of Anxiety 43-4 emphasis added.
20 ibid 44
21 ibid
22 ibid 45
23 ibid
24 ibid 47
25 ibid 49
26 ibid 48
27 ibid 111
28 ibid 49
29 ibid
30 ibid 52
31 ibid
32 ibid
33 ibid 61
34 ibid 62
35 ibid 67
36 ibid 68
37 ibid 71
38 ibid 72
39 ibid 96
40 ibid 111
41 ibid 96
42 ibid
43 ibid 97
44 ibid
45 ibid
46 ibid 28
47 ibid 103
48 ibid 104
49 This argument is forcefully made by Gillian Rose
in The Broken Middle
50 ibid 107-110
51 ibid 108
52 ibid
53 ibid
54 ibid 109
55 ibid
56 ibid 108-9
57 This summary simplifies a much more extensive
structure, but for present purposes iS'adequate
58 ibid 155
59 ibid 158
60 ibid
61 ibid 159
62 ibid 160
63 ibid 161
64 ibid 108 \
65 The Concept of Anxiety 28
FOOTNOTES Page 324
66 ibid 52-4
67 pp 30-3 and 35-7
68 The Sickness Unto Death 13
69 ibid
70 ibid 14
71 ibid 29
72 ibid 30
73 ibid
74 ibid 30-1
75 ibid 35
76 especially in Fear and TremblinC where themovement of faith is incomprehensi Ie in its
isolation from grace
77 in the writings of Judge William in Either/Or and
Stages on Life's Way, which, like Fear and Trembling,
present a misunderstanding of the movement by
ascribing it to man alone.
78 ibid 35-6
79 cf ibid 42 f.
80 eg Fear and Trembling p36-7
81 ibid 16-17
82 ibid 59-60 It might be argued that Kierkegaard
himself succumbed to this temptation in his late
attack on Christendom.
83 ibid 34
84 Works of Love p25-7
85 ibid 27 SKis emphasis
86 ibid 28 SK's emphasis
87 ibid 37
88 ibid
89 ibid 43
90 ibid 45
91 ibid 182
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